High Net Worth Security: The 2026 Guide for UHNW Families

Posted On:Oct 17, 2026
Posted By:Michael Braun

High net worth security in 2026 looks very different from five years ago. The people who want to harm or exploit wealthy families have not changed much. Their tools and their targets have. A cloned voice can now give orders to staff. A false phone call can send armed police to a front door. A wallet that no hacker could crack can be emptied by someone holding a knife in a kitchen. And the home, which most families still think of as the safest place they have, is where more and more of these incidents end up.

I have spent my career protecting wealthy families, executives and public figures in Southern California and beyond. Over the past few weeks alone, I have read about an armed home invasion at a footballer’s villa in Spain, masked men on a Hollywood Hills doorstep, a crypto executive abducted at his car in Toronto, a private bank losing tens of millions of euros to a fake voice, a survey describing ransomware gangs threatening executives’ families, swatting calls aimed at a musician and at a young woman who had been doxxed, three stalking cases in four weeks and two intruders surprising a 97-year-old singer in his own kitchen.

Each of those stories gets its own article in this series. This guide pulls them together into one framework: what changed, what it means for families and family offices, and what a sound protection program looks like now.

I wrote an earlier overview, High Net Worth Security: Guide for Southern California, which covers the regional basics. This 2026 guide is different. It is built around this year’s incidents and around the eight areas of protection families ask me about most.

High net worth security in 2026: what changed

If I had to sum up the change in one sentence, it would be this: the threats have moved closer to the family and further from the obvious defenses.

Five years ago, most of the high net worth security conversations I had were about the perimeter of an estate, the principal’s travel and the occasional public appearance. Cyber was a separate topic handled by IT. Family members other than the principal rarely came up. Household staff were vetted once and then trusted.

Today, every one of those assumptions has cracks in it.

The home is the main stage

Several of this autumn’s incidents happened inside or at the door of a family home, with people inside. That includes an armed invasion in Puçol, Spain, an attempted entry in the Hollywood Hills, swatting responses at family homes and an intrusion in Marly-le-Roi, France. Analysts tracking violent crypto robberies, as reported by CoinDesk, found that home invasions made up a larger share of recorded attacks in the first half of 2026 than a year earlier.

The voice is no longer proof

AI voice cloning has reached the point where a familiar voice on the phone cannot be trusted on its own. That matters for money, and it matters just as much for physical instructions: open the gate, change the pickup, share the schedule.

Cyber pressure turns physical

A survey published in October describes ransomware gangs threatening staff and their families, doxxing and swatting. The figures are self-reported and should be treated with caution, but the direction is clear: pressure that starts online can end at the front door.

Exposure is the fuel

Almost every incident in this guide depended on someone knowing where a person lived, where they would be or what they held. Doxxing, oversharing, published schedules and leaked travel plans are the raw material.

The whole family is in scope

Spouses, children, parents, siblings and household staff are now part of the risk picture. Several of this year’s incidents involved people who were not the obvious principal.

What has not changed

The fundamentals still work. Detect early. Delay at the perimeter. Respond quickly. Control who can give instructions. Reduce what strangers can learn. Train people. Test everything. The rest of this guide is about applying those fundamentals to the threats families actually face now.

Walled hillside estate at dusk with two protection officers beside an SUV

Key takeaways

The home is where many of 2026’s most serious incidents happened. Home security for high net worth individuals has to cover daytime and nighttime, secondary entrances and a plan for an occupied-home intrusion.
A familiar voice is no longer proof of identity. Family offices need callback, code word and two-person rules for physical instructions as well as payments.
Cyber extortion can become physical. Family offices should run one incident plan that connects cyber response to physical protection.
Exposure is the fuel. Reducing what strangers can learn about homes, schedules and holdings is some of the most cost-effective protection available.
Close protection for UHNW families should be scaled to risk and focused on the predictable moments: arrivals, departures, meetings and public appearances.
The whole family matters: spouses, children, elderly parents and household staff all belong in the plan.
Recommended hnw security teams can explain exactly what happens when an alarm sounds at 3 a.m., and they test it.

The threat picture this autumn: a dated news roundup

Before getting into each area of protection, here is a short, dated roundup of the incidents that shaped this guide. All are drawn from published reporting. Many involve allegations that have not been proven in court, and I have tried to describe them neutrally.

September 26: Hollywood Hills attempted entry

Fox News reported that Los Angeles police responded to a “hot prowl burglary” call at a Hollywood Hills home shortly before 11:30 p.m., with at least one person inside. Three people in dark clothing and ski masks were reportedly seen on security cameras. Accounts differ on whether the occupant confronted them or an alarm scared them off. The suspects fled before officers arrived. No injuries were reported. I cover this in Private Security for High Net Worth Family Homes in LA.

September 30: swatting calls in Los Angeles County

TMZ reported that Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputies responded twice in one afternoon to the home of rapper Blueface after false emergency calls.

October 1: federal cyberstalking arrest

NBC News reported that the FBI arrested a Massachusetts man who was then indicted on a cyberstalking count, accused of contacting a former political adviser more than 40 times in less than two months from changing phone numbers and sending disturbing messages to her parents. Together with two September stalking arrests in Los Angeles, it forms the basis of High Net Worth Security and the Persistent Stalker.

October 6: swatting after doxxing

CNN reported that police responded with weapons drawn to the family home of a woman at the center of a widely covered lawsuit, after a false report of a shooting. Her identity had been sought and reportedly shared online beforehand. I cover swatting in High Net Worth Security Services Against Swatting.

October 7: intruders at a 97-year-old’s home

AFP reporting carried by Le JSL said two people entered singer Hugues Aufray’s home in Marly-le-Roi through an open window and demanded valuables. They fled when his mother-in-law triggered the alarm. Nobody was hurt. See Close Protection for UHNW Families With Elderly Parents.

October 12 to 13: armed home invasion in Puçol

Todo Alicante reported that hooded intruders, one with a handgun, entered Villarreal goalkeeper Péter Gulácsi’s villa through a garage window while the alarm was off, took the family’s phones, forced the couple to open their safe and left with about 200,000 euros in valuables. Nobody was physically hurt. Euro Weekly News reported that he missed Villarreal’s Champions League match hours later. See Home Security for High Net Worth Individuals After Puçol.

October 13: UK knifepoint transfer claim

CoinDesk reported that a UK crypto trader said masked intruders held him at knifepoint and forced transfers of about $760,000, noting police had not confirmed his account.

October 14: Toronto kidnapping charges

The Toronto Police Service said seven men, three of them Canadian Armed Forces members, face 82 charges combined over the July abduction of a crypto exchange owner, who was allegedly targeted as he approached his vehicle. GPS tracking devices were among the items seized. See Close Protection for UHNW Families After a Crypto Kidnap.

October 14: ransomware and physical threats survey

Semperis published its 2026 Ransomware Risk Report, describing intimidation, swatting and threats against staff and families. Dark Reading noted the data is self-reported and uncorroborated. See Family Office High Net Worth Individuals Security Threats.

October 15: Toronto sentencing hearing

CBC News reported on a sentencing hearing for a man who pleaded guilty in the 2022 kidnapping of Aiden Pleterski, who read a victim impact statement describing years of fear. Pleterski has pleaded not guilty in his own separate fraud trial. See Personal Security for High Networth Individuals in Crypto.

October 15: burglary during a match

AFP reported that Brazilian forward Antony said his home in Spain was burgled while he was playing for Real Betis in a Champions League match.

Autumn: the Fideuram deepfake

Biometric Update, citing Reuters, reported that fraudsters using AI impersonation took about 95 million euros from Fideuram, the private banking arm of Intesa Sanpaolo, after a WhatsApp message and a cloned-voice call. The Banker reported two similar cases under investigation in Milan. See Security for UHNW Family Offices After a EUR 95M Deepfake.

Home security for high net worth individuals: perimeter, alarm discipline, night routines

Home security for high net worth individuals is where I start every engagement, because the home is where the family is most predictable and where most of this year’s serious incidents ended.

I think of a home in layers. The neighborhood. The property line. The grounds. The building shell. The occupied rooms. Each layer should detect, delay or control access, ideally more than one. When a layer fails, the next one should still work.

The perimeter

The property line is where I want to know someone is coming. Walls and fences delay. Gates control. But neither tells anyone that a person is climbing over the back wall at 2 a.m. That takes detection: exterior sensors suited to the terrain, cameras with analytics that alert someone awake, and lighting that removes the dark approaches.

I am wary of buying technology for its own sake. A sensor that triggers on every coyote will be switched off within a month. The detection has to fit the property, the landscaping and the family’s routines.

Alarm discipline

The most expensive alarm in the world does nothing if it is off. In the Puçol case, the alarm was reported to have been left off overnight. In my experience, alarms get disarmed because they are inconvenient. Pets set them off. Teenagers come home late. Staff forget codes.

So I design alarm systems around how the family actually lives. Zones that protect the perimeter and ground floor while the family moves freely upstairs. Pet-tolerant detection where needed. Clear responsibility for arming the system every night. And an alert to someone when it is not armed by a set time.

Night routines

Every home I protect has a written night routine, owned by a named person. Doors and windows checked. Garage secured. Alarm armed in the right mode. Exterior lights on. Any faults reported and handled. If the home has residential officers, they do it and log it. If not, a family member or estate manager does.

Daytime routines

Night routines get attention. Daytime routines often do not. Windows are opened for air, doors unlocked for staff, alarms off because people are home. The Marly-le-Roi intruders reportedly came in through an open window in the morning. I want daytime openings covered too: window restrictors, door discipline and sensors that alert even when the main alarm is off.

Secondary entrances

Garages, service doors, pool houses and utility rooms get far less attention than the front door. On a walkthrough, that is where I look first. A reported garage window entry in Puçol is a good reminder of why.

Home invasions with the family inside: lessons from Puçol

An empty-house burglary and a home invasion with the family inside are different problems. One is about property. The other is about lives.

The reporting on the Puçol case describes the sequence I fear most: entry through a secondary opening while the alarm was off, the family confronted in their bedroom by armed men, phones taken first, the couple forced to open the safe while their children slept nearby, roughly 40 minutes of control, and help only arriving after the intruders left and the goalkeeper went to a neighbor. I cover it in depth in Home Security for High Net Worth Individuals After Puçol.

Lessons I take from it

Prevention has to happen earlier. Once armed intruders are standing over a family, almost every option is bad. The work belongs at the perimeter and the building shell.

Phones are a single point of failure. If every alert goes to a phone in the principal’s hand, taking the phone takes everything. I want alerts reaching someone outside the room.

The safe does not protect the people who can open it. A stronger safe moves the pressure onto the family. Protecting people means stopping intruders before they reach them.

Life comes first. In a confrontation, I want families to comply and stay safe. Valuables can be replaced.

A plan for the occupied home

Every family should know what to do if someone gets in while they are home. Where they go. Who takes the children. How they call for help without their phones. Who outside notices something is wrong. For some homes, that includes a protected room, which I describe in Safe Room Planning for UHNW Homes. For others, it means residential officers awake and on site overnight, as described in Residential Security Officers for Los Angeles UHNW Estates.

Burglary around public schedules and travel

Some burglars do not want a confrontation. They want an empty house, and they pick their moment by watching public schedules.

AFP reported that Antony said his home was burgled while he was playing in a Champions League match, and noted earlier cases of footballers’ homes being targeted during games, as well as a 2019 Europol statement that a suspected gang had monitored footballers’ activities to identify burglary opportunities. The same logic applies to any family whose absences are predictable: a gala, a charity event, a holiday announced on social media, a regular weekend at a second home.

Hot prowl versus empty house

The Hollywood Hills case was described by police as a hot prowl, meaning someone was home. The Antony case, as he described it, happened while he was out. Both matter. An empty-house plan focuses on detection and response while the family is away. A hot prowl plan focuses on protecting the people inside. I explore both in Private Security for High Net Worth Family Homes in LA.

What I do when the family is away

Cameras that someone watches or that alert a responder in real time, not just record. Residential officers or a patrol response that can be on site quickly. Lights and routines that make the house look occupied. Posts about events and travel published after the family returns, not during. And a clear rule for staff about who knows when the family is away.

Response time

An alarm that alerts a monitoring center that calls a family member who calls the police can take a long time. I want to know exactly how long, in practice, it takes for someone to physically arrive at the property after an alert. If the answer is too long, on-site officers or a dedicated response arrangement may be needed.

Private security for high net worth family members: spouses, children, elders

Private security for high net worth family members starts with a simple exercise: list everyone the program needs to cover. Most families are surprised by how long the list gets.

The principal and spouse. Children at home. Adult children living elsewhere. Parents and in-laws. Siblings who are publicly linked to the family. Partners of adult children. Long-serving household staff who are close to the family. Each has a different routine, a different level of exposure and a different tolerance for security measures.

Spouses

Spouses are often as visible as the principal, sometimes more. They may run foundations, appear at events or have their own public profile. They may also be the person criminals expect to be less protected. Every protection plan I write includes the spouse’s routines, travel and home time, not just the principal’s.

Children

Children are where families feel threats most deeply, and where attackers know pressure works. I focus on four areas:

School and activities: who can pick them up, how pickup changes are verified and what the school knows.

Online exposure: what children and their friends post, especially uniforms, locations and routines.

Simple instructions: what to do if a stranger approaches, if police arrive at the house or if an alarm sounds.

Transport: who drives them, whether the driver is trained and how routes vary.

I always use family passwords for pickup changes. No password, no change, and the parent is called on a known number.

Elderly parents

The oldest generation is the group most often left out of security plans, and the reporting from Marly-le-Roi shows why that is a mistake. Older parents may live alone or with one other person, in a long-known home, with valuables in the house and fixed routines. I want panic buttons within reach of where they spend their day, caregivers briefed on what to do and daytime openings secured. I cover this in Close Protection for UHNW Families With Elderly Parents.

Adult children and extended family

Adult children who live independently but are publicly connected to the family can be reached more easily than the principal. Their homes, routines and online presence belong in the risk picture. So do siblings and in-laws who might be used as leverage.

Household staff

Staff are both part of the protection and part of the exposure. They have access, knowledge and routines. They can also be targeted, as the Semperis survey suggests, because they are easier to reach than the principal. I want staff vetted, trained and protected, and included in incident plans.

Scaling protection

Not everyone on the list needs the same protection. A teenager at boarding school, a grandmother in a quiet village and a spouse who chairs a public foundation each need something different. The point is that every one of them is on the list, has been assessed and has protection that matches their actual risk.

Close protection for UHNW families: when and how it is used

Close protection for UHNW families is often misunderstood. People picture a large man in sunglasses walking beside a celebrity. That is one version. It is rarely the most useful one.

Close protection is a scale. At one end, it is an assessment and some training. Then a security driver for certain movements. Then a trained protection officer with the principal during higher-risk activities. Then a full team with advance work, drivers and residential coordination. Most families sit somewhere in the middle, and the right point moves as their circumstances change.

When it makes sense

I recommend close protection when there is a specific threat, such as a stalker, an extortion attempt or credible online targeting. When a principal has a high public profile. When travel takes a family into unfamiliar or higher-risk places. During predictable high-exposure moments: public appearances, large events, meetings with new contacts. And after an incident, while the threat is assessed.

How it works in practice

Good close protection is mostly invisible. Advance work on venues and routes. A driver who controls the vehicle. A protection officer who watches the environment, not the principal. Clear communication with the residential team so that the transition from car to front door is covered. A plan for medical emergencies and for moving the principal away from trouble quickly.

I describe how we approach this in Los Angeles in Close Protection for UHNW Families in Los Angeles and through our executive protection services.

What it does not do

Close protection does not replace home security, exposure reduction or good procedures. A protection officer cannot help if the principal’s schedule is posted publicly and the attack happens at a place the officer was never told about. It works best as one part of a full program.

Discretion

Most families I work with value discretion. They do not want to look guarded. Good close protection officers dress for the setting, stay out of photographs and blend in. The goal is to be ready, not to be seen.

Vehicles, arrivals and departures: where abductions start

If I had to pick the single most dangerous moment in most principals’ days, it would be the few seconds between a building and a car.

Toronto police allege that the crypto exchange owner in this autumn’s kidnapping case was targeted as he approached his vehicle, abducted at gunpoint, handcuffed and assaulted. Police listed GPS tracking devices among the items seized in the investigation, though nothing in the public reporting establishes how any device was used. I cover the protective lessons in Close Protection for UHNW Families After a Crypto Kidnap.

Why the car door matters

Arrivals and departures are predictable. The principal has to leave the building and reach the car, or leave the car and reach the building. They are often distracted, carrying things, on the phone. They may be in a parking garage, on a quiet street or at a curb outside a restaurant. An attacker who knows when and where that will happen has a short, focused window.

What I do about it

Vary times and routes where possible. Have the vehicle ready and the driver watching before the principal steps out. Use controlled pickup points: a private garage, a secured entrance, a hotel’s back entrance. Keep the principal’s exposure in open space short. Have the protection officer, if there is one, out first and watching.

Vehicle sweeps

GPS trackers are cheap and easy to hide. For principals with an active threat or a high profile, I recommend periodic physical inspections of vehicles for tracking devices, done by people who know what to look for. A clean inspection does not prove there is no surveillance, but it removes one easy method.

The driver

A driver who is trained in security is different from a chauffeur. They watch for surveillance, choose routes, control the vehicle and know what to do if something goes wrong. I describe the role in Security Drivers in Los Angeles for UHNW Families.

Getting into other people’s cars

One rule I hold firmly: a principal at risk should not get into a vehicle controlled by someone they do not know well. The 2022 Toronto kidnapping described in CBC’s reporting began with a meeting with a supposed investor and a gun in the back seat of a pickup truck. Control of the vehicle is control of the movement.

Personal security for high networth individuals with digital assets

Personal security for high networth individuals who hold digital assets is a physical problem before it is a technical one. The keys may live on a device, but the device lives in a house, and the person who can unlock it is the target.

CoinDesk’s October 13 report cited Chainalysis estimating that criminals stole more than $30 million through violent attacks in the first half of 2026, and that home invasions accounted for 37% of recorded incidents, up from 14% a year earlier. It also cited CertiK identifying 52 verified attacks worldwide in that period.

I cover this area in depth in Personal Security for High Networth Individuals in Crypto. The core points:

Confidentiality is protection

The cheapest and most effective protection for a crypto holder is not being known as one. No portfolio screenshots. No talk of holding your own keys. No posts that connect a crypto identity to a real name and a home. The consultant quoted by Decrypt put it bluntly: oversharing paints a target on people’s backs.

The home needs real protection

Because so many attacks now happen at the residence, crypto holders need the same home security I would give any high-value family: perimeter detection, alarm discipline, secondary entrances secured and a plan for an occupied-home intrusion.

Meetings with new contacts

Unsolicited meetings, especially at places chosen by the other side, are a security event. Verify the person independently. Tell someone where you are going. Do not get into their vehicle. Consider having protection present.

The aftermath

In court in October, according to CBC, the man kidnapped in Toronto in 2022 described giving up normal routines, being unable to sleep and still worrying about his family’s safety years later. Plans should cover recovery, not just the incident.

Wrench attacks and why self custody cannot stop coercion

A “wrench attack” is the crypto world’s name for using violence or threats to force someone to hand over digital assets. The name comes from the idea that hitting someone with a wrench is easier than breaking encryption.

Self custody removes friction

Self custody means no bank or exchange stands between the holder and a transfer. That is the point for many holders. It also means no fraud desk, no hold period and often no way to reverse a forced transfer. Whoever can sign can send. That is exactly why attackers target people who hold their own keys.

What I recommend

I am not a financial adviser, and the structure of holdings is a question for qualified specialists. From the physical side, I want families to avoid arrangements where one person, alone, at home, can move a life-changing amount quickly. CoinDesk’s report pointed the same way, noting that protection extends to keeping holdings confidential and separating readily available funds from long-term reserves, while adding that no technical safeguard can eliminate the threat of violence.

Duress plans

Some holders keep decoy wallets to hand over under threat. I am cautious. A plan that relies on deceiving armed people threatening your family can escalate badly if they suspect a trick. My priority in a confrontation is always the same: preserve life, then recover. The structural work belongs before any confrontation.

Family as leverage

Attackers who cannot reach the holder may target a spouse, child or parent. That is why private security for high net worth family members matters so much for crypto families.

Security for UHNW family offices: the trust chain

Security for UHNW family offices has always been about controlling who can give instructions and who acts on them. A family office is a small private bank wrapped around a household. It moves money, and it coordinates homes, aircraft, cars, staff, schools and travel. Instructions flow from the principal and family to dozens of people, often by text or quick phone call.

That chain of trust is what makes a family office efficient. It is also what an impersonator, an insider or an extortionist will try to exploit.

Mapping the instructions that matter

When I review a family office, I list the instructions that can cause physical harm if they are fake or abused:

Admit a visitor or contractor to a residence.
Disarm an alarm or share codes.
Change a driver’s route or pickup.
Release a child to someone.
Share travel schedules, flights or hotels.

Remove items from a safe and hand them to a courier.

Change who can view the cameras.

For each, I ask: who can authorize this, through what channel, and how is it confirmed?

Authority belongs to procedure

My principle is that authority should belong to a procedure, not a voice or a person. I explain how to build that in Family Office Authority Control for UHNW Operations.

Cyber hygiene

The technical side of family office security, including accounts, devices and networks, is covered in Cyber Security for Family Offices and UHNW Families. This guide focuses on where those systems meet physical protection.

Deepfake voice and executive impersonation fraud

The Fideuram case, as reported by Biometric Update citing Reuters, is the clearest illustration I have seen of how impersonation works against very senior people. A WhatsApp message purporting to come from the group chief executive. A follow-up call using an AI-cloned voice. Transfers to foreign accounts. About 95 million euros, of which about 53 million was recovered. The Banker reported two more cases under investigation in Milan, bringing the total to about 120 million euros across three lenders.

I cover this in Security for UHNW Family Offices After a EUR 95M Deepfake.

Why it matters for physical security

The same sequence that moves money can move people. A message and a voice that sounds like the principal can tell a gate officer to admit a visitor, a driver to change a route or a nanny to hand a child to someone new. Each of those is a physical security event.

The controls

Callback on known numbers for any high-risk instruction. Verification words that are shared in person. Duress words that let a principal signal coercion. Two-person approval for the most serious actions. Staff trained with realistic scenarios. Principals who support staff when they insist on verification.

Principals’ voices

Principals should assume their voice can be copied. TechTarget noted that executives’ public content, including speeches, podcasts and interviews, can become raw material. The answer is not silence. It is to stop treating the voice as proof inside the household.

Payment diversion and principal schedule leaks

Not every impersonation is as dramatic as a cloned voice. Many are simpler: an email from what looks like a trusted vendor saying their bank details have changed, or a message from a “new assistant” asking for the principal’s schedule.

Payment diversion

Fraudsters insert themselves into ordinary payment flows: invoices from contractors, school fees, staff payroll, property costs. A family office that pays many vendors across several properties is a natural target. The fix is procedural: any change to payment details is verified by calling a known number, never one provided in the request, and large or unusual payments need two people.

Schedule leaks

From my side, the more dangerous leak is the schedule. A request for the principal’s travel, a hotel booking, a restaurant reservation or a school event, made by someone posing as staff, a vendor or a partner’s office, can give an attacker exactly what they need to plan a physical approach.

I treat schedules as protected information. They go only to people who need them, through approved channels. Requests to share them with anyone new are verified. Changes mid-trip, such as a new driver or assistant, are confirmed with the protection team before anything is shared.

Linking fraud and protection

When a family office spots a fraud attempt, it should tell the protection team. A fraudster who has been probing payments may also have been probing schedules. The two are often connected.

Family office high net worth individuals security when cyber extortion turns physical

Family office high net worth individuals security now has to plan for the point where an online attack reaches the family.

Semperis’s October 14 press release says bad actors threatened victims with psychological intimidation in nearly 25% of attacks in the countries studied, that 53% of victims reported attackers followed through on threats, that 24% of victims or family members were swatted and that 24% of victims or families hired personal security. Its report page lists 37% of attacks involving threats against friends or family of staff. Dark Reading pointed out that the data is self-reported, that neither Semperis nor Dark Reading could corroborate it, and that it found no documented case of ransomware-linked violence while reporting.

I take both sides seriously, and I cover them in Family Office High Net Worth Individuals Security Threats.

One incident plan

If an online attack can lead to a threat at the house, the cyber plan and the physical plan must be one plan. One decision-maker. A cyber lead. A physical security lead told immediately when an attack starts. Legal counsel. A clear trigger for involving law enforcement.

Out-of-band communication

If attackers are inside the office’s systems, its email and messaging may not be safe. Families need a separate channel, set up in advance, for the decision-maker, the principal and the protection team.

Protecting staff

Staff with access to payments or systems may be targeted at home. They should know what to report and should be protected if threats become specific.

Coordinating at the estate

For larger households, a staffed command center can be where cyber and physical response meet. I describe it in Estate Command Center for UHNW Residential Security.

Doxxing and the exposure of your home address

Every threat that reaches the house depends on someone knowing where the house is. Doxxing, the publishing of private information such as home addresses and family details, is often the step that turns online hostility into physical risk.

How addresses leak

Property records that name the owner. Business filings and charity registrations. Court documents. Old news coverage. Staff and contractor posts that show the house. Family members’ social media. Delivery and service accounts. Each is a small piece. Together, they can lead a stranger to the front door in minutes.

What can be done

Not all of it can be fixed. Some can. Holding structures for property ownership where appropriate. Removing or reducing personal information from data broker sites. Reviewing and cleaning up old posts. Training staff and contractors not to post from the property. Delaying event and travel posts. I describe the process in UHNW Protective Intelligence From Online to Physical.

When the address is already public

For many prominent families, the address cannot be hidden. Then the focus shifts to the property line: detection, visitor control and a residential team that handles anyone who shows up, so the family does not have to.

Location in real time

Addresses are not the only exposure. Real-time location, from livestreams, stories and check-ins, lets someone find a person anywhere. TMZ reported that in August, deputies briefly detained the same musician after a false emergency call to a Santa Clarita restaurant, which suggests someone knew where he was. Delayed posting is a simple habit that removes a lot of risk.

Swatting: preparing the home and staff

Swatting is a false emergency report meant to send armed police to an address. The caller describes a shooting, a hostage situation or violence. Officers arrive expecting danger. The people inside have no idea why.

This autumn, TMZ reported two false calls in one afternoon to a musician’s Los Angeles-area home, one describing a woman throwing a boy to the ground and one describing a seizure. CNN reported that police responded with weapons drawn to the family home of a doxxed young woman after a bogus report of a shooting, and that her lawyer said someone could have been killed. I cover the operational side in High Net Worth Security Services Against Swatting.

Why I treat it as a physical threat

Armed officers on the property, family members confronted at gunpoint, staff who may panic, children who may be terrified: that is a physical security event. The phone call is just the delivery method.

Before it happens

Reduce doxxing exposure, because you cannot swat a house nobody can find. Ask the local police department whether it accepts advance information from households at risk of false calls; procedures vary and not every agency has one. Even without a formal program, let the station know, through proper channels, that the family faces threats, who lives and works at the address and whether armed officers are on site.

When police arrive

On-site officers and everyone in the house need a simple, practiced procedure. Hands visible and empty. Slow movements. Follow instructions exactly. Identify yourself calmly. Armed residential officers secure their weapons according to their training before police approach and say clearly where the weapon is. Nobody runs to the door or window. Pets are secured if there is time. Children stay with an adult.

Afterward

The security lead collects officers’ names and a report number, documents everything and works with investigators. Repeat calls are treated as an ongoing threat, with exposure reviewed again and coverage increased if needed.

Tabletop exercises

An hour-long walkthrough of a swatting scenario, with the people who would actually be home, almost always reveals gaps: a nanny without the security lead’s number, an officer unsure whether to approach or wait, parents whose instinct is to rush home into the middle of an armed response. Each gap is easy to fix once found.

Stalkers: escalation from messages to the front gate

High net worth security plans often treat a stalker as a nuisance until the day the stalker is in the yard.

In about four weeks this autumn, three cases made the news. The Los Angeles Times reported that a man was arrested near Kris Jenner’s Calabasas home after being detained by her security, and that her team knew he had tried to contact her before. NBC Los Angeles reported that a stalking suspect was arrested in the yard of model Lindsey Pelas’s home despite a restraining order she had obtained. NBC News reported the federal cyberstalking arrest described above. I put them side by side in High Net Worth Security and the Persistent Stalker.

Contact becomes presence

The line that matters most is the moment someone stops contacting from a distance and starts showing up. Signs that a case is moving toward that line include more frequent contact, contact with family or staff, messages that show knowledge of routines or the home, working around blocks with new numbers or accounts, and any mention of visiting.

Log everything

Every contact and sighting goes into one log kept by the security team: date, time, method, number or account, content and who received it. Investigators and prosecutors need that record. Principals should not have to read every message; someone else can monitor and log.

Restraining orders need backup

A restraining order creates legal consequences and helps police act. It does not physically stop anyone. When a client obtains one, I treat it as the start of a heightened period: the subject’s photo and vehicle shared with residential officers and gate staff, detection on the approaches, a clear procedure if they appear and copies of the order ready for police.

Interception

The Calabasas case, as reported, shows interception working: a person stopped in the neighborhood by security before reaching the house, then arrested by deputies. Interception happens at the edges: neighborhood entrance, street, property line, office parking, school pickup. Private officers observe, report and protect. Police arrest.

Brief the family

Stalkers who cannot reach the target sometimes contact relatives. Spouses, parents, adult children, staff and schools should be told, calmly, what to look for and what to do.

Household staff, vendors and insider risk

The people with the most access to a family are the people who work in the home. Housekeepers, nannies, chefs, drivers, assistants, estate managers, gardeners, pool technicians, contractors and caregivers. The vast majority are trustworthy and dedicated. A protection program still has to account for the few who are not, and for the many who could be manipulated or targeted.

Vetting

Vetting should match the level of access. Someone who will be alone with children or have keys and codes needs a more thorough check than a one-day contractor. Vetting should be repeated, not done once and forgotten. I describe our approach in Household Staff Vetting for UHNW Families.

Need to know

Staff should know what they need to do their jobs, and not much more. A housekeeper may need access to a room without knowing what is in its safe. A contractor may need access to a mechanical area without free movement through private areas. This is not about suspicion. It is about limiting what can leak, by accident or by pressure.

Staff as targets

The Semperis survey describes threats against staff and their families. Staff may also be approached by people posing as vendors, journalists or other staff, looking for information about the family. Staff should know who to report such approaches to and should be protected if they are threatened.

Vendors and contractors

Vendors get the same controls as visitors: expected, named, verified, escorted where appropriate and logged. Contractors working on security systems deserve particular care, because they know how the systems work.

Departures

When staff leave, codes are changed, access is removed and keys are collected. Departures on bad terms deserve a short review of what the person knew and whether anything else should change.

Working with law enforcement

Private security and law enforcement do different jobs. Police have legal authority, investigative reach and the power to arrest. A private team protects the family, documents incidents and supports investigators. The best outcomes I have seen come when the two work together, each doing what it does well.

Build the relationship early

I would rather introduce a family’s security lead to the local station on a quiet day than meet officers for the first time during an emergency. That introduction can include who lives at the property, whether officers are on site and armed, and a reliable number for the security lead. For families at risk of swatting, it is also the moment to ask whether the department accepts advance information.

Report, do not hide

Some families want to handle threats quietly to avoid publicity. I understand the instinct. When children, staff or physical safety are involved, I recommend reporting. Several of the cases in this guide, including the Calabasas detention, the Pelas arrest and the Toronto investigation, show what police can do when they have something to act on.

Give investigators something useful

A clear log, photographs, camera footage, delivery details and the context of any related cyber incident make a case easier to act on. The security team should keep that record from the first contact, not try to reconstruct it later.

Know the limits

Private officers should never act as police. They observe, report, protect the family and, where the law allows, delay. They do not chase, interrogate or use force beyond what the law and the situation permit. Making that clear to officers and families protects everyone.

Travel security for UHNW families

Travel is when routines break, communication gets patchy and exposure rises. It is also when impersonation schemes work best, because calls from unfamiliar numbers are expected.

Before the trip

An assessment of the destination, accommodation and planned movements. Decisions about who needs to know the itinerary, and a rule that it goes only to them through approved channels. Ground transport with a vetted driver, ideally security trained. Medical planning: nearest suitable hospitals, medications, insurance and evacuation arrangements.

During the trip

Agreed check-in times and channels. A rule that requests to change plans, add new drivers or share hotel details are verified with the protection team. Delayed social media posting. Care with hotel room numbers and reservations made in the family name.

Higher-risk travel

For destinations or circumstances with higher risk, close protection for UHNW families on the road may be appropriate: advance work, a protection officer and secure transport. Crypto conferences, high-profile events and trips following a specific threat often justify it.

The empty home

When the family travels, the home becomes an empty-house burglary target, especially if the trip is known. The home plan should change accordingly: residential coverage, response arrangements and posts held until the family is back.

Our travel security services are built around those principles.

Medical readiness and safe rooms

Medical emergencies are far more common than intrusions in most households, and an intrusion can itself trigger one. A protection program that ignores medical readiness is incomplete.

Medical readiness

A current list of each family member’s conditions, medications and doctors, available to responders. Emergency equipment appropriate to the household, with people trained to use it. A plan for getting emergency services onto the property quickly, including gate codes and directions. Staff trained in first aid. For older family members, wearable alerts that cover falls as well as intrusions. I go into detail in Estate Medical Readiness for UHNW Households.

Safe rooms

A safe room provides time and separation while help is coordinated. It is not a place to hide indefinitely, and it is not a guarantee. The questions I ask are practical. Can the family reach it from where they sleep? Do children know how to get there? Does communication work from inside, tested, not assumed? Does the security team know when it is occupied? Does it interfere with evacuation in a fire? The full discussion is in Safe Room Planning for UHNW Homes.

After an incident

Even when nobody is physically hurt, a confrontation is frightening. Shock can appear hours later. Someone should stay with affected family members, and medical or psychological support should be offered. The Toronto victim impact statement reported by CBC is a reminder that the aftermath can last for years.

Multiple residences and empty homes

Many UHNW families own several homes: a primary residence, a beach house, a ski property, an apartment in another city, sometimes homes abroad. Each one has its own risks, and the ones that sit empty for long periods are often the weakest.

The occupancy problem

An occupied home and an empty home need different protection. When the family is in residence, the priority is the people inside: detection, response and a plan for an intrusion. When the home is empty, the priority is detecting entry quickly and getting someone there before damage is done or before the house is used to learn about the family.

The trouble comes in the transitions. A family arrives at the beach house for a weekend, and the system is still set for an empty property. Or they leave, and nobody resets it. I want every residence to have a clear occupied mode and unoccupied mode, with someone responsible for switching between them and confirming it is done.

Consistent standards

Families often have strong security at the main home and much weaker arrangements elsewhere. The second home has an older alarm, a local caretaker with a key and no clear response plan. I recommend a baseline standard for every property: working detection on entrances, alarms monitored by someone who will respond, a known response time and a local contact who is vetted and briefed.

Information about other homes

An empty house can reveal a lot about a family: photographs, documents, schedules on a calendar, addresses of other properties. I ask families not to leave sensitive information at homes they rarely visit and to treat staff at those properties as part of the same vetting and training program.

Coordination

For families with several homes, a single point of coordination, whether a family office, an estate manager or a command center, should know which homes are occupied, who is where and what each property’s status is. That makes it possible to adjust coverage as the family moves and to respond quickly to an alert at any of them.

Public appearances, events and the predictable moments

Many of the riskiest moments for wealthy families are announced in advance. A charity gala. A conference panel. A product launch. A child’s graduation. A concert or sporting event. Ecostylia noted that the 97-year-old singer’s upcoming concert dates were published on his official schedule. That is normal for a public figure. It also means anyone can know where he will be.

Advance work

For any significant public appearance, I want someone to look at the venue in advance. Where will the principal arrive and leave? Where will they wait? Who controls access to private areas? Where are the exits? Where would a medical emergency be handled? How is the event being publicized, and does that publicity include anything it should not, such as the hotel or the arrival time?

Arrivals and departures

The same principle from the car door applies at events. The principal’s exposure in open space should be short and controlled. A private entrance is better than a red carpet. A departure through a service corridor is better than a walk through a crowd to a car parked on the street.

Family members at events

Spouses and children who attend events with the principal need to be part of the plan. A child separated from the family in a crowd, or a spouse who leaves early on their own, can be the weak point in an otherwise well-planned appearance.

Post-event exposure

Photographs from events can reveal more than people realize: jewelry, faces of children, the family’s car, the driver. I ask families to think about which photographs are released and when, and to ask event organizers to do the same.

Building a security culture in the household

Equipment and procedures only work if the people in the household follow them. The most effective protection programs I have seen have one thing in common: the family and staff see security as part of how the household runs, not as something imposed by outsiders.

Lead from the top

When the principal follows the procedures, everyone else does too. When the principal skips the callback, props open the side door or posts from the beach house, everyone learns that the rules are optional. I spend time with principals explaining why the procedures protect them, and I ask them to model the behavior they want.

Make it easy

Procedures that are too complicated get ignored. I aim for a small number of clear rules that everyone can remember: lock it if you are not using it, verify before you act on an unusual instruction, report anything strange to one named person, and never confront an intruder.

Reward reporting

Staff need to feel safe reporting mistakes and concerns. A housekeeper who admits leaving a window open, or a driver who reports that someone seemed to be following, is doing exactly what I want. If they are punished for it, they will stop reporting.

Keep it human

Security culture should not make a home feel like a fortress. Families should still enjoy their homes, host friends and live normally. The goal is that the right things happen automatically, so that nobody has to think about security most of the time, and everyone knows what to do on the day it matters.

High net worth security services: what a professional program includes

High net worth security services vary widely. Some providers supply guards. Some install equipment. Some offer close protection. A professional program brings these together around the family’s actual risks.

Assessment

Every program should start with an assessment, not a sales pitch. That means the homes, the family’s routines, public exposure, staff, travel and any specific threats. I describe what a real assessment looks like through our security assessment services.

Residential security

Detection, access control, alarm discipline, night and day routines, visitor management and, where warranted, trained residential officers. Our residential security services cover each of these.

Executive and close protection

Scaled to the principal and family members: drivers, protection officers, advance work and coordination with the residential team.

Exposure reduction

Ongoing work to reduce what strangers can learn about homes, schedules, holdings and family members.

Procedures and training

Verification and duress procedures, incident plans, staff training, family briefings and tabletop exercises.

Coordination

One plan across homes, travel, the family office and cyber providers, with one decision-maker in an incident.

Testing

Procedures that are never tested drift. A professional program tests alarms, response times, verification and family plans regularly, and fixes what it finds.

Research behind the work

At MSB Protection, we run our own in-house research and development work aimed at countering the kinds of threats described in this guide. Unlike most security providers, we study how intrusions, impersonation, swatting and stalking actually unfold against households and test how detection, procedures and response can work together. That work feeds directly into the programs we build for families.

How to choose a provider and what to ask

People often search for recommended hnw security teams expecting a list of names. I cannot give you that list, and I would be cautious about anyone who claims to be everyone’s first choice. What I can give you is a set of questions that separate strong providers from weak ones.

Questions about the home

What happens, step by step, when an exterior sensor triggers at 3 a.m.? Who receives the alert? How long until someone is physically on the property? What do your officers do if the principal cannot use a phone? How do you handle garages and secondary entrances?

Questions about people

How do you handle an instruction from someone who sounds like the principal? Do you use verification and duress words? How do you protect children, elderly parents and staff? How do you train and supervise your officers?

Questions about new threats

How would you prepare our household for a swatting response? How do you handle a stalker who keeps changing numbers? What would you do if our family office were hit by cyber extortion? How do you reduce our exposure online?

Questions about limits

What will you not promise? What are the limits of private security? How do you work with law enforcement?

What a good answer sounds like

Specific, practical and honest. A good provider describes procedures, not feelings. They talk about the family, not just the principal. They tell you what they cannot do. And they want to start with an assessment.

What recommended hnw security teams have in common

In my experience, the teams families come to trust share a few habits. They write things down: procedures, logs, incident reports. They train regularly, not once. They supervise their people in the field. They coordinate with law enforcement rather than trying to replace it. And they review their own work after every incident, asking what could have gone better.

What to be wary of

Promises of complete safety. Claims to be the choice of famous clients that cannot be checked. Proposals that start with how many guards you need before anyone has looked at your homes. Providers who cannot explain how their officers respond to armed police.

A 30-day plan for families and family offices

Not everything has to happen at once. Here is how I would sequence the first month for a family starting from scratch.

Week 1: see what others see

List everyone the program needs to cover. Review public exposure for the principal, family and homes. Identify the most predictable routines: school runs, regular appointments, standing events. Ask the family office which instructions can cause physical harm if faked.

Week 2: fix the home basics

Walk each home with a professional. Check that alarms work and are being used, day and night. Secure garages, secondary doors and ground-floor windows. Put panic buttons where people actually spend their time, including in elderly parents’ homes. Write a night routine and assign an owner.

Week 3: set the procedures

Put callback, verification word and two-person rules in place for high-risk instructions. Set up family passwords for children’s pickups. Agree an out-of-band channel for incidents. Name one decision-maker for combined cyber and physical incidents. Brief household staff on visitors, deliveries and suspicious contact.

Week 4: practice and plan ahead

Run a tabletop exercise for an occupied-home intrusion and for a swatting response. Review travel plans for the next quarter and decide where close protection or a security driver is needed. Contact the local police department about advance information if the family’s profile warrants it. Schedule the next review.

After 30 days

Keep testing. Revisit exposure every few months. Update procedures when staff, homes or threats change. A program that is reviewed and practiced stays useful. One that sits in a binder does not.

Frequently asked questions

What is high net worth security?

High net worth security is the protection of wealthy individuals, their families, homes, movements and staff against crime, targeting and harassment. In 2026, it covers home security, close protection, family office procedures, exposure reduction and planning for threats such as impersonation, swatting and stalking.

What does home security for high net worth individuals include?

Home security for high net worth individuals includes perimeter detection, access control, alarm discipline day and night, secured secondary entrances, visitor management, panic buttons within reach, a plan for an occupied-home intrusion and, where warranted, residential security officers.

When do families need close protection for UHNW families?

Close protection for UHNW families is worth considering when there is a specific threat, a high public profile, higher-risk travel or predictable high-exposure moments such as public appearances and meetings with new contacts. It can be scaled from a security driver to a full team.

What is security for UHNW family offices?

Security for UHNW family offices covers who can give instructions, how they are verified, how schedules and payments are protected, how staff are trained and how cyber incidents are connected to physical protection. Family office high net worth individuals security extends that to the family, homes and staff the office supports.

How is personal security for high networth individuals different with crypto?

Personal security for high networth individuals with digital assets focuses on confidentiality, home protection and the risk of physical coercion, because hardware wallets and self custody do not stop someone being forced to unlock them.

What should private security for high net worth family members cover?

Private security for high net worth family members should cover spouses, children, elderly parents, adult children and household staff, each with protection matched to their routines and exposure.

How do I evaluate high net worth security services?

Ask for specific procedures: what happens when an alarm sounds overnight, how impersonation is handled, how swatting and stalking are prepared for, and what the provider will not promise. Good high net worth security services start with an assessment.

What makes recommended hnw security teams different?

Recommended hnw security teams are defined by what they can demonstrate: clear procedures, trained and supervised people, honest limits, coordination with law enforcement and regular testing. Reputation matters, but procedures matter more.

Conclusion: The fundamentals, applied to this year’s threats

The incidents behind this guide span four countries in Europe, two in North America and several kinds of threat. An armed invasion through a garage window. Masked figures on a doorstep. An abduction at a car door. A cloned voice moving millions. Extortion that reaches families. False calls bringing armed police. Stalkers moving from messages to the yard. Intruders surprising a 97-year-old in his kitchen.

What strikes me is how often the same fundamentals would have helped. An alarm that was on. A window that was closed. Detection at the perimeter. A callback before acting on a voice. A schedule that was not shared. A family that knew what to do. An officer who knew how to stand when armed police arrived.

High net worth security in 2026 is not about exotic technology. It is about applying those fundamentals to the threats families actually face, across every home, every generation and every movement, and testing them until they work under pressure.

That is what our residential, executive protection, travel and assessment teams do at MSB Protection, supported by our in-house research and development. If you want to talk through your family’s situation, you can contact us.

Sources

About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.