Personal Security for High Networth Individuals: Fake Police

Personal Security for High Networth Individuals: Fake Police

Personal security for high networth individuals when the threat wears a badge

Personal security for high networth individuals has to deal with a hard question that many people never think about: what do you do when someone who looks like a police officer tells you to get into a car? For almost everyone, the right answer is to cooperate with real police. For criminals who study wealthy people, that instinct is the opening. This week, police in Lucknow, India, made two more arrests in a case that shows exactly how it is used.

On Monday, October 19, 2026, police in Lucknow arrested two men wanted in the abduction of an antique dealer who, according to police, had been forced into a car by a gang impersonating police officers. The Times of India reported that the gang allegedly approached the businessman near his office, showed forged identity cards and forced him into a vehicle under the pretext of official questioning, then made him call his family to arrange money for his release. Six other suspects had been arrested in September. The same week, News24 reported that a man in the Free State province of South Africa had been kidnapped during a carjacking while sitting in his vehicle, and that his kidnappers had demanded a ransom of R3 million from his family.

Neither victim is a household name, and I am not going to speculate about the people charged beyond what police have said. Both cases are allegations under investigation. But the pattern they show is one I see in protective work around the world: the vehicle and the short walk to it are where many abductions begin, and a false claim of authority is one of the oldest ways to get a target to step into a car without a struggle.

This article supports the sections on vehicles, arrivals and departures and on working with law enforcement in our complete 2026 overview of high net worth security. That pillar piece explains where abductions start and how high net worth security connects the home, the car and the office. Here I want to go further into one specific scenario: interception away from home, by people who claim to be police or who simply take the car with you inside it.

If you are concerned about people who claim authority at your front door, read our piece on home security for high net worth individuals at the door. This article stays on the street, at the office curb and inside the vehicle.

Dark sedan with a driver at the wheel waits at a quiet city curb at dusk as a protection agent seen from behind watches

Key takeaways

  • Personal security for high networth individuals should include a plan for being stopped or approached by people who claim to be police, because real police deserve cooperation and fake police rely on it.
  • In Lucknow, police said the gang approached the businessman near his office, displayed forged police identity cards and forced him into a vehicle under the pretext of questioning.
  • Police also alleged that one of the accused knew the victim through the antique trade and tipped off the others about his valuables, and that the gang carried out reconnaissance of his movements first.
  • In the Free State, the victim was sitting in his vehicle when two men accosted him. His car was found abandoned about 5 kilometers away, and a ransom demand followed the next day.
  • The ransom in Lucknow was handed over by the victim’s own driver. Staff who might be asked to deliver money need a rule for that moment.
  • Verifying a police stop safely is possible. It needs to be agreed in advance, not improvised at the roadside.
  • Recommended HNW security teams plan movements around the transition points where interception happens, not just the drive in between.

What happened in Lucknow

I will stay with what has been reported by named publications and attributed to named officers. The accused are entitled to the presumption of innocence.

The approach near the office

The Hindustan Times reported in September that at around noon on September 12, 2026, businessman Sudarshan Ghosh was allegedly stopped near his office in Lucknow’s Krishna Nagar area by men posing as policemen, forced into his own car at gunpoint and driven for nearly 650 kilometers across Uttar Pradesh over the next nine hours while the gang demanded ransom from his family. Deputy Commissioner of Police Mohammed Mustaq said the accused introduced themselves as police officers and showed him forged identity cards before forcing him into his vehicle.

Nine hours in his own car

According to the same report, the gang drove the businessman toward Agra on the Agra-Lucknow Expressway and back, kept changing locations while he remained in the vehicle under threat, and stopped in Kannauj, where his driver handed over ₹13 lakh in cash along with gold and silver jewellery. They then drove him back to Lucknow and abandoned him near Shaheed Path. Police said the gang’s own SUV followed the victim’s car, that its registration plate was changed to avoid detection, and that the gang dropped three people who then followed the car in which the victim was held. The accused allegedly forced him to call his wife and ask her to arrange money from home.

The arrests

Police formed eight teams and, according to Additional Deputy Commissioner Vasanth Rallapalli, analyzed around 220 to 240 CCTV recordings. About a week after the abduction, six alleged gang members were arrested and police recovered two country-made pistols, three cartridges, ₹2.5 lakh in cash, an SUV, two forged number plates and four fake police identity cards, the Hindustan Times reported.

On Monday, October 19, The Times of India reported, a joint team of Krishna Nagar police and the Southern Zone Surveillance Cell arrested two more men who had been absconding and carried rewards of ₹25,000 each. Police said ₹1.34 lakh in cash was recovered from them, and described the case as part of an investigation into an interstate network involved in kidnapping and extortion.

How the target was chosen

The details on target selection matter for every family I work with. The Times of India reported that investigators said the gang targeted the businessman after collecting information about his business and financial condition, and that interrogation indicated the group identified people believed to have substantial wealth. Police alleged that one of the two men arrested on Monday had prior links with the antique trade, knew the victim and tipped off other members about valuables he possessed. The suspects then conducted reconnaissance of his movements before the abduction. Police said the two men had recently returned to Lucknow and were detained while allegedly seeking another target.

What happened in the Free State

News24 reported on Sunday, October 18, that Nadim Hoshen, 35, was kidnapped during a carjacking at about 18:00 on Tuesday at the corner of Pearson and Main streets in Villiers. A police spokesperson said the victim was sitting in his vehicle when two unknown men accosted him and took his Nissan Qashqai. The vehicle was later found abandoned about 5 kilometers away, but the victim was not found. On Wednesday, the suspected kidnappers were said to have contacted his family and demanded a ransom of R3 million for his release. At the time of the report, he had not been found and police were appealing for information.

I include this case because it shows the same structure without the uniform. The vehicle was the point of control. The victim was taken with it, the car was discarded once it had served its purpose and the demand came to the family within a day.

Why the vehicle is where so many abductions begin

When I map a principal’s week, the points of greatest exposure are rarely inside a building. They are the transitions: the walk from the office door to the car, the minute the car waits at a light outside a known address, the stop at a familiar shop, the drive along the same road at the same time each day. Both cases this week began at exactly those points. In Lucknow, the approach came near the victim’s office. In the Free State, the victim was sitting in his vehicle on a street corner.

There are practical reasons criminals choose the vehicle. It is a confined space that can be controlled with a weapon. It moves, which makes it hard for police and family to know where the victim is. It belongs to the victim, which makes it less conspicuous than a strange van. And it can be abandoned once the money is collected or the victim is moved, as the Free State car was.

A false claim of police authority adds one more advantage. It turns an abduction into something that looks, to passers-by and to the victim, like a lawful stop. Nobody intervenes when police put someone in a car. That is why the scenario deserves a plan of its own.

Personal security for high networth individuals: the fake police stop

I want to be careful here, because the overwhelming majority of police stops are genuine and deserve calm cooperation. Nothing in this article is advice to resist, argue with or flee from real officers. The point of a plan is to let a principal and a driver cooperate with genuine police while making it much harder for impostors to exploit that cooperation.

What impostors rely on

In my experience, people who impersonate police rely on three things: surprise, speed and the target’s wish to avoid a scene. They show an identity card quickly, they give a reason that sounds official, such as questioning about a business matter, and they ask the target to come with them now. The longer the interaction lasts, and the more people become involved, the worse it is for them.

What a principal can do

The principle is to slow the encounter down and bring others into it, politely. In the vehicle, that means the doors stay locked and the window opens enough to talk. The driver or principal can ask for the officer’s name and unit, and say that they will call the police emergency number to confirm the stop while remaining where they are. Police in different countries give different advice to drivers who are unsure whether a vehicle signaling them to stop is genuine. Families should find out what the police in each country they live in or visit recommend, and agree in advance what the driver will do.

On foot, the same principle applies. A principal approached outside the office by people claiming to be police can stay where there are witnesses and cameras, call the protection team or the office, and ask for the request to be made through their lawyer or at a police station. Genuine officers with genuine business can usually accommodate that. Impostors usually cannot.

What a protection team adds

Where a principal has close protection, the protection agent takes on the verification so that the principal does not have to. The agent speaks to the officers, asks the questions, makes the call and keeps the principal in or near the vehicle. In many places where we operate, the team will already know the local police, the look of local police vehicles and identification, and the numbers to call to check a stop. That knowledge is built before the trip, not during the stop.

Close protection for UHNW families on the road

Close protection for UHNW families is often pictured as an agent at the principal’s shoulder in a crowd. On the road, it looks different. It is planning which routes are used, how often they vary, where the car waits and for how long, and which places along the way are safe to go to if something feels wrong.

In Lucknow, police said the gang carried out reconnaissance of the victim’s movements before acting. Reconnaissance works because routines are predictable. I do not ask families to give up their routines. I ask them to understand which parts of the routine are visible, and to change the ones that would let someone choose a time and place in advance. The office arrival time, the regular lunch spot and the same parking place every day are the details a watcher collects.

The family’s other vehicles matter too. Spouses, children and elderly parents are often driven by staff on separate schedules. A gang that cannot reach the principal may choose the person who is easier to approach. Our article on security drivers for UHNW families covers how drivers are selected and trained for that wider role.

The office curb

The Lucknow approach came near the victim’s office. That is where I see one of the least protected moments in a principal’s day. Corporate buildings often have security inside, but the curb, the drop-off lane and the street-level car park belong to nobody in particular. The principal steps out, waits for the car or walks to it, and is exposed for a minute or two at a fixed address and a predictable time.

Our article on personal security for high networth individuals at work covers the office and airport in detail. For interception specifically, the measures I look at first are simple: the car arrives before the principal comes out, the driver stays at the wheel with the doors locked, the principal comes out when the car is in place and not before, and the pick-up point varies when there is a reason to think someone is watching.

Carjacking with the driver inside

The Free State case was a carjacking in which the victim was taken with his car. In many parts of the world, carjackers want the vehicle and let the occupants go. In others, the occupant is the target. Families who travel or live in places where kidnapping for ransom is a known risk need to know which pattern applies, and their drivers need training to match.

The measures are well established in protective driving. Keep doors locked and windows up in traffic. Leave space to the vehicle in front at lights so that the car can move. Be cautious about stopping for minor collisions in isolated places. Know where the safe locations are along each route. If the vehicle is boxed in and the threat is real, the occupant’s life comes before the car. None of this requires dramatic driving. It requires a driver who is paying attention to the right things.

The driver and the ransom

One detail from Lucknow deserves particular attention. According to the Hindustan Times, the ransom money and jewellery were handed to the gang by the victim’s own driver, in Kannauj, after the victim was made to call his wife and ask her to arrange money from home. I am not criticizing anyone involved. The family was under extreme pressure and the outcome was that the victim was released.

But it shows that staff can become part of a ransom chain in minutes, without any training for it. A driver asked to collect cash from the house and take it to strangers is himself at risk, and the family loses the chance to involve police before the handover. I recommend that every household agrees in advance what staff do if they are asked, by the principal or anyone else, to deliver money or valuables to an unknown location: they inform the security lead or the family office first, whatever the caller says. The family office then decides, with professional advice and the police, what happens next.

A hypothetical walk-through: a stop on the way home

To make this concrete, here is a hypothetical scenario. It is not based on any client, and the details are invented to illustrate the plan.

A principal leaves his office at six in the evening. His driver has been waiting at the curb with the doors locked for five minutes, and the principal comes out when the driver signals that the car is in position. Twenty minutes later, on a quiet stretch of road, a dark sedan with a flashing light on the dashboard pulls alongside and a man in plain clothes waves the car over.

The driver slows, keeps the doors locked and calls the local emergency number on the hands-free system, explaining that an unmarked vehicle is signaling him to stop and asking the operator to confirm it is police. While he speaks, he follows the advice the family has already looked up for that area, which in this hypothetical is to continue at a safe speed to a busy, well-lit place before stopping. He tells the family office by message that he is doing so.

Two minutes later, the car pulls into the forecourt of a busy service station with cameras. If the stop is genuine, the officers follow, the driver lowers the window enough to speak, and the matter is handled calmly in public with the dispatcher already aware of it. If it is not genuine, the sedan is unlikely to follow into a lit, watched space with a call to the police already logged. Either way, the principal never stepped out of the car on an empty road with strangers.

Nothing in that scenario requires force, speed or confrontation. It requires a driver who knows the plan, a principal who trusts the driver to run it and a family office that knows what is happening in real time.

Personal security for high networth individuals in trades that carry valuables

The Lucknow victim was an antique dealer. People whose work involves valuables, including dealers in jewelry, watches, art, antiques, precious metals and collectibles, face a particular version of this risk. Their stock moves. Clients and suppliers know when they are carrying it. Their offices and showrooms are public. And the people who know their business well are, by definition, people in the same trade.

Personal security for high networth individuals in those trades should treat movement of valuables as a protected activity: varied timing, a small circle of people who know about it, secure transport where the value justifies it and a rule that significant items are not carried by the principal alone. Showroom staff should know how to recognize and report someone who seems more interested in the owner’s movements than in the stock.

Working with police before you need them

The easiest way to verify a police stop is to already know the police. In the cities where a family lives, the protection team or the family office can build a relationship with the local station: who to call, what local unmarked vehicles look like, how plain-clothes officers identify themselves and how a principal can confirm a request to attend for questioning. Our article on private security for high net worth families and police liaison explains how to build that relationship without asking for special treatment.

If you are asked to come for questioning

The pretext in Lucknow, according to police, was official questioning. That is a request that sounds reasonable and is hard to refuse in the moment. It is also a request that genuine officers can usually make in a way that can be verified.

I advise principals to have a calm, polite answer ready. Something like: I am happy to help, I would like to call my lawyer and the station to confirm, and I will attend with my lawyer at the station. Said respectfully, that answer does not obstruct anyone. It moves the interaction from the street to a place where identities can be checked, and it brings other people into it. A principal with close protection can let the protection agent make the calls while the principal stays in a public place.

The family office should know the name of the lawyer to call and have a number for the local police that can confirm whether officers have been sent. If the principal travels, those details should be in the travel brief for each city. The time to find a lawyer and a station number is not when someone with an identity card is standing at the car door.

The insider who knows what you have

Police in Lucknow alleged that one of the accused knew the victim through the antique trade and told the others about the valuables he possessed. If that is proven, it fits a pattern I see often. The people who select wealthy targets rarely start with a list from a magazine. They start with someone who has been close enough to know what the target owns, how he moves and when he is alone.

That person might be a former business contact, a supplier, a former employee or an acquaintance from a club. They may not intend violence themselves. They may sell information, boast about it or be pressured into sharing it. Our article on the inner circle outside the payroll deals with this problem in depth. For interception, the practical point is that the information an attacker needs about your movements and your wealth often comes from someone you know, not from surveillance alone.

I advise principals in trades where valuables are held, displayed or carried, including jewelry, art, antiques, watches and precious metals, to treat information about their stock and their movements as sensitive. Who knows when a valuable piece will be moved, or that cash is kept at home, should be a short list.

Signs of reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is the stage where an attack can be stopped with the least risk. It is also the stage that families notice least, because each sign is small. Police said the Lucknow gang watched the victim’s movements before acting. In my work, the signs of that kind of watching include:

  • The same vehicle or person seen near the office, the home and a regular stop on different days.
  • Unusual questions to staff, drivers or neighbors about the principal’s schedule or possessions.
  • Contacts asking for meetings at short notice in places the principal does not normally go.
  • People photographing the building entrance, the car or the drop-off point without an obvious reason.
  • Drivers noticing that a vehicle follows them for longer than normal traffic would explain.

Drivers, gate officers and receptionists are well placed to see these things. They need to know that reporting them is welcome, that nobody will laugh at a false alarm, and who to tell. The protection team then decides whether the pattern justifies changes to routes, timings or the level of protection.

Family office high net worth individuals security: the ransom call

In both cases this week, the demand came to the family by phone. In Lucknow, police said the victim was forced to call his wife himself. In the Free State, the kidnappers contacted the family the day after the carjacking. That call is one of the hardest moments a family can face, and family office high net worth individuals security should prepare for it as carefully as it prepares for a fire.

A written protocol does not need to be long. It should say who in the family and the family office is told first, who speaks to the callers if they call again, what information is recorded, when police are informed and how, and which specialist advisers are called. It should also cover the possibility that the call is a hoax. Virtual kidnapping scams, in which callers claim to hold a family member who is in fact safe, rely on the same panic. The first step is always to try to reach the person said to be held, through every channel available.

I do not advise families to make decisions about ransom on their own, under pressure, in the first minutes. That decision belongs with the family, its advisers and law enforcement, with the safety of the person held as the priority.

Private security for high net worth family members who receive the call

Private security for high net worth family members includes the people who are not in the car. The spouse who receives the call, the parent at home, the assistant who answers the office phone: each of them may be the first to hear a demand. They need to know the protocol and they need support.

In Lucknow, the gang told the victim to have money arranged from home. That means someone at home had to gather cash and jewellery and hand it over. A household that keeps significant cash or valuables at the residence should know that this is a known pressure point, and that the staff and family at home can become part of the chain without warning. Our article on close protection for UHNW families after a crypto kidnap covers similar coercion where the asset is digital rather than physical.

Home security for high net worth individuals and the valuables at home

Home security for high net worth individuals is usually discussed in terms of keeping intruders out. This case shows another dimension. When a principal is held elsewhere, the valuables at home become the ransom. The less that is kept at the residence, and the fewer people who know what is kept there, the less leverage a kidnapper has.

I advise families to keep high-value items in professional storage where practical, to limit the cash held at home, and to make sure that any safe is not accessible to one person acting alone under pressure. A rule that two people, or the family office, must be involved in opening the safe for anything other than routine use gives the household a moment to pause and verify.

Travel and unfamiliar cities

Both cases this week took place in the victims’ home regions. But the scenario is more dangerous when a principal is traveling, because the uniforms, vehicles and identification of local police are unfamiliar, and the instinct to cooperate with authority is combined with uncertainty about local rules.

Before a family travels, the protection team should brief everyone on what local police look like, how a genuine stop works there, which emergency number to call and where the safe locations are along the main routes. Our article on close protection for UHNW families traveling abroad covers the wider travel plan, and our travel security service builds these briefings into each trip.

Security for UHNW family offices: who knows the schedule

Reconnaissance is easier when the schedule is easy to learn. Security for UHNW family offices includes deciding who knows where the principal will be and when. In many offices I review, the principal’s calendar is shared with a long list of people: assistants, drivers, the house manager, the pilot, business partners and sometimes the people the principal is meeting, who forward it to their own staff.

Each of those people has a reason to know part of the schedule. Few need all of it. I recommend that the family office shares movements on a need-to-know basis, sends drivers the pick-up time and place without the wider day, avoids putting home addresses in shared calendars and confirms new meetings in unfamiliar places through a known contact before the principal goes. Our article on guarding the schedule explains how schedule leaks happen and how to close them.

An invitation to a meeting at short notice, in a place the principal does not normally go, deserves a second look. That is not paranoia. It is the same check a good assistant would make for a business reason, applied with security in mind.

Check-ins and code words

In Lucknow, the victim was held for about nine hours, according to police. During that time, the gang made him call his wife. A family that has agreed simple check-in routines and a duress word has more options in that situation than one that has not.

A check-in routine can be as simple as the principal or driver confirming arrival at each stop on a busy day, so that the family office notices quickly if a confirmation does not come. A duress word is a word or phrase that sounds ordinary in conversation but tells the listener that the caller is under pressure. Both need to be agreed calmly in advance, known to a small group and practiced occasionally so that nobody forgets them under stress. Neither solves the problem on its own. They give the family information sooner, and information is what the police need first.

When the principal drives himself

Many principals I work with like to drive themselves, especially at weekends. I understand that. It is part of a normal life. It also removes the person whose job is to watch the mirrors, keep the doors locked and decide where to go if something feels wrong.

For principals who drive themselves, I suggest a short set of habits: doors locked as soon as they get in, a phone mounted where it can be reached without looking down, a habit of noticing whether the same vehicle appears behind them on different roads, and a mental list of safe places along the regular routes, such as police stations, fire stations and busy, well-lit businesses. If they are signaled to stop by a vehicle they are not sure about, they follow the local police advice they have already looked up, and they call the family office or the protection team as they do so.

Children, spouses and the separate vehicles

A gang that cannot reach the principal may look for a family member who is easier to approach. Spouses, children and elderly parents often travel on separate schedules, driven by staff who have had less training than the principal’s driver. In my experience, those vehicles are where the plan is thinnest.

The same principles apply to every family vehicle: locked doors, drivers who stay at the wheel during pick-ups, routes that are not entirely predictable and a clear rule for verifying a police stop. Children old enough to understand should know that they never get into a car with someone they do not know, even someone in uniform, without a parent or the protection team confirming it first. Our article on high net worth security for adult children and in-laws covers the family members who often fall outside the core plan.

After release: the first hours

In Lucknow, the victim was released near Shaheed Path after the ransom was handed over, and the case came to light when he went to the police, according to the Hindustan Times. The hours after a release matter. The victim needs medical attention and support. Evidence, including the vehicle, phones and anything the attackers touched, should be preserved. The family should assume that the people involved may try again, as police alleged two of the Lucknow suspects were doing when they were arrested.

Our article on close protection for UHNW families in the first 72 hours covers the period after an attack in detail. For interception cases, I add two points: review who knew the victim’s movements and valuables, and change the routines that were used, before the family returns to normal life.

High net worth security services and in-house research and development

The methods used by people who impersonate police change from place to place and year to year: the uniforms, the identification, the vehicles, the stories they tell. Effective high net worth security services keep up with those changes. At MSB Protection we run in-house research and development to counter threats to UHNW clients, and part of that work is studying cases like these, how the targets were selected and where the interception happened, so that our route planning, driver training and family briefings reflect current methods.

I am not claiming that research makes anyone immune. It does mean that the advice a family receives is based on what attackers are doing now, and that the transition points where they strike are part of the plan from the start.

What recommended HNW security teams do about interception

What recommended HNW security teams do about interception is mostly preparation. They map the principal’s transitions and the family’s separate movements. They vary what can be varied. They brief drivers and staff on what reconnaissance looks like and how to report it. They agree in advance how a police stop will be verified and practice it. They write a ransom call protocol and make sure the people likely to receive a call know it. And they keep in touch with local police, so that a genuine stop can be confirmed quickly and a fake one stands out.

What families and family offices can do now

  • Agree how the driver and principal will verify a police stop in each country where you live or travel.
  • Keep car doors locked and the driver at the wheel at every pick-up and drop-off.
  • Review the office curb: where the car waits, for how long and who can see it.
  • Vary the visible parts of the routine that would let someone choose a time and place.
  • Brief drivers, gate officers and receptionists on signs of reconnaissance and who to tell.
  • Write a short ransom call protocol and make sure family members and key staff know it.
  • Set a rule that staff never deliver money or valuables to unknown people without telling the security lead first.
  • Limit the cash and valuables kept at home and the number of people who know about them.

Frequently asked questions

What does personal security for high networth individuals do about fake police?

It agrees in advance how a stop will be verified, keeps the principal in or near the vehicle with witnesses and cameras around, and lets a protection agent or driver handle the questions and the confirmation call. Real officers deserve cooperation, and a verification plan lets the family give it safely.

Should a driver stop for an unmarked car signaling to pull over?

Follow the advice of the local police where you are. Families should find out what that advice is before they need it and agree what the driver will do.

How do kidnappers choose wealthy targets?

In the Lucknow case, police said the gang collected information about the victim’s business and finances, and alleged that one member knew him and tipped off the others, before watching his movements. Information from people close to the target is a common starting point.

What should staff do if asked to deliver a ransom?

Inform the security lead or the family office before doing anything, whatever the caller says. The family then decides with its advisers and the police how to proceed.

Is a carjacking always about the car?

No. In some places the occupant is the target, as the Free State case suggests. Drivers and families should know which pattern applies where they live and travel.

Keeping control of the moment of interception

The cases in Lucknow and the Free State are still under investigation, and the people charged have not been convicted. What has been reported is enough to draw practical lessons: an approach near the office, forged police identity cards, a victim held in his own car, a ransom carried by a driver and a car discarded once it had served its purpose.

Personal security for high networth individuals should treat that moment of interception as something to plan for, not something to hope away. For the wider program around it, including home security, the family office, travel and the law enforcement relationship, read our complete 2026 overview of high net worth security. If you would like help reviewing your movements and your driver procedures, our executive protection team can help, and you can contact us for a confidential conversation.

None of this means living in fear of every officer at the roadside. It means agreeing a few simple rules in advance, so that the principal, the driver and the family office all know how to respond calmly to a genuine stop and how to recognize one that is not. That small investment of time protects the principal on the ordinary days, when nothing is wrong, and gives the family a clear plan on the rare day when something is.

Sources


About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.


Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.

Loading comments...