Close Protection for UHNW Families in Los Angeles

Posted On:Oct 10, 2026
Posted By:Michael Braun

When people hear executive protection, they usually picture one principal and one protector.

That is often not how a high-net-worth family actually lives.

A UHNW household may include a spouse, several children, nannies, drivers, executive assistants, house managers, chefs, tutors, domestic employees and a family office coordinating several residences and constant travel.

The principal may be in Century City while a spouse is in Beverly Hills, one child is at school, another is at practice, a nanny is moving between locations and the family office is changing weekend travel plans.

That is one protection environment.

I do not look at those movements as unrelated errands.

I look at the family as a connected system.

That is the focus of this article: not how to hire a UHNW security consultant, not how to vet an executive protection company and not general family-office governance, but how close protection actually works when the client is a family rather than one executive.

For me, the distinction matters because protecting only the most visible person can leave the rest of the family carrying the same exposure without the same support.

A spouse may know the principal’s schedule.

Children create predictable daily movements.

A nanny may know where the children will be tomorrow morning.

A driver may know which residence is occupied.

An assistant may have the complete travel calendar.

A teenager may unintentionally publish where the family is spending the weekend.

None of those people needs to be treated like a suspect.

But every one of them affects the protective picture.

The threat environment has also changed enough that more organizations are thinking seriously about personal protection. After the December 2024 killing of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, a Reuters analysis of proxy statements published in April 2025 found that at least a dozen S&P 500 companies had flagged an increase in security risks, and several large companies disclosed new or increased security expenses for their executives.

That corporate trend matters to family protection because the exposure does not stop when the executive leaves the office.

It follows the person home.

And once it reaches the home, the spouse and children may become part of the same risk environment even though they had nothing to do with the business decision, lawsuit, public controversy or hostile attention that created the concern.

Key takeaways

Protect the family system, not only the principal. Spouses, children and household employees can all become part of the same exposure.
Children require different protection than adults. School, sports, friends and social life should be protected without making childhood feel like a security operation.
School runs are predictable by nature. The objective is not to make them chaotic. It is to understand the routine, control unnecessary information and recognize when something changes.
Nannies and household staff are part of the protection environment. They need clear procedures and good communication without being turned into amateur protectors.
The spouse may need an independent protection plan. A principal’s detail does not automatically cover the spouse’s movements, events, travel or exposure.
Teenagers create a separate information problem. Social media can reveal location, friendships, vehicles, schools, vacations and routines even when the parents post nothing.
Family travel requires one coordinated picture. Aircraft, hotels, vehicles, children, luggage, nannies and destination security should not be planned in separate silos.
The family office should coordinate information, not micromanage tactical protection. Security needs accurate schedules and changes quickly, while sensitive information should still remain compartmentalized.
Good close protection should preserve normal family life. A program that creates so much friction that the family avoids it will eventually fail.

Family protection is different from principal protection

A single executive can be relatively straightforward from an organizational standpoint.

One calendar.

One vehicle movement.

One office.

One principal.

A family is different.

Imagine a household with two parents and three children.

At 7:00 a.m. one parent leaves for the airport.

At 7:30 a nanny takes one child to school.

At 8:00 the second parent leaves for a workout.

Another child has a later school start.

A housekeeper arrives.

Landscapers enter.

A driver leaves for fuel.

A tutor is coming that afternoon.

One child is being picked up by another family after school.

The oldest teenager has made independent plans.

That is not one movement.

It is a network of movements.

If protection planning remains centered entirely on the principal, the family office may know that the executive is protected in New York while having almost no real visibility into what is happening around the rest of the household in Los Angeles.

That is why I start with the family structure.

Who lives in the household?

Who moves independently?

Who drives?

Which children require supervision?

Who regularly transports them?

Which schools, activities and social locations are recurring?

Which employees routinely accompany the family?

Who receives schedule changes?

Who has authority when the parents are away?

I am not trying to build surveillance around the family.

I am trying to understand the operating environment before deciding what needs protection.

Why this matters more in 2025 and 2026

Recent cases show why I do not separate the principal from the family.

In March 2026, prosecutors alleged that a woman fired multiple rounds at Rihanna’s Los Angeles-area residence while Rihanna, A$AP Rocky and their three children were home. No one was injured.

That case is important to me for one simple reason: the children did not create the exposure.

They were simply part of the household where the exposure arrived.

The same principle applies to stalking.

In June 2026, the Los Angeles Times reported that Sabrina Carpenter was seeking a restraining order against a man who allegedly tried to break into her home, was arrested, and then came back.

Again, the lesson is not that every public figure faces the same threat.

The lesson is that online attention, fixation and physical approach can eventually intersect with the private home environment.

There is also a broader organized-crime issue relevant to wealthy households in Southern California. In November 2025, FBI Los Angeles said South American Theft Groups had proliferated in Southern California and that some groups were using surveillance and technical tools while increasingly targeting homes associated with professional athletes and celebrities.

That does not mean every UHNW family should suddenly operate under crisis-level protection.

It means the family program should understand that wealth, visibility, routine and information can be combined by people who are willing to observe before they act.

Another 2026 case shows how family members themselves can become the target of surveillance. In October 2026, the FBI arrested a California real estate agent accused of secretly working for China. As the Associated Press reported, prosecutors allege she surveilled the U.S. home of the son of Taiwan President Lai Ching-te in 2025 and sent photos, video and license plate information for his vehicles to a Chinese government official. The allegations have not been proven in court.

For me, that case reinforces something I have believed for a long time:

The family is part of the principal’s exposure whether the family asked to be or not.

Start with a family protection map

Before deciding who needs an agent, I map the family operationally.

Not on a wall with pins.

I mean understanding who goes where, with whom and how often.

For each family member I want to know:

normal transportation
recurring destinations
school or work routines
public exposure
social-media exposure
medical considerations relevant to protection
whether they travel independently
whether household staff accompany them
who receives changes
who is allowed to pick up children
what happens when plans change.

That creates the baseline.

Then I look for the points where the family becomes most exposed.

For one family, that may be the principal’s public appearances.

For another, it may be school transportation.

For another, a spouse may be much more publicly recognizable than the primary wealth holder.

For another, the teenagers may create more real-time location exposure than the parents.

I do not assume the richest person automatically creates the greatest vulnerability.

Protecting the spouse requires its own assessment

A common mistake in family protection is treating the spouse as an extension of the principal.

They are not.

The spouse may have:

a separate career
charitable work
public events
fitness routines
shopping routines
social commitments
international travel
independent vehicles
separate staff.

If the principal has a full-time protection detail but the spouse moves independently all day, the family may have built a strong protective bubble around the person who already has the greatest support while leaving another highly identifiable family member much more exposed.

That does not mean the spouse automatically needs a dedicated agent.

I want the protection level to follow the actual risk.

Sometimes the right answer is full close protection.

Sometimes it is a shared family protector.

Sometimes it is transportation support.

Sometimes it is stronger planning and better communication.

Sometimes the spouse needs additional support only during elevated periods.

The important thing is that the decision is intentional.

I also want the spouse included in the protective relationship.

Security that is designed entirely around one partner tends to create friction with the other.

If the spouse does not understand why a procedure exists, it becomes easy to bypass.

Good protection should make sense to the people living with it.

Children change the protection problem

Children create a different responsibility because adults make security decisions for them.

I do not want children frightened by adult threat information.

I also do not want them completely unprepared.

The level of involvement should be age appropriate.

For a younger child, security may be as simple as:

Stay with the approved adult.

Do not leave school with someone who has not been approved.

If plans change, wait for the normal confirmation process.

Know who the regular protectors are.

For older children, the conversation can become more mature.

They can understand:

Why posting location in real time may create unnecessary exposure.

Why a new driver cannot simply say, “Your parents sent me.”

Why security sometimes needs to know where they are going.

Why an unusual person repeatedly appearing nearby should be mentioned.

The goal is not fear.

The goal is familiarity with a few simple protective habits.

School runs are among the most predictable family movements

School transportation is difficult to make unpredictable because school itself is predictable.

The same location.

The same general arrival window.

The same dismissal period.

Five days a week.

Trying to create random routes and constant changes simply for the sake of being unpredictable can become pointless and disruptive.

I approach school protection differently.

I want control over what can be controlled.

Who transports the child?

Who can pick the child up?

Who changes that authorization?

How is a last-minute change verified?

Does the school know which adults are authorized?

Does the nanny know what to do if somebody claims there has been a change?

What happens if the normal driver is unavailable?

Who is the backup?

Where does the child go if the pickup person is late?

Those procedural questions matter more to me than creating unnecessary drama around the school.

The physical environment matters too, but the child should not become a spectacle.

A professional protector needs to understand that protecting a child at school is different from moving an executive through a hostile public event.

The protection posture should fit the environment.

Nannies are part of the protective system

In many UHNW households, the nanny spends more time with the children than the protection team does.

That makes the nanny operationally important.

But I do not expect a nanny to become a bodyguard.

That is not the job.

I want nannies to have clear procedures for a small number of situations:

Who is authorized to pick up the child?
Who can change plans?
Which security number should they call?
What do they do if someone persistently approaches them?
What do they do if a vehicle appears repeatedly during the same routine?
What should they avoid discussing with strangers?
What family information should remain private?

The nanny should know enough to recognize that something is unusual and report it.

The professional protection team should take it from there.

That distinction is important.

When everybody is told to “be security,” nobody really is.

Teenagers create a completely different protection problem

Teenagers are difficult to protect with the same structure I would use around an adult principal.

They need independence.

They want to see friends.

They drive.

They attend school events.

They go to restaurants.

They date.

They use social media.

They change plans at the last minute.

If protection becomes too restrictive, many teenagers will find ways around it.

That creates a worse security situation than designing a program they are willing to use.

My objective is not to monitor every conversation or make a teenager feel watched.

I want them to understand which behaviors create unnecessary exposure and give them a simple way to reach the protection team when something feels wrong.

The online side of this deserves particular attention.

In a March 2025 alert, the FBI warned that violent online networks were targeting minors and other vulnerable people and specifically advised families to discuss the risks of sharing personal information online. The Bureau also listed threats to dox victims or to have police called to the home under false pretenses among the tactics these networks use.

For UHNW families, that conversation has another layer because a teenager may unintentionally reveal information about people other than themselves.

A photo can show:

A home.
A street.
A recognizable vehicle.
A private aircraft.
A school uniform.
A sports club.
A regular restaurant.
A vacation property.
A friend whose account is public.

The teenager may not publish an address.

They may still publish enough separate pieces for somebody to build one.

I do not expect teenagers to disappear from social media

For most families, telling a teenager to stop using social media completely is unrealistic.

The better approach is education and boundaries.

I would discuss:

Real-time location posting.
Showing the front of the residence.
Showing license plates unnecessarily.
Posting travel while the family is still away.
Tagging private aircraft or recognizable terminals.
Sharing school schedules.
Accepting unknown followers.
Responding to persistent strangers.
Direct messages that become increasingly personal.
Requests for private photographs.
People claiming connections to the family.

Attempts to move the conversation to encrypted or disappearing-message platforms.

The purpose is not to make every online interaction suspicious.

It is teaching the child what deserves a second look.

Swatting is a reason the online and physical programs must connect

Online exposure can create a very physical event at the residence.

In April 2025, the Los Angeles Times reported that deputies responded to Nicki Minaj’s Hidden Hills residence after a false report involving an alleged shooting.

That is not simply an internet nuisance.

A false emergency call can produce a real armed law-enforcement response.

For a family with children, household staff and private security on the property, everybody needs to understand that possibility.

The residence team should know how to identify themselves to responding officers.

The family office should know who contacts law enforcement afterward.

The protective team should preserve information related to the false report.

And the children should not be expected to manage any of that.

That is adult responsibility.

Protecting children means protecting information around them

Children rarely control all of their own exposure.

Schools publish photographs.

Sports clubs post schedules.

Friends tag one another.

Parents of friends take pictures.

Charities publish event galleries.

A nanny may post from a park.

A tutor may list a high-profile family relationship on a professional profile.

The answer is not to demand complete secrecy from everybody in the family’s orbit.

The answer is understanding the information environment.

For higher-profile families, I may ask:

Which schools publish student names or photographs?
Are location permissions understood?
Do childcare employees understand social-media expectations?
Do household employment agreements address privacy?
Does the family have a process for requesting removal of sensitive material?
Who notices if a child’s information suddenly appears somewhere it should not?

That is close protection too.

A spouse or child can become the easier route to the principal

I never assume unwanted attention will remain focused on the original person.

If someone cannot get a response from the principal, they may contact:

The spouse.

Children.

An assistant.

A nanny.

A sibling.

A parent.

A business partner.

That is one reason I want concerning-contact information centralized.

In May 2025, the Los Angeles Times reported that former Rams star Aaron Donald obtained a five-year restraining order against a woman he alleged had stalked him and threatened his son. His filing expressed concern for his wife, young children, older children and brother as well as himself.

I would not draw conclusions beyond that specific case.

What it demonstrates operationally is that a security concern involving one public person can affect the wider family.

That is why I do not build threat reporting around only one phone number belonging to the principal’s agent.

Household staff should know what normal looks like

Household staff can provide tremendous protective value simply by understanding the household baseline.

The housekeeper may know which service companies usually arrive.

The nanny knows who normally picks up the children.

The driver knows which vehicles regularly appear near the residence.

The estate manager knows which contractors are authorized.

The assistant knows whether an unexpected appointment makes sense.

That knowledge is useful.

But I do not want employees improvising investigations.

Their job is:

Notice.
Report.
Follow the procedure.
Let the protection team assess the significance.
A housekeeper should not confront an unfamiliar person outside.
A nanny should not follow a suspicious vehicle.

A driver should not begin conducting surveillance because the same car appeared twice.

Professional protection depends on good information without turning household employees into untrained security personnel.

Staff need one reporting path

A family with several employees can generate fragmented information very quickly.

A nanny tells the mother.

A driver tells the estate manager.

A housekeeper tells the residential guard.

An assistant emails corporate security.

Individually, each report may look insignificant.

Together, they may show a pattern.

I want one practical intake process.

It does not have to be complicated.

It can be as simple as:

If something feels unusual and concerns the family, send it to this designated security contact.

Include what happened.

When.

Where.

Who was involved.

Do not speculate.

That gives the protection team facts it can compare over time.

Family events require a different protective posture

UHNW family life includes events that do not fit neatly into an executive calendar.

Birthdays.

School fundraisers.

Graduations.

Religious events.

Weddings.

Children’s sports.

Private dinners.

Holiday parties.

Charity functions.

A family event can create more complexity than a corporate meeting because the family wants it to feel personal.

That changes how I approach the protection.

I do not want the security presence becoming the event.

I want to understand:

Who is attending?
Is the event private or publicly promoted?
Is there a guest list?
Where are arrivals occurring?
Are vendors present?
Are children moving separately from parents?
Is press or social-media activity expected?
Are household staff coordinating the event?
What happens when an uninvited person arrives?
Who can approve a last-minute guest?

The answers determine the posture.

A ten-person family dinner at a private residence is not the same operation as a 300-person charity event.

Do not confuse event security with family close protection

A venue may have security.

That does not mean the family has close protection.

Event security usually focuses on the event:

Credentials.
Entrances.
Crowds.
Venue rules.
Incidents.

The family’s protection team focuses on the family.

Where are the children?

Where is the principal?

When is the spouse leaving?

Who is driving?

Has a person of concern appeared?

What happens if a child needs to leave early?

The two security functions should communicate, but they have different jobs.

Family travel magnifies coordination problems

Travel is where weak family-security organization becomes obvious.

At home, the estate manager, household employees and protection team may already know one another.

During travel, the structure changes.

Now there may be:

Flight crews.
FBO personnel.
Hotel staff.
Local drivers.
Destination security.
Nannies.
Children.
Luggage.
Rental residences.
Event personnel.
Local guides.
A second protection company.

The family office.

Information can spread quickly.

I want one coordinated travel security picture.

Not one person booking the aircraft, another booking cars, another arranging protection and nobody realizing the hotel changed.

Protect family movements without distributing the entire itinerary

This is where the family office becomes particularly important.

The family office often has the most complete logistical picture.

That does not mean every person working on the trip needs that picture.

The pilot needs aviation information.

The driver needs movement information.

The nanny needs the children’s plan.

The hotel may need arrival information.

The local protector needs enough information to manage the protective movement.

There is rarely a reason every participant needs the full family itinerary.

That becomes even more important because social engineering is becoming more convincing.

In December 2025, the FBI updated a warning about malicious actors impersonating senior U.S. officials using text messages and AI-generated voice messages. The FBI said the campaign also targeted officials’ family members and personal acquaintances.

Earlier in May 2025, the FBI had warned that attackers were using text and AI-generated voice messages to impersonate senior officials in attempts to establish trust and gain access to personal accounts.

For a family office, that means an urgent message that appears to come from the principal is no longer enough.

If the message changes:

A pickup.
A destination.
A passenger.
A wire.
A hotel.
A security instruction.
A travel plan.

I want important changes verified through a known channel.

The family office should coordinate, not become the tactical detail

I see the family office as the connective tissue.

It often knows:

Where everybody is supposed to be.
Who is traveling.
Which staff member is responsible.
What changed.
Which vendors are involved.
What property is occupied.

That information is enormously useful.

But the family office should not be trying to direct every protective position in real time.

The protection leader needs authority to make tactical decisions within the agreed mission.

The family office needs authority over:

Schedule.
Resources.
Major client decisions.
Approvals.
Coordination.

Those responsibilities should complement each other.

Family offices themselves report gaps in non-investment risk management

This is not just a theoretical issue.

Citi’s September 2025 Global Family Office Report surveyed 346 family offices across 45 countries and found that 37% identified operational risk and 33% identified family-related risk among their concerns. Citi also reported that roughly half of respondents felt underprepared for cybersecurity, personal-security and geopolitical risks.

That finding makes sense to me.

Many family offices were originally built around investments, accounting, tax and administration.

Physical protection can cross all of those organizational lines without fitting neatly inside any one of them.

The answer is not turning investment staff into security professionals.

The answer is assigning responsibility clearly and connecting the right people.

Outsourcing does not mean giving away control

The same 2025 Citi report found that many family offices were considering external suppliers while keeping decision-making authority largely in-house.

That is how I prefer to structure protection.

The family may outsource:

Executive protection.
Residential security.
Protective intelligence.
Travel support.
Technical expertise.

But somebody representing the family still needs to own the relationship.

Who sets expectations?

Who receives major reports?

Who approves changes?

Who can increase the detail?

Who can reduce it?

Who decides whether the family accepts a risk?

Those decisions should not disappear into the vendor relationship.

The protection team needs one current version of the family schedule

One of the simplest operational improvements is also one of the most valuable.

Security should know which schedule is current.

If the assistant has one itinerary, the nanny has another, the driver received an old text and the protection team has yesterday’s calendar, the family has created unnecessary risk through ordinary administrative confusion.

I do not need every insignificant calendar detail.

I do need changes that affect protection.

A new school pickup.

A different aircraft.

An unexpected dinner.

A child traveling separately.

A spouse extending a trip.

A new driver.

A last-minute public appearance.

The system should make those changes visible to the people who need them without broadcasting them throughout the organization.

That is what family-office coordination should accomplish.

The family office should own the protective picture, not the tactics

That distinction is important.

The family office should know enough to understand:

Who is covered.
When coverage changes.
Which family member is traveling.
Which residence is occupied.
Which children are moving independently.
Which staff members are involved.
Whether there is a developing security concern.

But I do not want an investment professional, executive assistant or COO trying to position agents during an incident.

That is where professional protection leadership needs room to operate.

I like a simple division of responsibility.

The family office owns the family requirements.

The protection team owns the protective response.

The family office says:

The principal is traveling tomorrow.

The spouse will remain in Los Angeles.

Two children have separate afternoon activities.

A nanny is taking one child.

The oldest child is driving independently.

The family is flying out Friday night.

The protection team takes that information and decides what operational support is appropriate.

That is a healthier model than having ten people giving tactical directions to the detail.

Not every family member needs the same level of protection

Close protection for UHNW families should not automatically mean assigning an agent to every person.

That can become expensive, intrusive and operationally unnecessary.

I prefer to think in terms of exposure.

One family member may need dedicated protection.

Another may need coverage only during travel or public events.

A child may need protected transportation but no visible agent during the school day.

A spouse may need security during specific periods of increased exposure.

An adult child may mainly need protective-intelligence monitoring and travel support.

The protection posture should follow the risk.

That also means it can change.

If the family suddenly receives a credible threat, coverage may increase.

If the concern resolves and exposure decreases, the footprint may come back down.

I do not believe in maintaining an unnecessarily large security detail simply because that is what was established during a crisis.

Family privacy has become a practical protective tool in California

California families now have a more centralized way to reduce some data-broker exposure.

California’s Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform, known as DROP, lets a consumer send a single verifiable request to registered data brokers to delete their personal information. The California Privacy Protection Agency states that beginning August 1, 2026, data brokers are required to access the system at least every 45 days and process qualifying deletion requests.

That is useful for UHNW families because, as the California Privacy Protection Agency’s Data Broker Registry explains, data brokers collect and sell personal information that can include precise geolocation, health-related information and browsing history.

I would not present DROP as a complete privacy solution.

It is not.

Public records, business records, social media, archived websites and information published by third parties still exist.

But it is another tool.

For a family protection program, I would use it as part of recurring privacy maintenance.

Not once.

Recurring.

Check what appears.

Request removal where available.

Look again later.

Privacy exposure changes as the family moves, buys property, creates businesses, joins boards, attends events and enters new public records.

Protect the family address, but also protect the pattern around the address

Removing an address from a data broker is useful.

But sometimes the pattern of life reveals almost as much as the address itself.

A recurring vehicle.

A school route.

A private aviation terminal.

A gym.

A restaurant.

A child’s sports facility.

A housekeeper posting from work.

A driver appearing at the same place every morning.

Security becomes stronger when the family stops thinking about privacy as one hidden address and starts thinking about the total pattern.

That is also why I connect privacy with physical protection.

If the family office discovers that a residence address is suddenly circulating publicly, the residential team should know.

If a child’s school is being discussed by an unwanted person, the person managing school movements should know.

If an individual has been asking questions about a spouse’s routine, the spouse’s protection plan may need to change.

Information should move to the people who need it.

Organized residential crime is another reason I connect family and estate security

Not every threat to a wealthy family is personal.

Some are financially motivated.

That matters because the protection posture may need to distinguish between a person targeting the family personally and a crew targeting a residence because it appears valuable.

In August 2025, LAPD announced arrests in an operation targeting what the department called the Rich Rollin Burglary Crew. LAPD said the group was linked to at least 92 residential burglaries in Los Angeles since 2022, with most occurring during 2024 and 2025. The department reported that searches connected to the investigation recovered 15 firearms, body armor, jewelry, watches, stolen credit cards, fake IDs and multiple license plates.

In April 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles announced a guilty plea in a separate case involving a network prosecutors said facilitated burglary crews operating across the United States and causing at least $23.9 million in losses.

I do not use those cases to tell every wealthy family they are under active threat.

That would be irresponsible.

I use them to reinforce a practical point:

Wealth attracts more than one kind of risk.

A family protection program needs to recognize the difference between:

Organized property crime.
Stalking.
Fixation.
Business-related threats.
Kidnapping risk.
Domestic concerns.
Public controversy.
Random crime.

The response should fit the problem.

The residence and the mobile detail need to exchange information

If the mobile protection team sees unusual behavior, the residential team should not discover it by accident.

If the residential protector deals with an unwanted visitor, the mobile team should know before the principal returns.

That sounds obvious.

It often is not.

Organizations create silos easily.

The residence has one log.

The executive protection detail has another.

The family office has email.

The assistant has text messages.

The nanny has WhatsApp.

The driver calls somebody directly.

Now everybody has a piece of the story.

Nobody has the whole story.

I want a clear process for moving security-relevant information.

Not every household detail belongs in the system.

Only information that matters to protection.

Create escalation thresholds before something happens

I do not like making every unusual event into a crisis.

I also do not like waiting until behavior becomes obviously dangerous before adjusting protection.

The family should have predetermined triggers for review.

Examples may include:

Repeated unwanted contact.
A person appearing at multiple family locations.
Attempts to obtain children’s information.
Threatening communications.
A suspicious approach to household staff.
Unexpected physical presence at a residence.
Evidence that private travel information has leaked.
A major business dispute becoming public.
Doxxing.
A significant increase in public exposure.

The threshold does not always mean adding agents.

It means reassessing.

Sometimes the result is:

Continue monitoring.

Sometimes:

Notify law enforcement.

Sometimes:

Change arrival procedures.

Sometimes:

Add temporary residential coverage.

Sometimes:

Increase protection around one family member.

The important thing is not inventing the entire response after the situation is already escalating.

A family protection plan needs redundancy

Families change plans.

Children get sick.

Flights divert.

A driver calls out.

School closes.

A nanny cannot work.

A principal decides to remain somewhere overnight.

Protection has to absorb normal life.

That means having backup options.

Who is the backup driver?

Who can transport a child if the normal nanny is unavailable?

Who covers the spouse if the primary agent travels with the principal?

Who can work the residence if the family returns earlier than planned?

Who has access to the current information?

A protection program that works only when every person and schedule remains exactly as planned is fragile.

Medical capability should follow the family

I will keep this brief because medical readiness deserves its own program.

But I consider it part of close protection.

The family may split into several movements.

If all the medical equipment and trained capability leave with the principal while the children and spouse remain behind, the household needs to know what capability remains.

At minimum, I want the relevant protectors current on practical lifesaving skills such as CPR, AED use and severe-bleeding response.

I also want the team to know where emergency services should be directed.

Again, the answer should fit the family.

A child with a known severe allergy creates different planning considerations than an adult principal with no known medical condition.

Good family protection should become almost invisible

I do not mean invisible to an adversary.

I mean invisible to normal family life.

The ideal program becomes part of the rhythm.

The nanny knows who to call.

The children recognize the protectors.

The spouse knows what happens if plans change.

The assistant knows which schedule changes matter to security.

The driver knows the pickup process.

The estate manager knows who controls access.

The family office knows who owns the protection program.

Nobody has to reinvent the process every morning.

That is when close protection starts feeling less like a security operation and more like a professional service supporting the household.

What I would review with a UHNW family right now

I would start with a simple family map.

List every person whose safety the program is intended to support.

Then ask:

Who moves independently?
Who is publicly identifiable?
Who posts publicly?
Who has predictable daily routines?
Who travels regularly?
Who spends significant time with children?
Who has access to the full family calendar?

Then review transportation.

Who drives each family member?

What happens when that person is unavailable?

How are last-minute changes verified?

Then review children.

Who can pick them up?

Who can change authorization?

What should the child do if the normal plan changes unexpectedly?

Then review staff.

Does everyone know where security concerns should be reported?

Do they understand what family information should remain private?

Then review online exposure.

Search the family as an outsider would.

Use California privacy tools where useful, including the state’s 2026 DROP system.

Finally, review how information moves.

If a security concern appears at the residence today, will the person protecting the principal tomorrow know about it?

If the answer is no, that is where I would start fixing the system.

How MSB Protection approaches close protection for UHNW families

At MSB Protection, I do not begin by deciding how many protectors a wealthy family should have. I begin with a security assessment of how the family actually lives.

I begin with the family.

Who needs protection?

Where does exposure occur?

How does the household actually operate?

What existing resources already work?

What would create unnecessary disruption?

Then I build around that reality.

Depending on the family, the program may combine:

Executive protection.
Residential security.
Protective intelligence.
Family transportation.
Travel support.
Security assessments.
Household coordination.

The objective is not to create the largest detail.

The objective is to create enough capability in the right places.

I also put a high value on continuity.

A career protector who knows the family can recognize changes that someone seeing the household for the first time may miss.

They know the children.

They know the normal vehicles.

They know the household staff.

They know how the principal communicates.

They understand the difference between normal and unusual.

That familiarity should never replace professional verification.

But it is valuable.

For a long-term UHNW family program, I would rather build a stable, trained core team with competent relief than constantly rotate unfamiliar people through the family’s private life.

Frequently asked questions

Does every UHNW family need 24/7 close protection?

No. Wealth alone does not determine the protection model. I would look at public exposure, known threats, lifestyle, residence, travel, family structure and existing security layers before recommending coverage. Some families justify continuous protection. Others are better served by a lighter or more targeted model.

Should children have dedicated executive protection agents?

Sometimes, but not automatically. A child may need protected transportation, school coordination or increased coverage during an elevated threat without needing a visible full-time agent everywhere they go. The goal should be meaningful protection while preserving as much normal childhood as possible.

How should nannies and household staff fit into the security program?

They should understand the procedures relevant to their jobs, know how to report unusual activity and understand what information should remain private. I do not expect household employees to investigate threats or act as protectors unless they were specifically hired and trained for that role.

How can a California UHNW family reduce online address exposure?

There is no single solution, but California residents can now use the state’s Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform to request deletion from registered data brokers. Data brokers became responsible for processing DROP deletion requests beginning August 1, 2026.

I would combine tools like that with recurring searches for exposed addresses, family information, property connections, social-media disclosures and information published by third parties.

What is the role of a family office in close protection?

The family office should help maintain the accurate operational picture: schedules, travel, properties, responsible staff, approvals and changes. It should also designate who owns the security relationship. The executive protection team should then translate that information into protective decisions rather than expecting non-security staff to manage tactical operations.

Sources

Closing thought

Close protection for a UHNW family is not simply executive protection multiplied by the number of family members.

Families do not operate that way.

They split apart.

They change plans.

Children grow up.

Spouses have independent lives.

Staff members carry important information.

Travel creates new environments.

Threats can move from one family member to another.

A strong protection program has to move with the family rather than forcing the family into a rigid security structure.

For me, the objective is straightforward:

Protect the principal.
Protect the spouse.
Protect the children appropriately.
Give nannies and staff clear procedures.
Keep the family office connected.
Control unnecessary information.
Recognize changing behavior early.
Scale protection when the risk changes.

And do all of that without making the family feel like security has taken over its life.

That is what close protection for a UHNW family should accomplish.

About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.