When I assess security around a UHNW household, I spend a lot of time looking at gates, cameras, alarms, executive protection and the physical property.

But there is another security layer that is just as important:

The people the family intentionally allows inside.

Nannies.

Housekeepers.

Estate managers.

Chefs.

Drivers.

Personal assistants.

Caregivers.

Property managers.

Household coordinators.

A family may spend hundreds of thousands of dollars building physical security around a residence and then give one employee a gate remote, alarm code, house key, family calendar, access to the children and knowledge of when everybody is traveling.

That does not mean household employees should be treated as suspects.

I do not believe in operating that way.

Most people working inside private homes are there because they are trusted professionals doing legitimate work.

The point is that access has value, and hiring somebody into that environment deserves a process proportionate to the access being granted.

A basic internet background check is not enough.

Neither is:

• The agency said they checked her.
• My friend recommended him.
• She worked for another wealthy family.
• He has been a driver for twenty years.
• Those can all be useful pieces of information.
• None of them should replace verification.

A 2025 Los Angeles case shows the broader issue. In October 2025, LAPD announced that a joint LAPD, FBI and CHP Major Theft Task Force had arrested two women for grand theft. Police said the suspects used a cleaning service app to create fake profiles, which gave them access to victims’ homes, and that detectives recovered $50,000 in cash, jewelry and high-end handbags belonging to multiple victims, along with Wi-Fi jammers, GPS trackers, stolen license plates and burglary tools.

That case was not about a long-term household employee betraying a family.

The distinction matters.

What it demonstrates is how dangerous it can be to confuse a plausible service profile with verified identity and trusted access.

For UHNW families, I want a much more deliberate process, the same discipline I describe in UHNW security lessons from a former bodyguard case.

Key takeaways

• A household staff background check is one layer, not the hiring decision. I want identity verification, work-history confirmation, references, role-specific screening and a clear picture of what access the candidate will actually receive.
• California employers cannot simply run criminal checks however they want. The California Fair Chance Act generally prohibits employers with five or more employees from asking about conviction history before making a job offer.
• Using a third-party background-check company creates federal compliance obligations. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the FTC says employers need a written, stand-alone notice and written permission before getting a report from a background company, plus specific notices before and after an adverse decision based on it.
• California has its own rules on top of federal law. California regulates investigative consumer reports separately, so the screening company and employment counsel should confirm what can be reported and what notices are required.
• Nannies deserve a separate screening layer. California TrustLine checks in-home childcare providers through California DOJ fingerprint records, the Child Abuse Central Index and FBI criminal history records.
• A staffing agency does not remove the family’s responsibility to verify what was actually checked. I want the family office to understand the scope, date and limitations of the screening rather than accepting the phrase fully vetted.
• Vetting should follow access. I screen an estate manager differently from a gardener, nanny, chef or temporary housekeeper because their authority, information access and physical access are different.
• Hiring is only the beginning. The security program eventually has to address onboarding, credentials, confidentiality, changes in role and offboarding. A perfect background check cannot protect the family from access that remains active after the employment relationship changes.

I start with the position, not the person

Before I run a background check, I want to understand the job.

That sounds backwards to some families.

They want to know everything possible about the candidate first.

I would rather define what the candidate will actually be trusted with.

Consider two household employees.

The first is a landscaper who works outside every Thursday morning.

The second is an estate manager.

The estate manager may know:

• Alarm procedures.
• Children’s schedules.
• Travel plans.
• Vehicle information.
• Vendor relationships.
• Safe locations.
• Private contact information.
• Family disputes.
• Medical information.
• Staff schedules.
• Security procedures.
• The two people do not have the same access.

So I do not treat them as the same screening problem.

For every position, I would map at least four categories:

Physical access.

Which properties, buildings and rooms can this person enter?

Information access.

What calendars, addresses, family information or security information can they see?

Authority.

Can this person admit vendors, spend money, change schedules, issue instructions or approve access for somebody else?

Proximity.

Will the person be alone with children, elderly family members or the principal?

That access map determines how deep the vetting should go and what controls belong around the position afterward.

I am not looking for a perfect human being

This is important.

A good screening program should not become a search for anything embarrassing in a person’s past.

That is not what I am trying to accomplish.

I am trying to answer questions relevant to the job.

Is this the person they claim to be?

Does the work history make sense?

Do prior employers confirm the role?

Are the references real?

Are there unexplained inconsistencies that matter?

Does any lawfully obtained background information have a direct relationship to the responsibilities we are considering?

Can the person handle the access the job requires?

That is a much better process than collecting as much personal information as possible and then trying to find a reason not to hire somebody.

It is also much safer legally.

The California Fair Chance Act changes the timing

This is where UHNW households need to be careful, especially when a household or family-office employment structure has enough employees to fall within the law.

The Civil Rights Department says California’s Fair Chance Act, in effect since January 1, 2018, generally prohibits employers with five or more employees from asking a job candidate about conviction history before making a job offer, among other requirements. It is also known as a ban-the-box law.

This is not theoretical enforcement.

In July 2026, the California Civil Rights Department announced a $200,000 settlement with Ralphs over allegations that the company unlawfully denied people employment based on irrelevant arrests or convictions. Ralphs agreed to reform its hiring practices and train staff involved in hiring.

For a family office, the practical point is straightforward:

Do not create your own informal criminal-screening process because the household is private.

The employment structure still needs to comply with whatever federal, state and local rules apply.

And applicability can depend on how many people the employing entity has, where they work and whether another legal exception applies.

Los Angeles County has another Fair Chance layer in unincorporated areas

There is another point that often gets misstated.

The Los Angeles County Fair Chance Ordinance does not automatically apply to every employer everywhere in Los Angeles County.

The County says the ordinance applies to employers with five or more employees when the employee or applicant performs, or would perform, at least two hours of work on average each week in an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County. The ordinance took effect September 3, 2024.

That distinction matters for UHNW families because Los Angeles addresses can sit in very different jurisdictions.

Beverly Hills is not the same legal jurisdiction as an unincorporated area.

A family office supporting multiple residences may also have employees working in different places.

I would have employment counsel determine which rules apply to the actual employer and work location rather than assuming one Los Angeles rule covers everything.

A commercial background report requires a real process

When a family, family office or staffing company uses a consumer-reporting agency to run an employment background check, federal law imposes procedures around that report.

The Federal Trade Commission says the employer must give a written notice in a stand-alone format before obtaining the report and get the applicant’s written permission. Before an adverse decision based on the report, the applicant must receive a copy of the report and the federal Summary of Rights; further notices are required after the decision.

That matters because a UHNW family can create legal exposure by trying to be more thorough without understanding the rules.

The answer is not less vetting.

The answer is disciplined vetting.

California adds another layer through investigative consumer reporting law

California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act adds its own rules when investigative consumer reports are used for employment.

Those rules include limits on what a reporting agency may furnish and how far back certain records can go. The exact rules should come from the screening company and employment counsel, not from a security consultant.

That is why I would never promise a family:

We check the candidate’s entire criminal history forever.

That is not how California employment screening works.

A professional screening process has legal boundaries.

TrustLine should be part of nanny due diligence in California

Nannies are different because the job often includes unsupervised access to children.

California created TrustLine specifically for in-home and license-exempt childcare providers.

The California Department of Social Services says TrustLine checks applicant fingerprints through the California Criminal History System, examines the Child Abuse Central Index and FBI criminal history records, and receives California DOJ updates on the continued eligibility of registrants.

CDSS also states that nannies and babysitters placed through an employment agency must be listed on the TrustLine registry or be a current applicant.

I consider TrustLine a useful layer.

I would not treat it as the complete nanny-vetting program.

TrustLine’s own resources for families also cover how to interview, check references and hire a nanny, which tells you the registry is one part of the process.

That is how I look at it.

A clearance tells me something important.

It does not tell me whether the candidate was dependable for the last family.

Whether they respected privacy.

Whether they handled boundaries appropriately.

Whether they arrived on time.

Whether they drove children safely.

Whether they left their last position under circumstances that deserve clarification.

Those questions require actual vetting.

I do not accept agency screening as a black box

If a staffing agency tells me:

We background check everyone,

my next question is:

What does that mean?

Did they verify identity?

Criminal-history report?

TrustLine?

Motor-vehicle record?

Employment history?

Education?

Professional licenses?

References?

When was each check performed?

Was the candidate screened when they joined the agency three years ago, or before this placement?

I am not questioning the agency’s honesty.

I am defining the product.

A reputable staffing company should be able to explain what its screening process actually includes.

And the family should still decide whether that level of screening matches the access this particular position will receive.

References should tell me how the person actually worked

A reference is only useful if I verify that the reference is real and ask questions that relate to the position.

I do not get much value from:

“Was she nice?”

“Would you recommend him?”

Those questions invite vague answers.

For a nanny, I want to understand reliability, judgment, boundaries, driving responsibilities, communication with parents and how the person handled changes in schedule.

For an estate manager, I want to know whether the person actually managed vendors, budgets, household staff and sensitive information.

For a driver, I care about punctuality, discretion, driving habits, vehicle care and whether the person remained dependable during long or changing days.

For a housekeeper, I want to understand attendance, trust, responsibility and whether the person followed household procedures.

The questions should match the job.

I also verify that I am actually speaking with the prior employer or authorized representative.

A phone number supplied by the candidate is a starting point.

It is not verification by itself.

Where practical, I independently confirm the company, household representative or family office before relying on the reference.

A direct reference call and a third-party reference investigation are not necessarily the same legally

This is another place where families can accidentally create compliance problems.

If an employer directly calls a former employer or personal reference, that communication is generally treated differently under the Fair Credit Reporting Act from an investigative report produced by a background-screening company.

In a 1999 staff advisory opinion, the FTC said that reference checks conducted for employers by third-party agencies are investigative consumer reports under the FCRA.

That means I want to know who is doing the investigation.

If the family office hires a professional screening company to interview former employers, the disclosure, authorization and adverse-action rules discussed earlier may apply.

Using a more sophisticated screening service does not mean the legal process becomes less important.

Usually the opposite.

Employment verification comes before interpretation

I separate verification from judgment.

First establish the facts.

Did the person work there?

During what dates?

What was the title?

What were the duties?

Was the role full-time, part-time or temporary?

Then I compare that information with the resume and interview.

A difference is not automatically dishonesty.

Job titles change.

Families use different terminology.

Someone called an estate manager in one household may have functioned more like a personal assistant.

What concerns me is unexplained inconsistency.

If a candidate says they managed an entire estate for four years and the prior employer confirms a six-month housekeeping position, I want to understand that discrepancy before granting access to another household.

I am not trying to catch someone.

I am trying to make sure the hiring decision is based on an accurate picture.

Employment gaps should not automatically be treated as security concerns

I do not consider an employment gap evidence of misconduct.

People leave work to raise children.

Care for parents.

Travel.

Recover from illness.

Move.

Change careers.

Work informally.

The right question is whether the candidate can explain their employment history consistently and whether the information relevant to the position can be verified.

Turning every blank period into suspicion creates noise.

Good vetting is about relevant facts, not suspicion for its own sake.

Work authorization is an employment requirement, not a security investigation

For employees, employment eligibility should be handled through the proper federal employment process.

Employers generally must complete Form I-9 for paid employees working in the United States. USCIS guidance lists an exception for casual domestic employment in a private home that is sporadic, irregular or intermittent.

That exception should not be stretched to cover a regular nanny, housekeeper or estate employee simply because the work occurs in a private residence.

I keep this separate from security vetting.

Form I-9 confirms employment authorization.

It does not tell me whether the person has good references, drives responsibly or should have access to the alarm system.

Different processes answer different questions.

Social media can be reviewed, but I stay inside legal boundaries

Public online information can sometimes provide useful context.

The FTC lists public social media activity among the things employers might check, and FTC and EEOC guidance reminds employers that any background information used in hiring must not be used to discriminate.

I would never turn that into a fishing expedition through someone’s private life.

And in California, the boundary is important.

California law also limits what an employer may ask for. I do not request personal social media passwords, ask candidates to open private accounts in front of me, or ask for private content.

So I do not ask a nanny to hand over an Instagram password.

I do not tell a driver:

“Log into your private Facebook account while we watch.”

That is not how I conduct screening.

What I look for in public online information

I am interested in issues directly relevant to the role.

Does the candidate publicly advertise confidential details about prior employers?

Do they post photographs taken inside private homes that appear to belong to families they worked for?

Do they routinely post a principal’s vehicles or travel locations?

Does the public employment history materially contradict the resume?

Those can be legitimate questions.

I am not interested in judging lawful political opinions, religion, family structure or other protected characteristics.

The California Civil Rights Department lists the characteristics protected from employment discrimination, including race, religion, sex, disability, age and many other categories.

A social-media review that is not disciplined can expose the employer to information it never needed.

That is why I prefer the review to be structured and job-related.

Financial screening is not appropriate for every household position

Another common mistake is assuming:

They will work around wealthy people, so we should run a credit report.

California does not allow employment credit reports for every position.

Current Labor Code section 1024.5 generally prohibits employers from using consumer credit reports unless the position falls within specified categories.

Those categories include managerial positions, positions with access to certain financial or confidential information, and positions with regular access to $10,000 or more in cash.

That can matter in a UHNW household.

An estate manager authorized to move money or execute financial transactions may present a very different situation from a nanny or housekeeper.

I would not run the same financial screening on every employee simply because the family is wealthy.

Again:

Screen to the role.

Drivers deserve a driving-record process

If somebody will routinely drive the principal, children or other family members, the driving record matters.

The California DMV says driver records now include the reportable information required by the Vehicle Code, such as convictions and accidents.

At hiring, I want a current record.

Then I want to think about how the family will know if something important changes later.

California’s Employer Pull Notice program exists for exactly that general purpose: monitoring employee driving records for reportable actions.

The DMV says the program helps employers identify problem drivers or driving behavior.

Some categories of drivers must be enrolled by law.

A normal private household driver does not automatically fall into every mandatory EPN category.

However, DMV program requirements say drivers not covered by mandatory enrollment may be enrolled by the employer with their consent.

That is worth considering for a family whose employee spends hours every week transporting children or the principal.

Since April 1, 2026, the DMV has required participating employers to conduct EPN business electronically.

One driving-record check on hiring is not enough for a long-term driver

A driver may be hired with a clean record.

Three years later, circumstances may have changed.

That is why I think driving-sensitive positions deserve periodic review.

The same applies to:

• Driver license validity.
• Insurance requirements where applicable.
• Any specialized licenses required by the actual job.
• The process should be transparent.

The employee should know what is being monitored and why.

I am not interested in secret monitoring.

I am interested in making sure the person entrusted with transporting the family remains qualified to do it.

Confidentiality agreements make sense, but they have limits

For UHNW households, confidentiality agreements are normal and often appropriate.

A household employee may learn:

• Home addresses.
• Children’s information.
• Medical information.
• Travel schedules.
• Financial details.
• Business information.
• Family disputes.
• Security procedures.

The family has a legitimate interest in protecting that information.

But an NDA should not be written as though the employee loses every legal right the moment they enter the residence.

At the same time, the California Civil Rights Department explains that employment agreements cannot prevent workers from disclosing information about discrimination, harassment, retaliation or other unlawful acts at work.

So my goal is not:

Sign this and you can never say anything about anything that happens here.

My goal is:

Protect the family’s legitimate confidential information without trying to contract around employee rights.

That agreement should be drafted by qualified employment counsel.

The NDA should match the information the employee can actually reach

A nanny may need confidentiality around:

• Children.
• Schools.
• Travel.
• Household routines.

A personal assistant may have access to:

• Calendars.
• Medical appointments.
• Private communications.
• Business information.
• An estate manager may know almost everything operationally.
• The confidentiality expectations should reflect the job.
• I also make those expectations practical.
• Do not photograph private areas unnecessarily.
• Do not post from the residence.
• Do not identify family travel dates.
• Do not share guest names.
• Do not disclose alarm procedures.
• Do not tell friends when the property is empty.

Those rules are easier to understand than a twenty-page agreement nobody remembers.

Screening does not justify giving every employee broad access

This point matters.

A successful background check does not mean:

Now we trust this person with everything.

The person should still receive the access necessary for the role.

Not more.

A housekeeper may need the residence during defined hours.

They probably do not need the principal’s office.

A nanny may need family areas and child-related spaces.

They may not need access to a wine cellar, security office or network room.

A chef may need the kitchen, pantry, service entrance and storage.

They may not need unrestricted bedroom access.

An estate manager may need much broader authority.

That is why I use role-based access.

Trust and access control are not opposites

Families sometimes worry that access controls make employees feel distrusted.

I look at it differently.

Clear access protects everyone.

The employee knows what areas are expected.

Security knows what normal access looks like.

The family does not have to rely on informal assumptions.

If an employee accidentally enters a sensitive part of the residence, there is less ambiguity about whether they were supposed to be there.

Professional households should have professional boundaries.

That is not hostility.

It is structure.

This is where household staff vetting connects with estate operations and the same access philosophy I use for contractors in Beverly Hills estate vendor access control.

The difference is that a long-term employee may ultimately receive far more access than a vendor.

That makes the next phase even more important.

Onboarding is where screening becomes security

Once the family decides to hire somebody, the background check is finished.

The security work is not.

This is the point where I translate the position into actual access.

Keys.

Gate credentials.

Alarm codes.

Smart-lock accounts.

Garage remotes.

Wi-Fi.

Calendars.

Vehicle access.

Children’s schedules.

Vendor contacts.

Travel information.

The mistake is treating onboarding as:

They passed the background check, so give them whatever they need.

I prefer phased access.

Give the employee what the role requires today.

Add access later if the responsibilities expand.

That makes the household easier to manage and simplifies offboarding if the employment relationship ends.

The employee relationship should be formal before the access becomes informal

UHNW households sometimes operate with sophisticated security and surprisingly informal employment administration.

That is not a combination I like.

California’s Household Employer’s Guide makes clear that direct household employment can create real employer obligations. Household employers must register with the EDD within 15 days after paying $750 in total cash wages to household employees in a calendar quarter.

The EDD lists chauffeurs, cooks, gardeners, housekeepers, maids and pool maintenance workers, among others, as examples of household employees.

For me, that reinforces a broader point:

Do not let the family office treat someone as a casual vendor when the person is functioning as an employee inside the household. Family office authority control starts with knowing who actually works for the family.

Employment counsel and payroll professionals should determine the legal classification.

Security should then build the access model around the real relationship.

I give every credential an owner

A household should be able to answer:

• Who has this key?
• Who has this gate remote?
• Who owns this alarm user?
• Who has this smart-lock account?
• Who has access to the camera application?

If nobody knows, the credential is already a security problem.

I prefer individually attributable access wherever the technology allows it.

That gives the estate the ability to determine:

• Who entered.
• When.
• Through which point.
• Whether the credential is still needed.
• Shared codes are convenient.
• They also spread.
• One housekeeper gives the code to another.
• A former employee remembers it.
• A contractor sees it entered.
• Months later, nobody knows who still has it.

For long-term household staff, individual credentials are much easier to control.

Phased access is especially useful during the first weeks

I do not mean that new employees should be treated badly or followed around suspiciously.

I mean access should grow with demonstrated need.

A new nanny may initially need:

• Family living areas.
• Children’s rooms.
• Kitchen.
• Approved exterior areas.
• Vehicle access if driving is part of the role.

That does not automatically mean the nanny needs:

• The principal’s office.
• Security-equipment spaces.
• Wine storage.
• Safe rooms.
• Network closets.

A new estate manager will likely require much broader access because that is the job.

The principle stays the same:

Access follows responsibility.

Not status.

Not trust language.

Not how much the family likes the person.

Household staff should understand the security rules on day one

I do not expect employees to infer what the family considers sensitive.

Tell them.

I would include practical issues such as:

Do not post photographs from inside the residence without permission.

Do not share the family’s travel schedule.

Do not confirm whether the principal is home.

Do not give contractors access simply because they say the estate manager approved them.

Do not lend keys or credentials.

Report lost credentials immediately.

Report unusual visitors or approaches.

Do not photograph alarm panels or security systems unnecessarily.

Use approved channels for schedule changes.

Those rules protect the employee too.

The housekeeper should not be placed in the position of deciding whether a stranger at the service entrance is really the new electrician.

There should be a process.

Employment training obligations can apply even inside a private household structure

A family office also has to remember that a sophisticated private household is still a workplace.

In December 2025, the California Civil Rights Department reminded employers that those with five or more employees must provide sexual harassment prevention training every two years, at least one hour for nonsupervisory staff and two hours for supervisors.

CRD guidance says the requirement applies to California-based employees when the employer has five or more employees anywhere, even if they do not all work at the same location.

For a family with multiple residences, drivers, assistants and household personnel, that threshold can become relevant quickly.

I would have counsel review the structure rather than assuming private household employment falls outside normal workplace obligations.

Domestic-worker rules also changed in 2025

California expanded occupational-safety protections for many domestic-service workers beginning July 1, 2025.

Cal/OSHA says SB 1350 extended workplace safety and health protections to workers employed by businesses to perform household domestic services, such as housecleaning companies and homecare agencies, with an exception for private households that directly hire workers for ordinary household domestic tasks such as housecleaning, cooking and caregiving.

That distinction can matter when a family employs staff through a family-office entity, management company or other business structure.

Again, I would not try to solve that with security policy.

I would flag it for employment counsel.

The security program works better when the employment structure is clean.

Ongoing monitoring should not become surveillance of employees

Once somebody is hired, I do not believe the family should secretly investigate every aspect of that person’s life.

That creates distrust and can create legal problems.

What I want is ongoing awareness around things relevant to the position.

For a driver:

• Is the driver’s license still valid?
• Has the driving record materially changed?

For someone with professional credentials:

Are the credentials still current?

For access:

Does the employee still need everything they were issued?

For behavior inside the household:

Are there factual security concerns that need review?

That is very different from continuously monitoring someone’s private life.

Staff should report behavior, not diagnose coworkers

If a household employee raises a concern about another employee, I want facts.

Not:

“I think he is unstable.”

I want:

“He attempted to enter the office three times after being told that area is restricted.”

Or:

“She asked me for the alarm code even though her role does not require it.”

Or:

“He photographed the vehicle registration and could not explain why.”

Or:

“She brought an unapproved person onto the property.”

Facts can be assessed.

Labels create noise. The same applies to executive protection teams working around household staff.

The same principle applies to residential security.

A protector should document what was observed, not write amateur psychological conclusions into the activity log.

That distinction matters because California employees have rights to their personnel records. The Labor Commissioner says employers must keep personnel records for at least three years and let current and former employees inspect them under Labor Code section 1198.5.

Write professionally.

Write factually.

Assume documentation may eventually be read by somebody other than the person who created it.

A role change should trigger an access review

An employee can remain trustworthy while their job changes.

That still requires security adjustment.

A nanny becomes household manager.

An assistant begins managing travel.

A driver stops transporting children and becomes primarily an estate employee.

An estate manager moves to another property.

The question becomes:

Does the person’s current access still match the current job?

Sometimes access should increase.

Sometimes it should decrease.

Role changes are one of the easiest times for old permissions to accumulate.

The family should review them deliberately.

Resignations and terminations require a coordinated plan

Offboarding is where many otherwise strong programs fail.

An employee leaves.

Everybody focuses on the emotional or HR side.

The key remains active.

The garage remote is never recovered.

The smart-home login still works.

The person remains inside a group calendar.

The camera app is still installed.

That should not happen.

I want HR, the estate manager, family office and security aligned before the employment ends whenever circumstances allow.

Security offboarding and employment-law compliance should happen in parallel

California has specific final-pay rules.

The Labor Commissioner says a discharged employee must be paid all wages due at the time of termination, including earned but unused vacation. An employee without a written contract for a definite period who quits without notice must be paid within 72 hours; with at least 72 hours notice, wages are due at the time of quitting.

I do not want the security team attempting to manage those employment obligations.

That belongs with payroll, HR and counsel.

But security should coordinate timing.

If access needs to end at 3:00 p.m., credentials should not remain active until somebody remembers the next morning.

My offboarding checklist is deliberately boring

That is a good thing.

I want an inventory.

Physical key.

Gate remote.

Garage remote.

Vehicle key.

Access badge.

Alarm credential.

Smart-lock account.

Camera access.

Wi-Fi access.

Shared-drive access.

Calendar access.

Household-management software.

Vendor systems.

Company phone.

Laptop.

Credit card.

Fuel card.

Parking credential.

Anything tied to the employee’s role.

Then I ask a second question:

What did this person know that cannot be physically recovered?

Shared gate code?

Wi-Fi password?

Alarm PIN?

Safe combination?

Vendor password?

If the information was shared and remains sensitive, change it.

Offboarding should be proportionate

Not every departure is adversarial.

Many employees leave on excellent terms after years of service.

I still revoke access.

That is not an accusation.

It is normal security hygiene.

The employee no longer needs the credential because the employee no longer holds the role.

Treating offboarding as a standard process actually removes some of the personal tension.

Everyone gets offboarded.

Not just employees the family distrusts.

Residential security should know enough to enforce the change

If a former employee is no longer authorized, the residential team needs to know.

They do not necessarily need the employment story.

They need the operational instruction.

As of this time, this person is no longer authorized for unescorted access.

If the former employee needs to retrieve belongings, there should be an approved process.

If they return unexpectedly, the gate should not admit them simply because everyone recognizes the vehicle.

Familiarity is not current authorization.

The family office should own the master access picture

For a large UHNW household, I want one authoritative record showing:

• Current employees.
• Current roles.
• Properties authorized.
• Credentials issued.
• Vehicle authorization.
• System access.
• Who approved each access level.
• When it was last reviewed.

That prevents the security team, estate manager and executive assistant from maintaining different versions of reality.

The family office does not have to administer every door lock.

But somebody has to own the truth.

Frequently asked questions

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What should a household staff background check include?

It depends on the role, but a professional process may include identity verification, employment-history confirmation, references, lawful criminal-history screening, role-appropriate driving records, applicable professional-license verification and, for California in-home childcare, TrustLine.

The scope should follow the access and responsibilities of the position.

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Should UHNW families run credit checks on every household employee?

No.

California generally restricts employment credit reports to specified types of positions, including managerial and financially sensitive roles. A chef, housekeeper or nanny should not automatically receive a credit check because the employer is wealthy.

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Is TrustLine enough for hiring a nanny in California?

No.

TrustLine is an important screening layer. CDSS says it uses fingerprint-based DOJ and FBI criminal history records and checks the Child Abuse Central Index.

I would still conduct interviews, verify prior employment and speak with references.

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How often should household staff be re-screened?

There is no universal interval that fits every role.

I would conduct periodic reviews based on the position and information being monitored.

Driving records may justify recurring review for drivers.

Professional licenses should be checked for continued validity.

Access rights should be reviewed whenever responsibilities change.

The goal is ongoing suitability, not repeated investigation without cause.

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What should happen when a household employee leaves?

Revoke access promptly and systematically. A residential security team or a security assessment can confirm nothing was missed.

Recover physical credentials and devices.

Disable electronic accounts.

Review shared passwords or codes.

Notify residential security of the change.

Handle final payroll and other employment obligations through the proper HR and legal process.

A former employee should not retain access simply because the departure was friendly.

Sources

• lapdonline.org
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• ftc.gov
• cdss.ca.gov
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• dcba.lacounty.gov
• trustline.org
• ftc.gov
• uscis.gov
• consumer.ftc.gov
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• codes.findlaw.com
• dmv.ca.gov
• dmv.ca.gov
• dmv.ca.gov
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• edd.ca.gov
• edd.ca.gov
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• calcivilrights.ca.gov
• dir.ca.gov
• dir.ca.gov
• dir.ca.gov

Closing thought

The purpose of household staff vetting is not to make a private home feel suspicious.

It is the opposite.

Good vetting allows a family to trust intelligently.

Verify identity.

Verify history.

Check what the law allows you to check.

Speak with references.

Match screening to the actual job.

Then give the employee the access needed to succeed.

No more.

No less.

From there, security becomes an employment-lifecycle issue.

Onboarding.

Credentials.

Role changes.

Documentation.

Ongoing review.

Offboarding.

A background check is a snapshot.

A UHNW household is a living environment.

The protection program has to account for both.

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About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

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Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.