Close Protection for UHNW Families Traveling Abroad

Posted On:Oct 18, 2026
Posted By:Michael Braun

Close protection for UHNW families starts before the flight

Close protection for UHNW families abroad is decided long before anyone boards a plane. It is decided when someone accepts an invitation, picks a car service, books a villa, shares an itinerary or agrees to “just meet at the hotel.” Two sets of kidnappings that came back into the news this month show how quickly a trip can turn when those early decisions go unexamined.

On October 6, 2026, BusinessMirror reported that two South Korean nationals had been kidnapped for ransom in separate incidents in Metro Manila in August and September. In one, a 41-year-old businessman was traveling along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City on September 4 with his girlfriend and another Korean national when a sport utility vehicle bumped their car and forced them to stop. Several men seized him and drove him away. The kidnappers demanded 30 million pesos. He was recovered four days later at a condominium in Pasay by the Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group, after his family had paid nearly 550,000 pesos.

Further north and west, Turkish media revisited an abduction in Abkhazia this week. According to an English-language account published by News TRNC on October 18, citing the Turkish daily Sabah, an Istanbul businessman and his partner traveled to Abkhazia on a trade invitation from a friend, were forced into a vehicle by armed men, held at a remote mountain house and beaten, while video of the abuse was sent to their families with a $5 million ransom demand. The regional news service Caucasian Knot, in an October 2 summary, dates the abduction to May 11, says the three men were located and freed on May 14, and reports that the friend who issued the invitation was later detained on suspicion of involvement.

This article supports the travel section of our 2026 guide to high net worth security. The guide sets out the principles. Here I want to show how a protection program actually works for a family that travels: how to examine the invitation, how to control movement on the ground, how to set up communications that tell you within minutes when something is wrong, and what to do in the first hours if someone does not check in.

I am writing as someone who plans this kind of travel for a living. I am not going to tell families to stop traveling to places they want to go. I am going to tell them how to go with their eyes open.

Close protection agent holds an SUV door at a hotel entrance at dusk as a traveling family approaches with luggage

Key takeaways

The trip’s risk often starts with the invitation. In Abkhazia, according to the authorities cited by Caucasian Knot, the friend who invited the businessmen was later detained as a suspect. Independent checks on the host, the deal and the itinerary are part of protection.
Vehicle movement is where kidnappings tend to happen. In Manila, police say an SUV bumped the victim’s car to force it to stop. A trained driver and a planned route change what happens next.
Do not let the destination decide your security level for you. Two kidnappings in a large, busy city prompted the South Korean embassy to hold a joint conference with Philippine police on October 1.
Set up check-ins that someone actually monitors, so that a missed contact triggers a response in minutes rather than a worried phone call the next day.
Decide before the trip who the family calls, who speaks to police and the embassy, and who handles any contact from kidnappers.
The family office should treat itineraries as sensitive, share them on a need-to-know basis and plan travel and residential security together.
Close protection abroad usually works through vetted local partners. Who those partners are, and how they were checked, matters as much as who flies with you.

Two kidnappings in Manila and what they share

BusinessMirror’s report draws on the South Korean Embassy in Manila, the Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group and the South Korean Foreign Ministry. The embassy declined to give much detail beyond confirming that both victims had been rescued safely.

The first case, which had already been reported in local media, involved the 41-year-old businessman abducted in Pasay City on September 4. According to the Anti-Kidnapping Group, he was traveling along Roxas Boulevard with his girlfriend and another Korean national when an SUV bumped their car, forcing it to stop. Several men then allegedly seized him and took him away. The newspaper describes this method as one commonly used in kidnapping-for-ransom cases. The initial demand was 30 million pesos. Four days later, police recovered him at a condominium in Pasay City, after his family had paid nearly 550,000 pesos.

The second case was announced by the Foreign Ministry in Seoul. A South Korean man in his 40s was riding in a vehicle with an acquaintance in the Pasay area in the last week of August when abductors forced him into their vehicle and drove off, leaving the acquaintance behind. About 18 hours later, the kidnappers contacted a different acquaintance and demanded a ransom. He was later freed unharmed.

The two cases prompted the embassy to strengthen coordination with Philippine law enforcement. On October 1, about 40 officials from the embassy, the Korean National Police Agency and the Philippine National Police attended a joint conference on overseas kidnapping response. They discussed crisis negotiation, cybercrime investigation and information sharing, and ran a joint simulation exercise.

Three features of these cases stand out for me.

Both abductions happened in vehicles, on the move, in a busy part of a capital city. Neither involved a remote road or a jungle camp. That fits what I see in many kidnapping environments: the vulnerable moment is the journey, and especially the moment a vehicle is forced to stop.

In both cases the victim was with other people, and the kidnappers took only the person they wanted. In the second case, they left the acquaintance behind. That suggests they knew who they were looking for, which raises the question of how they knew where he would be.

And in both, the ransom contact went to someone close to the victim: the family in the first case, a second acquaintance in the second. Kidnappers need a channel to the people who will pay. Families who have not thought about who that channel will be, and how they will respond, end up improvising under extreme pressure.

The business invitation in Abkhazia

The Abkhazia case is older, but it was reported again in Turkish media between October 16 and 18, and it illustrates a risk I see in UHNW travel more often than people expect: the trip that someone else arranges for you.

According to Caucasian Knot, which cites the Abkhaz prosecutor’s office and other regional sources, three Turkish citizens were abducted by an armed group on May 11 in the village of Duripsh in the Gudauta district. They were forced into a Toyota Land Cruiser Prado and taken to a place where they were held. The relatives of one of them were asked to pay $5 million. On May 14, the State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia located all three and freed them. A criminal case was opened for kidnapping, extortion and illegal possession of weapons, and several suspects were detained. Caucasian Knot reports that the status of the third man, the friend who had issued the invitation, changed during the investigation: he was first treated as a victim and then, on May 17, detained on suspicion of involvement. A further suspect was detained on September 14.

The Turkish accounts published this week add detail, which I present as reported. News TRNC, citing Sabah, says the businessman works in pharmaceutical warehousing and packaging in Istanbul’s Beylikdüzü district, that he and his partner traveled at the invitation of their friend to discuss a trade deal, that they were beaten for two days at a secluded mountain house, and that the kidnappers filmed the beatings and sent the footage to their families in Istanbul. Relatives contacted Turkey’s foreign ministry, and Abkhaz security services used local cameras to locate the house.

Caucasian Knot’s summary also places the case in context. It notes that on September 27 a local man was detained on suspicion of murdering a 26-year-old Russian tourist, and it lists earlier abductions of foreign businesspeople in the territory over the past decade. I mention that context not to single out one place, but because it is exactly the kind of local picture that should be part of any decision to travel there.

What makes this case useful for planning is that the risk came packaged as an opportunity. The travelers were invited by someone they knew, for a reason that made sense, to a place where their host presumably had contacts. If the authorities’ account is correct, the invitation itself was the setup. No amount of physical protection at the destination fully addresses that if nobody independently examined the trip before it began.

Why travel changes the threat picture

At home, a well-protected family has layers that took years to build: a known neighborhood, a residence designed around their needs, trusted staff, vetted drivers, relationships with local police, and a security team that knows the routine. When they travel, almost all of that is left behind. They arrive in a place where they do not know the streets, do not speak the language, cannot tell a normal situation from an unusual one, and depend on people they have never met.

Travel also concentrates information. An itinerary lists exactly where the family will be, hour by hour. It passes through travel agents, hotel staff, car companies, assistants, hosts and local contacts. Each of those is a point where the information can leak, and abroad, the family has little visibility of who sees it.

Finally, travel changes who the family is in the eyes of the local environment. At home, a successful businessperson may be one of many. In some destinations, the same person stands out immediately: by their clothes, their watch, their vehicle, their hotel, their entourage or simply their nationality. The South Korean cases are a reminder that criminal groups in some cities look specifically for foreign businesspeople, and that a large, busy, modern city is not by itself a sign of low risk.

None of this means a family should travel in a convoy with armed guards everywhere. For many trips, the right level of protection is discreet and mostly invisible. What it does mean is that the protection has to be built for the trip, rather than assumed from home.

The invitation check: vetting the host, the deal and the itinerary

The Abkhazia case is a sharp illustration of something I always do before a client travels for business: I look at the trip as if I were the person who might want to exploit it. Who knows they are coming? Who arranged the trip? What do we know about the host and the people the host will introduce? Who chose the meeting places, the accommodation and the transport? What would happen if the host were not who they appeared to be?

The invitation check is not about distrusting friends or business partners. It is about making sure that decisions with real consequences are not made on trust alone. In practice it covers:

The host. Who are they, what is their business, who else knows them, and is there anything in public or professional records that raises concern? If the host is a long-standing partner, that is reassuring. If the relationship is new, or recently changed, more checking is justified.
The deal. Does the reason for the trip make sense? Is there pressure to travel quickly, to come alone, to keep the trip quiet, or to meet somewhere unusual? Those are warning signs in themselves.
The destination. What is the current security picture? Are there recent cases involving foreign businesspeople? What is the local police capability, and how does the traveler’s own government support citizens there? Is the area recognized by the traveler’s home country, and does that affect consular help?
The arrangements. Who is booking the hotel, the cars, the drivers? Can the traveler’s own team book them instead, or at least verify them independently?
The exit. If something feels wrong after arrival, how does the traveler leave? Is there an alternative route out?

Sometimes the result of the check is simple: go, but book your own hotel and your own car. Sometimes it is to move the meeting to a neutral city. Occasionally it is not to go. A professional team should be able to give the family that advice plainly, and the family should feel able to take it without embarrassment toward the host.

Personal security for high networth individuals on the road: the vehicle and the bump

Personal security for high networth individuals traveling abroad depends heavily on what happens in vehicles. The Manila case describes a familiar method: one vehicle bumps another and forces it to stop, and the attackers take the person they want while the occupants are still reacting. We covered a related case in our post on close protection after a crypto kidnapping, where the vulnerable moment was the car door.

The bump works because ordinary drivers react in ordinary ways. They stop. They get out to inspect the damage or exchange details. They unlock the doors. In many places that is the right thing to do after a minor collision. In a kidnapping environment, it is exactly what the attackers are counting on.

A trained security driver reacts differently. They keep the doors locked. They assess whether the collision was deliberate: was the other vehicle following, did it brake or turn suddenly, are there people approaching on foot? If something is wrong, they do not stop and get out; they drive away from the situation if they safely can, toward a known safe location, and report it. The difference between those two reactions is often the difference between an incident and an abduction.

The car itself matters less than people think. An armored vehicle is appropriate in some places for some clients, but in many cities a well-maintained, unremarkable car with a trained driver, locked doors and a planned route is the better choice, because it does not draw attention. What matters more is:

Who the driver is, how they were vetted, and whether they are trained to recognize and respond to an attack.
Whether the route is planned, with alternatives, and varied where the trip lasts more than a few days.
Whether the vehicle is tracked by someone who will notice if it stops unexpectedly or leaves the planned route.
Whether the principal knows to stay in the vehicle with the doors locked if something happens.
Whether there is a known safe destination, such as a hotel with good security or a police station, on each route.

For families who use drivers at home, our post on security drivers in Los Angeles explains what to look for. The same principles apply abroad, with the added challenge that the driver will usually be a local partner the family has never met.

Drivers, local partners and who you trust abroad

Very few families travel with their own security team for every leg of every trip. Close protection abroad usually depends on local partners: drivers, security officers, fixers, hotel security, sometimes a local protection company. That is sensible, because local partners know the city, the language and the police. But it also means the family is trusting people who were chosen by someone else.

In the Manila cases, the kidnappers knew whom to take. In the Abkhazia case, the authorities say one of the people traveling with the victims was involved. I am not suggesting that local partners are a threat. I am suggesting that how they are chosen deserves real attention.

When we work with local partners, I want to know:

Who they are, how long they have operated, whether they are licensed where licensing exists, and who has worked with them before.
Which individuals will actually be assigned, not just which company.
How those individuals were vetted and how they are supervised.
What they will be told about the client and the itinerary, and what they will not be told.
How they communicate with our team and how often.
What they will do if there is an incident, and what they are not permitted to do.

The itinerary point is important. Local partners need enough information to do their job: pick-up points, times and destinations. They do not need the client’s full name in advance in every case, the purpose of the trip or the rest of the family’s schedule. Releasing information in stages, close to when it is needed, reduces the window in which it can leak.

Hotels, villas and rentals: home security for high net worth individuals away from home

Home security for high net worth individuals does not stop at the front door of the primary residence. When a family travels, their hotel suite, villa or rental becomes their home for the duration, often with far fewer protections than they are used to.

Hotels can be well protected, with controlled access, staff and cameras. But they are also public buildings with many staff and guests, and room numbers and arrival times travel quickly through the front desk, housekeeping and the concierge. Villas and private rentals offer privacy, but often come with weak locks, no alarm, unknown staff and owners who may have handed out keys to many people.

For accommodation, I look at:

Location: how far from the places the family needs to go, and what the routes between them look like.
Access: who can get to the family’s floor or the villa’s grounds, and how.
Staff: who works in the property, who has keys and who will know the family is there.
Booking: whether the reservation can be made in a different name or through a company, and how many people at the property will know who the guest is.
Room or suite position: avoiding ground floors where possible in hotels, and checking the second exit route.
Villa specifics: locks, lighting, perimeter, an alarm if one exists, a safe that is bolted down, and whether the family’s own security can be present.
Emergency: the nearest hospital, police and the route to the airport if the family needs to leave quickly.

For high-profile clients, an advance visit by the security team before arrival is often worth more than any other single step, because it turns assumptions into knowledge.

Private security for high net worth family members traveling separately

Private security for high net worth family members becomes complicated when the family is not traveling together. A spouse may be on a separate itinerary. Adult children travel independently, often to places with their own risks. Younger children may travel with a nanny, with grandparents or on a school trip.

The family members who travel without the principal often have less protection, less planning and more public exposure, especially younger family members who post freely. They can also be just as valuable to someone who wants leverage, because a kidnapping of a family member can achieve the same result as a kidnapping of the principal.

I want every family member’s significant travel to go through the same basic process, scaled to the risk: a look at the destination, sensible accommodation and transport, a way to check in, and a contact who knows where they are. For young adults, that conversation works well when it is framed as practical support rather than control: help with a reliable car, a well-chosen hotel, a phone number to call if anything goes wrong, and an agreement about not posting their location in real time.

Close protection for UHNW families: when an agent should travel with you

Families often ask me a direct question: for this trip, do we need someone with us? There is no fixed rule, but there are clear factors that push the answer toward yes.

The destination has a recent pattern of attacks on foreign businesspeople or wealthy visitors. The Manila cases and the Abkhazia history are examples of the kind of information that should change the plan.
The principal is recognizable, through public profile, media coverage or the nature of their business, or the trip itself will be publicized.
The trip involves fixed, known appointments, such as a conference, a signing, a public event or a meeting arranged by others, that make the principal’s location predictable.
The family is traveling with children, or with older relatives who cannot move quickly in an emergency.
There is a known threat, such as a stalker, a dispute or a warning from law enforcement, that could follow the family.
The local support is unknown or weak, with no trusted local partner, limited police capability or limited consular help.

When an agent does travel, their value is often in the work nobody sees: advancing the hotel, checking the routes, briefing the driver, watching who takes an interest in the family in the lobby, and making the small decisions that keep the family out of the vulnerable moments. A good agent abroad is not a bodyguard standing in the background of photographs. They are the person who makes sure the plan is followed and adjusts it when the situation changes.

Where a full-time agent is not justified, a hybrid approach often works: a security lead who plans the trip and monitors it remotely, vetted local drivers, and an agent who joins for the higher-risk parts, such as airport arrivals, a particular meeting or an evening event.

Children, nannies and the separate itinerary

Families traveling with young children usually split up during the day. One parent goes to meetings, the other takes the children out, a nanny stays at the hotel with the youngest. Each of those groups is now a separate movement with its own exposure, and the one with the children is often less protected and more predictable than the others, because children’s days follow a rhythm: breakfast, the pool, a park, a nap, an early dinner.

I want the children’s group to have its own small plan. Who is with them, which car they use, where they are going, how they check in and what the nanny does if something feels wrong. The nanny should have the security lead’s number, should know the code word, and should understand that she can end an outing and return to the hotel without asking anyone’s permission. She should also know not to discuss the family’s plans with hotel staff, other nannies or friendly strangers, and not to post photos of the children from the trip.

If a protection agent is traveling with the family, the question of who they stay with when the family splits needs to be answered in advance. Often the right answer is the children, not the principal.

Public moments abroad: restaurants, events and the watch on your wrist

Travel tends to create more public exposure than ordinary life at home. Families go out to dinner more, visit busy places, attend events, shop in expensive districts and wear things they would not wear on an ordinary Tuesday at home. In many cities, criminal groups watch exactly those places.

We wrote about street robberies of watches and jewelry in our post on personal security in public, and those lessons travel. On a trip, I want families to think about:

What they wear in public. A conspicuous watch or jewelry signals value to anyone who is looking, and is harder to protect abroad than at home.
Arrivals and departures at restaurants and hotels, which are the predictable moments when people stand on the curb waiting for a car.
Where the car waits, and whether the driver can pull up only when the family is ready to step out.
Photographs taken in public and posted in real time, which tell anyone following the account where the family is.
Unexpected approaches from people who seem friendly, helpful or interested in the family’s plans.

None of this means the family should stay in the hotel. It means the security plan should cover the evening as carefully as the business meeting.

Phones, data and the digital trail on the road

Travel creates a digital trail that can point people to the traveler in physical space. Location sharing, check-ins on social media, booking confirmations forwarded to personal email, hotel Wi-Fi and photos with location data embedded all contribute to it. I keep this section short because the aim is physical, but it is a real part of how people get found.

The practical steps are simple: switch off location sharing except with the security team, avoid posting in real time, be careful about what is discussed on hotel networks, keep devices with you or locked in a secured safe, and consider a travel phone for higher-risk destinations so that a lost or seized device does not expose the family’s whole contact list. If a phone is taken during an incident, assume that its contents, including family contacts, are now known to the people who took it, and tell the security lead so that the family can be warned.

Check-ins that someone actually monitors

In the second Manila case, according to the South Korean Foreign Ministry as reported by BusinessMirror, the kidnappers made contact about 18 hours after the abduction. In the Abkhazia case, the families learned what had happened when video of the beatings arrived. In both situations, the people who cared about the victims found out on the kidnappers’ schedule.

A good travel program changes that timing. The goal is that if a family member does not arrive where they were expected, someone on the security side knows within minutes, not hours, and starts following a plan.

Check-ins do not have to be intrusive. For many trips, they can be as simple as:

A message on arrival at each new location: airport, hotel, meeting, restaurant.
Agreed windows during the day when a short message is expected.
Location sharing with the security team for the duration of the trip, switched off when the trip ends.
A code word that means “I am not able to speak freely,” agreed before departure.
A clear rule for what happens if a check-in is missed: first a call, then a call to the driver or local partner, then escalation.

What matters is that someone is actually watching. A check-in that goes to the principal’s assistant, who is in a meeting, or to a security company inbox that nobody reads at night, provides no protection. The person monitoring needs to be available for the whole trip, aware of the itinerary and authorized to escalate.

I also want families to think about what kidnappers will try to do with communications. They will often take phones. They may use the victim’s own phone to contact family. They may send images or video to create fear and urgency. A family that has agreed in advance that every contact like this goes immediately to the security lead, and that nobody negotiates, pays or argues on their own, is in a far stronger position than one that is learning this in real time.

If someone does not check in: the first hours

The first hours after a family member goes missing abroad are chaotic. People are frightened, information is scarce and everyone wants to do something. That is when a written plan earns its value. The plan I put in place for travel covers, at minimum:

Verify. Try every way to reach the person and the people with them: phone, messages, the driver, the hotel, the meeting host. Many missed check-ins turn out to be a dead phone battery. But the verification should take minutes, not hours.
Escalate inside the family’s circle. The security lead informs the person the family has designated to make decisions, usually a family member or the head of the family office.
Preserve information. Last known location, last messages, the itinerary, the names of the people with them, photos, the vehicle details. Write it down while it is fresh.
Contact the right authorities. The traveler’s embassy or consulate and, in coordination with them where appropriate, the local police. In the Manila cases, the Anti-Kidnapping Group recovered both victims. In Abkhazia, according to the Turkish reports, relatives went to Turkey’s foreign ministry, which set the response in motion.
Control communication. Decide who answers any call or message from people claiming to hold the family member. Decide that nobody else speaks to them. Keep the matter out of public channels and social media.
Bring in specialist help. If the family has kidnap and ransom insurance, the policy usually provides access to specialist response consultants. Call the insurer early.

Payment decisions are among the hardest a family can face. In the first Manila case, the family reportedly paid a fraction of the initial demand before police recovered the victim. I am not going to give general advice on whether to pay in a given case, because that depends on the law, the country, the insurer, the authorities’ advice and the specific situation. What I will say is that those decisions should be made with professional advice and in coordination with the authorities, never alone and never under the kidnappers’ deadline.

Working with local police and your embassy

Both of this month’s cases ended with local security services finding the victims. In Manila, the South Korean embassy then went further and held a joint conference and simulation exercise with Philippine police on October 1, explicitly to improve information sharing and crisis response. That is a model for what families should want: a working relationship with the authorities that exists before anything happens.

Families cannot build relationships with foreign police forces themselves, but their security team can prepare. Before a high-risk trip, I want to know:

The contact details for the traveler’s embassy or consulate, including the after-hours emergency number.
Whether the traveler is registered with their government’s traveler enrollment program where one exists.
The local emergency numbers and, where relevant, the specialist unit that handles kidnapping or serious crime.
Whether our local partners have working relationships with the police, and with whom.
Whether the traveler’s own government recognizes and has consular access in the place being visited, and if not, which government is the protecting power.

Working with the authorities is not always simple. In some places, the police are excellent and fast. In others, they are under-resourced, or involving them has risks of its own. That is part of the destination assessment, and it is why the decision about when and how to contact local police in an emergency should be made with advice, and planned for ahead of time.

Security for UHNW family offices planning travel

Security for UHNW family offices includes travel planning, because the family office is usually where the itinerary is built. Flights, aircraft, hotels, cars, restaurants, meetings and events all pass through the office. That gives it the ability to protect the trip and also makes it a source of leaks.

For travel, I want the family office to:

Treat itineraries as confidential documents, shared on a need-to-know basis, in pieces where possible, and never on open group chats or as attachments sent to long distribution lists.
Route bookings for high-risk trips through the security team or at least have the security team review them.
Avoid using the principal’s name where a company or alias booking is lawful and practical.
Plan residential security for the homes the family leaves at the same time as the travel plan. Our post on guarding the family’s schedule covers the calendar side.
Keep a central record of who is traveling where, for every family member, so that the security team knows when several people are abroad at once.
Know the insurance position, including any kidnap and ransom cover, and how to activate it.

Private aviation adds its own steps. Departures from executive terminals reduce exposure compared with commercial airports, but they still create predictable moments. Our post on Van Nuys FBO executive protection covers the departure side in Los Angeles.

High net worth security services for travel

High net worth security services for travel range from a desk-based assessment to a full protective detail. The right level depends on who is traveling, where, why and how visible they are. For many families, a single program includes several levels across the year.

Pre-travel assessment. A written look at the destination, the itinerary, accommodation and transport, with specific recommendations. Appropriate for nearly every significant trip.
Vetted local services. Drivers, vehicles and, where needed, local security officers arranged and checked by the security team.
Remote monitoring. Check-ins, location monitoring and an on-call security lead for the duration of the trip.
Advance work. A member of the team travels ahead to check accommodation, routes, venues and local partners.
Close protection. One or more protection agents travel with the family, working with local partners.
Medical support. Planning for medical emergencies, from knowing the nearest suitable hospital to arranging evacuation cover.

Our travel security and executive protection services are built around those levels. At MSB Protection we also do our own in-house research and development, and some of that work goes into the tools our teams use to monitor travelers and respond quickly when a check-in is missed.

What recommended HNW security teams ask before the family leaves

When families ask what separates recommended HNW security teams from others, I point them to the questions those teams ask before a trip. A team that is not asking these questions is not planning the trip. I go into the broader picture in our post on what separates recommended HNW security teams.

Who arranged this trip, and how well do we know them?
Who knows the itinerary, and who needs to?
Who is driving, and how were they chosen?
Where are the vulnerable moments: arrivals, departures, fixed meetings, predictable routes?
What happens if a check-in is missed?
Who does the family call, and who speaks to the authorities and the insurer?
What is the medical plan?
What is the plan for leaving early if something feels wrong?
Who is looking after the houses while the family is away?

After the trip: the debrief

Families are tired when they get home, and nobody wants to sit through a meeting about a trip that went well. But a short debrief, ten minutes with the security lead, is how the next trip gets better.

The questions are simple. Did anything feel wrong? Did anyone show unusual interest in the family? Did the drivers, hotels and local partners do what they were supposed to? Were the check-ins workable? Was anything shared or posted that should not have been? What would the family change next time?

The security team should also record anything that should affect future trips to the same place: a hotel that handled privacy well or badly, a driver who was excellent, a route that was slower than expected. Over time, that record becomes one of the more useful things a family’s security program owns.

Family office high net worth individuals security: a pre-departure checklist

Family office high net worth individuals security for travel can be reduced to a short checklist that the family office completes, with the security team, before any significant trip:

Invitation, host and purpose reviewed, with independent checks where the relationship is new.
Destination assessment completed, including recent incidents and local police capability.
Accommodation reviewed and, for higher-risk trips, booked or checked by the security team.
Drivers and vehicles vetted; routes planned with alternatives and safe locations.
Itinerary shared only with those who need it.
Check-in schedule agreed, monitoring person assigned, code word agreed.
Emergency plan written: who decides, who communicates, who contacts the embassy and insurer.
Embassy contacts and traveler registration confirmed.
Medical plan in place.
Residential security for the homes left behind adjusted for the travel dates.
Family and guests reminded not to post locations in real time.

Frequently asked questions

What does close protection for UHNW families include when traveling abroad?

It can range from a pre-travel assessment and vetted drivers to a full protective detail with advance work, depending on the risk. A sound program also includes monitored check-ins, an emergency plan, coordination with local partners and authorities, medical planning and protection of the homes the family leaves.

How do kidnappers choose their targets abroad?

Often through information: who is arriving, where they will stay, who they are meeting and how they will move. In the Manila cases, the kidnappers took specific people from vehicles with others inside. In the Abkhazia case, authorities say someone close to the victims was involved. Controlling information and vetting the people around the trip are part of protection.

Is personal security for high networth individuals necessary in safe cities?

Risk depends on the person, the purpose of the trip and their visibility, as well as the city. The South Korean cases took place in a large, busy capital. A short assessment tells you what level is sensible for a specific trip.

What should a family do if a traveling family member is kidnapped?

Follow the emergency plan: verify, escalate to the designated decision maker, preserve information, contact the embassy and the appropriate authorities, control all communication with the kidnappers through one person and call the kidnap and ransom insurer if there is a policy. Do not negotiate, pay or post publicly without professional advice.

Should business invitations be checked by a security team?

For travel to higher-risk places, or when the host relationship is new, yes. A quiet independent check of the host, the purpose and the arrangements is a small cost compared with the consequences of a trip that was designed to trap the traveler.

Bringing travel into the security plan

The Manila kidnappings and the Abkhazia abduction share a pattern I see in many travel incidents. The danger came during movement, from people who knew whom they wanted, and the families learned what had happened on the kidnappers’ timetable. In Abkhazia, if the authorities are correct, the danger was built into the trip from the moment the invitation was accepted.

Close protection for UHNW families abroad is therefore not only about who stands next to the family on arrival. It is about examining the invitation, choosing the people around the trip, controlling who knows the itinerary, training the driver to react correctly to a bump, monitoring check-ins and knowing exactly what to do in the first hour if someone goes missing.

For the complete framework, read our 2026 guide to high net worth security. If your family is planning travel and you would like an assessment or a protection plan, our travel security team can help, and you can contact us for a confidential conversation.

Sources

About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.

Close Protection for UHNW Families Traveling Abroad