2026 Mid Terms: Do Elections and Political Activism Increase Security Risks for America’s Wealthiest Families?
A German journalist recently contacted our firm with an interesting question: How do the upcoming 2026 U.S. midterm elections affect the security of the ultra-high-net-worth individuals we protect?
It is a relevant question, particularly in a country where political disagreements can become deeply personal and where some of the world’s wealthiest individuals are also prominent political donors, activists, and public advocates.
Throughout my career in executive protection, I have generally advised principals against publicly taking political positions whenever possible. That recommendation has never been about favoring one political party over another. It has been about limiting unnecessary exposure to individuals whose grievances may have little to do with financial gain.
However, some of our principals are politically active. They support candidates, host fundraising events, participate in politically connected organizations, and publicly advocate for causes that matter to them.
Our responsibility is not to determine their political involvement. It is to understand the risks associated with their decisions and adapt our protection strategy accordingly.
The journalist’s question prompted me to examine two related issues more closely: whether U.S. midterm elections historically increase the security risks faced by wealthy Americans, and whether public political activity itself changes an ultra-high-net-worth individual’s threat profile.
The historical findings are important because these are not quite the same question.
There is no convincing statistical evidence that midterm elections alone produce a nationwide increase in violent crime against wealthy Americans. There is, however, meaningful historical evidence that public political activity can introduce additional forms of targeting, particularly when an individual becomes strongly associated with a political movement or ideological grievance.
Understanding that distinction is essential to effective executive protection.
Do the 2026 Mid Terms Increase Security Risks for Ultra-High-Net-Worth Individuals?
The November 3, 2026 midterm elections will determine control of the U.S. House of Representatives and influence the composition of the Senate, alongside numerous state and local elections.
As with previous midterms, the political campaigns have brought increased attention to candidates, donors, political organizations, and individuals associated with contentious public issues.
But heightened political attention does not automatically translate into higher rates of violent crime.
Our review of historical crime statistics and election-related incidents found no consistent relationship between changes in congressional control and nationwide violent or property crime.
National crime rates have followed much broader historical patterns. For example, violent crime was substantially higher during the early 1990s than during the 2018 midterms, yet some of the most notable incidents involving politically motivated targeting of wealthy Americans occurred in the more recent period.
This demonstrates why conventional crime statistics alone are insufficient when evaluating the security of politically exposed individuals.
A billionaire who attracts the attention of an ideologically motivated individual may face a very different threat from a wealthy individual targeted by criminals seeking financial gain.
The more relevant question is therefore not whether the 2026 Mid Terms will make every wealthy American less safe.
It is whether the election cycle creates additional exposure for particular individuals because of their political activities, public statements, business interests, or association with controversial issues.
That is where the historical evidence becomes more concerning.
Wealth Already Creates Security Risks. Political Visibility Can Introduce New Ones.
Ultra-high-net-worth individuals face certain security exposures simply because of their wealth.
Kidnapping, extortion, robbery, stalking, home invasion, and financially motivated criminal targeting have existed for decades, regardless of whether the victim was politically active.
Consider the 1994 kidnapping of Mexican banker Alfredo Harp Helú.
Harp Helú, a prominent banker and major shareholder of Banamex-Accival, was abducted in Mexico City and held for 106 days before being released. Contemporary reporting described a multimillion-dollar ransom and a case that generated considerable concern among Mexico’s business community.
His wealth and financial prominence were central to the circumstances of the crime. The available reporting does not establish public political activism as the principal motivation.
The case illustrates a fundamental reality: individuals do not need to take political positions to become targets.
Contemporary reporting on the Alfredo Harp Helú kidnapping — Los Angeles Times
Political involvement, however, can introduce a different set of motivations.
A financially motivated criminal may see a billionaire primarily as an opportunity to obtain money.
An ideologically motivated attacker may see that same billionaire as a representation of a political movement, economic system, government policy, or perceived enemy.
In the second scenario, the attacker’s objective may not be financial gain at all.
It may be punishment, intimidation, publicity, retaliation, or the advancement of an ideological grievance.
From a protection perspective, this distinction is significant because different motivations can produce different targeting behaviors and attack methods.
A security program primarily designed around opportunistic crime cannot automatically be assumed sufficient against an individual who has developed a sustained ideological fixation on the principal.
Why We Have Historically Advised Principals Against Public Political Positioning
At MSB Protection, our longstanding recommendation has been to avoid unnecessary public political exposure whenever it does not serve an important objective of the principal.
This advice is based on a relatively straightforward risk-management principle: avoid introducing additional exposure without understanding its potential consequences.
A private political opinion does not ordinarily create the same public visibility as a major campaign donation, prominent endorsement, nationally televised political statement, or sustained advocacy campaign.
Similarly, attending a private political event is operationally different from hosting a widely publicized fundraiser at a personal residence.
The distinction matters because political exposure exists along a spectrum.
An individual who privately supports a political candidate may attract little additional attention. A major donor whose contributions are publicly disclosed becomes more identifiable. A billionaire who repeatedly appears in political advertising or publicly challenges a controversial policy may become personally associated with that political cause.
A wealthy individual who runs for office acquires yet another category of exposure through public appearances, campaign schedules, press coverage, and interactions with voters.
These distinctions are not theoretical.
Federal campaign-finance rules require many political contributions to be publicly disclosed. The Federal Election Commission maintains searchable records identifying contributors, contribution amounts, dates, employers or occupations, and geographic information. Detailed filings can also contain mailing addresses, although these are not necessarily residential addresses.
That means a principal’s political involvement may become discoverable even when the principal has made no public announcement.
Federal Election Commission — Individual Contribution Records
For security professionals, information exposure matters because individuals who develop a grievance may combine publicly available information from multiple sources.
Political activity is only one element of that process. Public business records, media coverage, property information, photographs, and online activity may contribute to the overall picture.
The objective is not to prevent political participation. It is to ensure that a principal understands the additional exposure that may accompany certain forms of participation.
When political involvement is important to the principal, the appropriate response is to reassess and mitigate the relevant risks.
Before Developing a Protection Strategy, Study the Attacks That Already Happened
One of the first steps in developing a comprehensive protection strategy is historical research.
Security professionals should study documented attacks, attempted attacks, interrupted plots, and cases where protective measures succeeded or failed.
For me, these cases provide some of the most valuable educational material available to the protection profession.
We need to understand more than the incident itself.
We need to examine why the perpetrator selected the target, how the grievance developed, what information was gathered, which behaviors preceded the attack, and how the attacker attempted to reach the intended victim.
This approach allows us to move beyond assumptions about what an attacker might do and examine what attackers have actually done.
It also helps identify security gaps that might otherwise be overlooked.
A particularly relevant example occurred immediately before the 2018 U.S. midterm elections.
The 2018 César Sayoc Bombing Campaign
Between October 22 and November 2, 2018, César Sayoc mailed 16 improvised explosive devices to prominent individuals and organizations across the United States.
His intended victims included former President Barack Obama, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, several other prominent political figures, CNN, and billionaires George Soros and Tom Steyer.
The first device was recovered on October 22, addressed to Soros in New York.
Additional devices were recovered in the days that followed. The FBI arrested Sayoc on October 26, and investigators ultimately recovered all 16 devices.
Fortunately, none of the intended victims was injured.
Sayoc subsequently pleaded guilty to 65 federal offenses and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
The Department of Justice characterized the campaign as an act of domestic terrorism.
U.S. Department of Justice — César Sayoc Sentencing and Investigation
The timing of the campaign was significant: the devices were mailed in the final weeks before the November 6, 2018 midterm elections.
However, the most important findings for security professionals concern Sayoc’s behavior before the attacks.
According to federal investigators, Sayoc had published hostile political statements online for years. He issued threats against individuals he perceived as political opponents and conducted extensive research into potential victims.
The Justice Department documented that he began researching victims and their addresses as early as December 2017.
His activity intensified in the period preceding the attack.
This demonstrates that the October 2018 incident was not simply an isolated expression of anger arising on Election Day.
The perpetrator had developed grievances, identified individuals, researched their locations, and engaged in threatening behavior over an extended period.
From an executive-protection perspective, these are exactly the kinds of historical findings that make behavioral threat assessment and protective intelligence important.
The objective is to recognize concerning patterns early enough to permit assessment, intervention, or proportionate protective measures.
The Importance of Behavioral Threat Assessment
Understanding a perpetrator’s psychology can be valuable, but security professionals should be cautious about attempting to identify attackers through a fixed psychological profile.
Research from the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center emphasizes that there is no single profile of a person who will commit targeted violence.
Instead, behavioral threat assessment examines concerning conduct in context, including threats, grievances, planning behaviors, preparation, and indicators of movement toward violence.
Political beliefs alone are not evidence of dangerousness. Nor is mental illness, by itself, a reliable indicator that someone will commit an attack.
A threat assessment must consider the totality of the circumstances.
The Sayoc investigation provides a particularly useful case because authorities documented both an ideological grievance and concrete behaviors associated with target selection and attack preparation.
That combination is far more operationally relevant than political affiliation alone.
U.S. Secret Service — Mass Attacks in Public Spaces, 2016–2020
George Soros and Tom Steyer: Two Billionaires Targeted During the 2018 Midterms
The attempted attacks against George Soros and Tom Steyer are especially relevant to the protection of ultra-high-net-worth individuals because neither man needed to hold elected office to become a political target.
Both were wealthy private citizens with prominent political activities.
Soros was widely known for his philanthropy and political contributions, including his support for Democratic causes and organizations promoting democratic governance and civil rights.
Steyer was a major Democratic donor and political activist who founded NextGen America and publicly advocated for political and environmental initiatives. During the 2018 election cycle, his activism included a highly visible campaign calling for the impeachment of President Donald Trump.
Both men had become recognizable figures within the national political landscape.
Sayoc selected them alongside former presidents, elected officials, and prominent media organizations.
This is perhaps the most significant aspect of the case for the UHNW protection profession.
A wealthy private citizen can become a politically symbolic target without ever holding public office.
The historical record does not establish that every major political donor faces a comparable risk. Nor does it mean that Soros or Steyer were responsible for the crimes committed against them.
Rather, the case demonstrates that a perpetrator motivated by political grievances can select private citizens based on their perceived political significance.
For a protective security team, that possibility changes the scope of the risk assessment.
The principal’s political visibility, hostile narratives directed at the individual, publicly discoverable information, residential exposure, and emerging threatening behavior all become potentially relevant.
It also raises an important question: Is the existing protection program designed to address targeted ideological threats, or has it primarily been structured around conventional crime and privacy concerns?
Those two requirements can overlap, but they are not identical.
The 2022 Midterms Demonstrated Another Vulnerability: The Family Residence
Four years after the Sayoc bombing campaign, another politically motivated attack illustrated why protecting a prominent principal cannot be limited to that individual’s public appearances.
On October 28, 2022, eleven days before the midterm elections, David DePape entered the San Francisco residence of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Pelosi was not home.
Her husband, Paul Pelosi, was present and was seriously injured when DePape attacked him with a hammer.
Federal prosecutors established that DePape had intended to target Nancy Pelosi because of her official duties.
In May 2024, DePape was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison.
U.S. Department of Justice — David DePape Sentencing
Although this incident involved a prominent political household rather than a confirmed UHNWI-specific data point, its protective implications are directly transferable.
The intended target was absent, but a family member suffered the consequences.
This demonstrates why the protection of politically exposed individuals must encompass the wider household.
A comprehensive assessment should consider spouses, children, residential staff, household routines, visitor procedures, emergency communications, and the ability to detect and respond to unauthorized entry.
An executive protection program that concentrates exclusively on the principal’s movements may leave important vulnerabilities elsewhere.
For UHNW families, residential security and personal protection must operate as complementary parts of the same system.
Political Threats Do Not Necessarily End on Election Night
Another important historical lesson concerns the period following an election.
In November 2022, Solomon Peña lost his campaign for a seat in the New Mexico House of Representatives.
Following the election, Peña pressured officials regarding certification of the results.
He subsequently participated in a conspiracy involving shootings at the homes of four elected officials, with attacks beginning in December 2022 and continuing into January 2023.
In March 2025, a federal jury convicted Peña in connection with the shootings and a subsequent plot against witnesses.
U.S. Department of Justice — Solomon Peña Conviction
The victims were not selected because of ultra-high-net-worth status. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates an important election-related threat mechanism.
Political grievances can persist beyond Election Day, and private residences can remain targets well after voting has concluded.
This is particularly relevant when elections involve contested outcomes, recounts, litigation, or continuing public accusations.
For politically exposed principals, protective measures should therefore not automatically return to normal immediately after the polls close.
The appropriate timing depends on the presence or absence of credible threat indicators, ongoing grievances, and the individual’s relationship to the underlying controversy.
Political Exposure Can Affect More Than Physical Security
Traditional executive protection often focuses on threats to the principal’s physical safety.
However, political activity can expose other assets associated with a wealthy individual.
An especially relevant example occurred in February 2014, when Las Vegas Sands Corporation experienced a destructive cyberattack.
At the time, the company was led by billionaire Sheldon Adelson, a prominent political donor and outspoken advocate on issues involving Israel and Iran.
U.S. intelligence subsequently implicated Iran in the attack. Contemporary reporting connected the incident to Adelson’s public remarks about Iran, although that asserted motive should be distinguished from the government’s confirmed attribution of the cyberattack.
The incident was not a midterm-election attack. Its relevance is the broader relationship between a principal’s public political statements and threats to assets associated with that individual.
In 2015, the Department of Justice described the incident as a major nation-state-sponsored destructive cyberattack against a U.S. corporation.
U.S. Department of Justice — Las Vegas Sands Cyberattack
For UHNW families, this expands the meaning of personal security.
An adversary may attempt to harm or pressure a principal by targeting a company, foundation, family office, employees, digital infrastructure, or other associated assets rather than attempting direct physical contact.
The appropriate response must therefore consider the principal’s broader enterprise, not just the individual’s physical movements.
That includes cybersecurity, information protection, organizational resilience, crisis communications, and coordination among the family office, corporate leadership, and protective security personnel.
What Makes the 2026 Mid Terms Relevant Today?
As we approach the November 3 election, there are already reasons for security professionals to pay attention to the broader election-related threat environment.
On October 15, 2026, the FBI issued a public warning concerning threats against election workers, emphasizing that threats can occur through telephone calls, email, social media, or direct personal contact.
The following day, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued additional guidance concerning cyber threats against election and campaign officials, including phishing, text-message fraud, and the misuse of increasingly convincing digital impersonation technologies.
FBI — October 2026 Election Worker Threat Advisory
FBI and CISA — October 2026 Election Cybersecurity Advisory
These warnings concern election-related personnel and organizations. They do not establish that UHNW individuals are experiencing the same threat levels.
However, they provide useful context for protective intelligence.
A politically active principal may interact with candidates, campaign organizations, elected officials, political staff, or highly visible political events.
Those relationships can create overlapping security considerations.
Recent research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies similarly emphasizes that terrorism directly targeting U.S. elections remains rare, while attacks and plots involving electoral targets have appeared across several recent election cycles.
CSIS — The Terrorism Threat to the 2026 Midterm Elections
The lesson is not that widespread election-related violence is inevitable.
It is that low-frequency, high-consequence incidents deserve serious preparation when the consequences for a particular principal or family could be severe.
How MSB Protection Adjusts Its Strategy for Politically Active Principals
A principal’s political activities should be treated as part of the overall risk profile, not as an isolated security problem.
At MSB Protection, our approach is based on understanding the principal’s assets, identifying credible threats, evaluating vulnerabilities, and developing protective measures proportional to the actual exposure.
This is consistent with the principles of Enterprise Security Risk Management, or ESRM, which treats security as a partnership with the individuals responsible for the assets being protected.
The principal ultimately decides which risks to accept.
Our responsibility is to provide the information necessary for that decision and develop an effective strategy for mitigating the risks the principal does not wish to accept.
For politically exposed clients, several areas deserve particular attention.
1. Historical Research and Protective Intelligence
Before developing a new protection strategy, we examine relevant historical incidents, including successful attacks, failed attempts, disrupted plots, and known patterns of threatening behavior.
We then evaluate whether those patterns have relevance to the principal’s current circumstances.
Protective intelligence should identify credible indications of fixation, direct threats, escalating grievances, unusual interest in the principal’s location, or other behavior warranting assessment.
The objective is not to monitor people merely because they disagree with a principal politically.
It is to identify specific behaviors that could indicate an emerging threat.
2. Understanding the Principal’s Assets and Political Exposure
A protection strategy must begin with an understanding of what matters most to the principal.
That may include personal safety, family members, residences, employees, business continuity, privacy, reputation, or the ability to participate in important professional and civic activities.
Political exposure should then be evaluated in context.
A principal who makes publicly disclosed campaign contributions may face different exposures from one who regularly appears on national television, hosts fundraisers, or operates a politically influential media organization.
The assessment should also consider the principal’s willingness to accept certain risks in pursuit of personal objectives.
3. Layered Residential and Family Protection
The Sayoc and Pelosi cases illustrate why residential protection must consider both targeted access attempts and indirect attack methods.
Layered security should combine deterrence, early detection, delay, and an effective response.
Depending on the property and assessed threat, appropriate controls may include perimeter monitoring, access management, secure delivery procedures, reinforced entry points, protected areas, duress communications, and coordination with responding law enforcement.
Household employees and family members should understand relevant emergency procedures without being unnecessarily burdened by the protection program.
4. Political Events, Fundraisers, and Travel
When a principal participates in a political fundraiser, public appearance, or campaign-related event, the protection team must evaluate the location and surrounding environment.
This includes identifying responsible security stakeholders, assessing access arrangements, understanding potential demonstrations, evaluating arrival and departure procedures, and coordinating emergency response plans.
Where protected government officials are involved, coordination with the U.S. Secret Service or other responsible protective agencies may be necessary.
The objective is to integrate security into the event rather than treat it as an afterthought.
5. Digital Privacy and Enterprise Security
A politically exposed principal’s digital footprint may reveal information about residences, family relationships, travel, staff members, and business interests.
Protection programs should therefore incorporate appropriate privacy reviews, cybersecurity safeguards, information-sharing controls, and coordination with the family office or corporate security team.
Digital security is particularly important because adversaries may attempt to obtain information or create harm without approaching the principal physically.
6. Continuous Threat Reassessment
A protection strategy cannot remain static when the principal’s public exposure changes.
Major endorsements, campaign announcements, fundraising events, controversial statements, viral media coverage, or direct threats may warrant renewed assessment.
During election periods, this process should continue beyond Election Day when relevant grievances remain active.
The goal is to increase or reduce protective measures according to evidence, rather than maintaining a permanently elevated posture without justification.
The Security Professional’s Responsibility Is to Protect the Principal’s Freedom
There is an important distinction between advising a principal about political exposure and attempting to influence that individual’s political decisions.
Our clients are accomplished individuals with their own beliefs, priorities, and responsibilities.
Some prefer to remain entirely private.
Others believe strongly in supporting candidates, organizations, or causes.
Both choices are theirs to make.
A successful protection program should not unnecessarily interfere with a principal’s ability to live according to those priorities.
Instead, the security team should explain the relevant risks, discuss potential consequences, and identify practical ways to reduce exposure.
If a principal chooses to host a fundraiser, the task is to secure the event.
If a principal publicly endorses a candidate, the task is to assess whether that visibility changes the threat environment.
If a principal becomes the subject of a credible and escalating grievance, the task is to identify that development and adjust the protection program.
This is where executive protection becomes more than simply placing security personnel around an individual.
It becomes an ongoing partnership in managing risk.
Conclusion: What the 2026 Mid Terms Teach Us About Protecting America’s Wealthiest Families
The historical evidence does not support the idea that U.S. midterm elections automatically make all wealthy Americans less safe.
It does support a more specific conclusion.
Public political activity can change the threat profile of an ultra-high-net-worth individual by increasing visibility, creating ideological significance, exposing personal information, and introducing adversaries whose motivations extend beyond financial gain.
The 2018 bombing campaign against prominent political figures and billionaires George Soros and Tom Steyer demonstrates this threat mechanism particularly clearly.
The 2022 attack on the Pelosi residence shows why family members and private homes must be included in a comprehensive protection assessment.
The Las Vegas Sands cyberattack illustrates how the consequences of public political positions can potentially extend to businesses and other assets associated with a principal.
None of these examples establishes a universal statistical increase in danger for politically active wealthy individuals. But each provides important historical evidence that security professionals can study and apply.
My longstanding recommendation to principals has been to avoid unnecessary public political exposure whenever possible.
The research reinforces the reasoning behind that advice, while also demonstrating why a blanket approach would be insufficient.
The important factor is not simply whether a principal participates in politics. It is how that participation changes the principal’s visibility, exposure, potential adversaries, and access to effective protective measures.
As the 2026 Mid Terms approach, the appropriate response is not indiscriminately increasing security around every wealthy household.
It is to understand each principal’s circumstances, study relevant historical attacks, identify credible threats, and continuously reassess the protection strategy.
Ultimately, our responsibility is not to determine how our clients should live their lives.
It is to ensure they can make informed decisions and pursue their interests with an appropriate level of protection.
About the Author
Michael Braun is the Founder and CEO of MSB Protection, a luxury private security firm specializing in executive protection, residential estate security, and enterprise security risk management for at-risk public figures, executives, and ultra-high-net-worth individuals, including some of the world’s most influential people.
Before moving to the United States, Braun served with the Bavarian Police in Germany, including its specialized Unterstützungskommando (USK) unit. He subsequently spent 12 years with Gavin de Becker & Associates in California, serving as a Security Operations Director and Senior Team Leader, implementing and managing protective operations for high-profile clients.
Through MSB Protection, he focuses on intelligence-led protective strategies, behavioral threat assessment, advanced residential security, and the integration of comprehensive security risk management into the lives and enterprises of UHNW clients.
Connect with Michael Braun on LinkedIn for further analysis of historical attacks, executive protection, and security risks affecting ultra-high-net-worth individuals.