Security for UHNW Family Offices: Mail and Parcel Screening

Posted On:Oct 21, 2026
Posted By:Michael Braun

Security for UHNW family offices starts with the mail and parcel room

Security for UHNW family offices is usually discussed in terms of people: the principal, the children, the drivers, the protectors at the door. Far less attention goes to the envelopes and boxes that arrive every day, addressed to the family by name, carried past the gate by a courier and set down on a desk in the house or the office. In my experience that daily flow of mail and parcels is one of the least supervised routes into a household, and this week it was in the news across the United States.

On Thursday, October 15, 2026, Votebeat reported that the FBI was investigating a series of suspicious mailings sent to election officials across the country, and that three election officials briefed on the investigation had been told more than 100 letters were sent to people and groups nationwide. Some contained a powdery white substance. One office was evacuated while hazmat workers cleared the area. On Monday, October 19, Utah News Dispatch reported that a letter addressed to Utah Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson had been intercepted by a local postal inspector on Sunday and handed to the FBI before it reached her office.

These letters were aimed at public officials, not private families. I am not suggesting that a family office in Beverly Hills or Montecito is the next target of this particular campaign. What the reporting shows is how a threat arrives through an ordinary channel that every household uses, how quickly an office has to decide what to do with it, and how much depends on the people who sort the mail before anyone opens it. Those are questions every household and every family office should be able to answer.

This article supports the sections on household staff, vendors and insider risk and on the family office trust chain in our complete 2026 overview of high net worth security. That pillar piece explains how high net worth security works as a whole, from the perimeter to travel. It mentions threat letters and packages briefly. Here I want to go through the mail and parcel flow in detail: where it enters, who handles it, what a screening routine looks like and what to do when something is wrong.

If you want the wider picture of threats that start online and end up at the door, read our piece on family office high net worth individuals security when cyber turns physical. This article stays with the physical item: the envelope, the box and the hands it passes through.

Residential security officer seen from behind checks a parcel on a table in a bright estate receiving room by the gate

Key takeaways

Security for UHNW family offices should treat mail and parcels as an access route, with a named owner, a set location and a written routine, not as an administrative chore.
The FBI said this month that some of the letters sent to election offices contained an unknown substance. Several were intercepted before delivery, which shows the value of screening upstream of the people they were meant for.
In Nebraska, staff did not open a similar envelope and turned it over to the FBI. Not opening a suspicious item is a decision that has to be trained in advance.
In June, a package left in the lobby of an apartment building in Monaco exploded as a family approached the entrance. Unattended items at a residence are a physical security issue, not a mail issue.
Screening works when it happens away from the family, in a defined space, by trained people who know what normal looks like for that household.
Deliveries reveal routines and addresses. Limiting what is delivered to the main residence reduces both the risk and the information leak.
Recommended HNW security teams write the mail procedure down, train the staff who actually receive the items and test it.

What was reported this month

I will stay with what named publications and named officials have said. The investigations are open, and nobody has been charged in connection with the letters as far as the reporting I have read goes.

The election office letters

According to Votebeat, the FBI said on Thursday, October 15, that it was investigating a series of suspicious mailings sent to election officials across the nation. In a statement quoted by the publication, the FBI said that it and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service were investigating mailings sent to various addresses nationwide, including Secretary of State offices and related election offices, and that some of the letters contained an unknown substance.

Votebeat reported that three election officials briefed on the investigation were told more than 100 letters had been sent to people and groups across the country, a list that included at least two U.S. senators and a polling organization. The publication later corrected its headline to make clear that it was unknown how many of those letters went to election officials and how many went to politicians or other recipients.

The details by state are instructive. Officials in Louisiana and Oklahoma said they had received letters containing a powdery white substance. The Wisconsin Elections Commission said it had received a suspicious mail piece containing an unidentified powdery substance and that, after examination, it was deemed not dangerous. In Arizona, the Secretary of State said his office received a letter filled with white powder, which led to the evacuation of the office while hazmat workers cleared the area. In Nebraska, staff did not open a similar envelope and turned it over to the FBI. Ohio, New Hampshire and Washington said law enforcement had intercepted letters bound for their offices, and Pennsylvania said the Postal Service blocked delivery of a suspicious letter.

The Utah interception

Utah News Dispatch reported on October 19 that Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson said in a social media post that on Sunday “our local postal inspector was able to intercept ours and hand it off to the FBI before it could be delivered to my office.” The week before, her office had told the publication that it was in contact with postal employees who were actively monitoring its mail so that a similar letter could be intercepted before it reached the office.

The same report noted that this was not the first time. In September 2024, the FBI found a letter containing white powder addressed to Henderson’s office. A pattern like that matters for any target. Once a person or an office has received one threatening mailing, the chance of another is no longer theoretical, and the routine should change accordingly.

The Monaco package

The mailings this month are not the sole reminder that items left for someone can be dangerous. On June 29, 2026, a package exploded in the lobby of an apartment building in Monaco. The Guardian reported that Monaco’s public prosecutor said a man entered the building, left a package in the lobby and walked away, and that moments later, as three occupants of a ground-floor flat approached the entrance, it exploded. French media identified the three as businessman Vadym Iermolaiev, his wife and their 13-year-old child, all of whom were injured. Monaco’s minister of state said it appeared the family had been specifically targeted and that surveillance footage showed the suspect walking around the area several times while waiting. Four other people were treated for shock and cuts from shattered windows.

That case was not a postal delivery. It was an item placed at the entrance of a residence, where the family would pass it. I include it because the protective lesson is the same: anything that arrives at the home without being expected, verified and handled by someone other than the family is a potential threat, and the place where it sits matters as much as what is inside it.

Why mail and parcels are an access route

When I assess a residence, I walk the perimeter, the gates, the doors and the windows. Then I ask a simple question that often gets a vague answer: how do things get in? People are logged at the gate. Vehicles are logged. Contractors are escorted. But the box from an online retailer, the envelope from a law firm, the flowers from a friend and the gift basket from a business partner often arrive with less scrutiny than the gardener.

There are three reasons I treat that flow as an access route.

First, it reaches the family directly. A letter addressed to the principal by name is designed to be opened by the principal, or by someone close. A box marked for a child is likely to be carried to the child. Unlike a visitor, an item does not need to talk its way past anyone.

Second, it is constant. A busy household can receive dozens of deliveries a week. Volume creates routine, and routine creates the habit of signing, carrying and opening without thinking. That habit is what a hostile sender relies on.

Third, it carries information both ways. What arrives tells an observer what the family buys and when they are home. What the courier sees at the gate tells anyone who asks the courier about cameras, staff, dogs and the layout of the drive. I come back to this point later, because it is where mail security and privacy meet.

What the threat actually looks like

I want to keep this practical and avoid alarm. The great majority of mail and parcels that reach a family are harmless. The aim of a screening routine is not to treat every delivery as a weapon. It is to make sure the rare dangerous item meets a trained person in a safe place, rather than a child in the kitchen.

Threatening letters

The common case is a letter that contains a threat in words, sometimes with a substance meant to frighten. Many such substances turn out to be harmless, as Wisconsin found this month. That does not make the letter harmless. It is a communication from someone who knows the address and wanted the recipient to feel it, and it belongs with your protective intelligence work and with law enforcement.

Substances

Powders, liquids and residues inside an envelope create a medical and evacuation question that the household has to answer in minutes. The response in Arizona, where the office was evacuated while hazmat workers cleared the area, is what professional handling looks like at an office scale. A home needs a scaled version of the same decision made in advance: who leaves, which rooms are closed, who calls emergency services, and who does not touch anything further.

Devices

Explosive devices sent by post or left at a residence are rare. The Monaco case shows what they can do when they reach the entrance where a family walks. I am not going to describe device indicators in detail in a public article. What a family needs to know is simpler: an unexpected package with no clear sender, placed where you would not normally find a delivery, is left alone and reported.

Items that are not dangerous in themselves

Some deliveries are risky because of what they reveal, not what they contain. A gift sent to the house by a stranger confirms that the stranger knows the address and wants you to know it. Repeated deliveries from an unknown sender can be part of a fixation. Packages ordered in the family’s name by someone else can be a test of whether the address is valid. In my work, these items often matter more to a threat assessment than the rare dangerous one.

Security for UHNW family offices: who owns the mail

When I ask who owns the mail in a household, I usually get several answers. The house manager signs for packages. The assistant opens the principal’s letters. The nanny takes in anything for the children. The gate officer accepts couriers after hours. The family office receives business mail at its own address and forwards some of it to the house. Each of those people is doing a reasonable job. Nobody owns the whole flow.

Security for UHNW family offices works when one person or one role is accountable for how mail and parcels move from the street to the family. That person does not have to handle every item. They own the procedure, they train the people who do handle items, and they are the person the security team calls when something looks wrong.

In smaller households, that is often the estate manager. In larger ones, it may sit with the family office operations lead, with the residential security supervisor handling the physical side. What matters is that the role is written down, that it has a deputy for days off, and that everyone who receives deliveries knows who it is.

Mapping the flow before you screen it

Before I recommend any screening measure, I map how items actually arrive. It is usually more complicated than the family thinks.

Postal mail to the residence, delivered to a box at the street or to the gate.
Courier parcels from the major carriers, delivered at the gate, at the door or left at the drive.
Same-day and app-based deliveries, often by drivers who change every time.
Food and grocery deliveries, sometimes ordered by staff, sometimes by teenagers.
Florists, gift services and hand-delivered items from friends, partners and businesses.
Mail and parcels sent to the family office, then forwarded to one or more homes.
Items delivered to second homes, boats and aircraft hangars while the family is away.

For each route, I want to know where the item is handed over, who receives it, where it goes next, who opens it and how long it sits unattended at any point. The weak points usually show up in that last question. A box left at the top of the drive for an afternoon, or an envelope placed on a hall table for the principal to open when they get home, has bypassed every other measure on the property.

Where screening should happen

The principle I apply is distance. Items should be checked as far from the family, and as early in the flow, as the household can manage. The postal inspector in Utah intercepted the letter before it was delivered to the office. That is the principle at its strongest. A private household cannot rely on the postal service doing that for it, but it can apply the same idea at its own scale.

Off-site receiving

For some families, the cleanest option is to stop the bulk of deliveries going to the main residence at all. Business mail goes to the family office. Personal parcels go to a receiving address that is not the home, where staff collect and check them before bringing them in. This reduces both risk and the number of strangers who learn the home address and the gate routine.

A receiving point at the perimeter

Where deliveries do come to the residence, they should stop at the perimeter. A gatehouse, a staff entrance or a small outbuilding can serve as a receiving point. Couriers do not drive to the front door. Items are signed for at the gate and taken to a defined space for checking. That space should be away from living areas, with good light, a clear surface and a door that can be closed.

A screening routine in the family office

At the family office, the same principle applies. Mail is opened in one place, by trained staff, not on the desks of whoever it is addressed to. In my experience, offices that already have a mail room for volume reasons can add a screening step at low cost. Offices that do not should still choose a room and a routine.

Gifts, flowers and hand deliveries

Gifts deserve their own rule, because they are where good manners and good security pull in opposite directions. A family that receives a bouquet from a business partner, a hamper from a charity or a present for a child’s birthday does not want to treat the sender as a suspect. Nor should it. The rule I suggest is not suspicion. It is confirmation.

When a gift arrives, someone confirms with the sender, through a contact the household already has, that they sent it. That takes a short call or message and is usually welcomed as a thank-you. If the sender cannot be confirmed, the gift stays in the receiving room until the security lead has looked at it. Gifts from unknown people go into the log, whatever they contain, because they tell you that someone you do not know has chosen to make contact at the home.

Hand deliveries need the same care. A letter brought to the gate by someone who will not give a name, or left in the mailbox without postage, is a person at your perimeter, not just a piece of paper. Cameras at the delivery point should be checked for that time, and the item treated as suspicious until the security lead says otherwise.

Second homes and the mail that arrives while you are away

Many families I work with have several residences. Mail keeps arriving at each of them whether anyone is there or not. At an empty home, parcels pile up at the gate, letters overflow a box at the street and anyone watching learns that the house is unoccupied. Items left for days are also items that nobody has screened.

For homes that are not occupied, I recommend that postal mail is redirected to the family office or a receiving address, that online orders never default to that home, and that the caretaker or security officer clears anything that does arrive the same day. Our article on high net worth security for empty homes and second homes covers the wider routine for properties that sit empty for weeks at a time.

What the courier sees

I mentioned earlier that deliveries carry information both ways. It is worth spelling out. A courier who delivers to the same estate every week learns where the cameras are, how long it takes for someone to answer the intercom, whether there is a dog, which entrance the staff use and roughly when the family is at home. Couriers are overwhelmingly honest people doing a hard job, and I am not suggesting otherwise. But that knowledge can be asked for, overheard or sold, and the person asking does not have to be the courier.

Moving deliveries to a receiving point at the perimeter, or off the property entirely, limits what any courier can see. It also makes a courier who wants to come further than the gate stand out. If someone in a delivery uniform insists on bringing an item to the front door, or asks questions about the family, staff should decline politely and tell the security lead.

Medical readiness for a substance incident

A suspicious substance is a medical question before it is a security one. Many households already keep a first aid kit and have some staff trained in basic first aid. For a substance incident, the useful additions are simple: a decision about which room is used for opening items so that it can be closed off, a sink nearby for hand washing, a plan for moving people out of the area without passing through it, and a clear rule that the person who handled the item waits for emergency services rather than walking through the house.

Our article on estate medical readiness for UHNW households describes the wider medical plan for a residence. The mail routine should sit inside it, so that the house manager and the security officer know who does what if the worst happens on an ordinary weekday morning.

A walk-through: one ordinary morning

To show how security for UHNW family offices works in practice, here is a hypothetical morning at a household that has the routine in place. It is not a real client and none of the details are drawn from one.

At eight, a courier arrives at the gate with three parcels. The gate officer signs for them without opening the gate, checks them against the expected-delivery list on the tablet and finds two matches: a replacement part for the pool system and a box of school supplies ordered by the nanny. The third box is addressed to the principal by first name alone, with no sender, and is heavier than its size suggests.

The officer takes all three to the receiving room by the staff entrance. The two expected parcels are opened there and carried into the house. The third is left on the table, the door is closed and the officer calls the security lead. The security lead looks at the camera image of the courier and the label, confirms that nobody in the household ordered it and asks the family office whether a business contact might have sent it. Nobody has. The security lead calls the local police non-emergency line for advice, and a decision is made with the family office about how to proceed.

Meanwhile, the family has breakfast. The children go to school on time. The principal is told, briefly, that an unexpected item is being dealt with and that the security lead will update him by lunch. Nobody in the family touched the box, and nobody had to decide anything in a hurry.

In this hypothetical, the box turns out to contain a gift from an old acquaintance who used the wrong address format. The routine still did its job. It put a trained person, a closed room and a clear decision between an unexpected item and the family. If it had been something else, the same steps would have mattered far more.

That is the point of security for UHNW family offices in the mail room. It is not about expecting the worst from every delivery. It is about making sure the household behaves the same way every time, so that the rare dangerous item meets a routine rather than luck.

How a professional program handles mail and parcels

When we build a mail and parcel routine for a family, it is short enough to fit on two pages and specific enough that a new house manager could follow it on day one. These are the parts I consider essential.

Know what is expected

The simplest screening tool is a list of what the household expects. Staff who order items for the family log them. Family members are asked, gently and consistently, to let the house manager know when something is coming, especially items ordered for the children. An expected parcel from a known retailer, matching an order, is low risk. An unexpected item, or one that does not match any order, gets a closer look. This is not technology. It is discipline, and it removes a large share of the uncertainty before anyone looks at a label.

Look before opening

Staff who receive items are trained to look at them before opening them. Is the sender known? Is the address written in an unusual way, with a title or a misspelled name? Is there an unusual weight, smell, stain or sound? Has it been delivered by hand by someone who did not want to be seen? None of these indicators is conclusive on its own. Together, they tell a trained person when to stop.

Stop, isolate, report

When something looks wrong, the instruction is the same every time: do not open it further, do not shake it, do not carry it through the house. Leave it where it is, or in the receiving room if it is already there, close the door, wash your hands, move people away and call the security lead. In Nebraska this month, staff did not open a suspicious envelope and turned it over to the FBI. That is the behavior I want from household staff, and it happens reliably when they have been told that stopping is the right decision and that they will not be criticized for a false alarm.

Escalate to the right people

The security lead decides with the family office whether to call emergency services, local police or federal agencies. In the United States, mail threats involve the Postal Inspection Service, and threats with a substance or a possible device are a matter for emergency services first. I prefer families to make that call early. Delay to avoid embarrassment is the wrong trade.

Preserve and log

A threatening letter is evidence. It should be handled as little as possible, kept in the condition it arrived in, and logged with the date, the delivery route and who touched it. The log matters for the threat assessment too. A second letter from the same sender, or a gift following a letter, changes the picture. Families that keep a simple record of unusual deliveries are better placed to see a pattern early.

Train the people who actually receive things

The weakest link is often the person nobody thought to train: the weekend housekeeper, the temporary assistant, the teenager who answers the gate intercom. A short briefing for everyone who might take in a delivery, refreshed twice a year and whenever staff change, covers a large share of the risk. In larger households, a short practical exercise with a dummy parcel shows whether the routine works or exists on paper.

Home security for high net worth individuals: the delivery at the gate

Mail security and home security for high net worth individuals overlap at the gate. Every courier who arrives is a stranger who has been invited, in a general sense, to approach the property. That is useful cover for anyone who wants to look around.

I recommend that couriers are met at the gate rather than let through, that they are not told whether the family is home, and that staff do not discuss the household with them. Cameras should cover the delivery point with a clear view of faces and vehicles. Items should not be left outside the perimeter for long periods. If the family is away, deliveries should be paused or redirected, because a pile of parcels at a gate tells passers-by more than any social media post.

This connects to our article on home security for high net worth individuals at the door, which covers people who claim to be couriers, police or utility workers. A fake delivery is one of the oldest ways to get a door opened. The receiving point at the perimeter is part of the answer to that problem as well.

Private security for high net worth family members and their mail

Private security for high net worth family members has to account for the fact that family members receive things separately. Teenagers order clothes and electronics. Adult children living at home have their own correspondence. An elderly parent may receive letters that are part of a scam campaign. A spouse may receive gifts at work that follow them home.

I do not suggest reading anyone’s mail. I suggest that everyone in the household knows the routine, that parcels for children go through the same receiving point, and that family members tell the house manager about anything that worries them, including messages that arrive by other channels and are followed by a delivery. The pattern that concerns me is a contact online, then a parcel at the house. That sequence means the sender has made the move from distance to presence.

When the mail is part of a threat campaign

Utah News Dispatch noted that Henderson’s office had received a white powder letter in 2024 as well as this year. Once a family has received one threatening item, the routine should tighten until the security team is satisfied the risk has passed. That means all mail screened off-site for a period, unexpected parcels refused, gifts returned to sender or held, and the threat assessment updated.

Close protection for UHNW families may also step up during that period. If a sender knows the address, the next contact may not come by post. The protective response then covers arrivals, departures, the school run and the principal’s movements, not just the mailbox. Our article on private security for high net worth family members under threat explains how that wider posture is built when a threat names the family or the home.

Family office high net worth individuals security: the office address

Family office high net worth individuals security includes the office itself. A family office address is often public, through company filings, websites or correspondence. It is a natural place for letters intended for the family to arrive. That is useful if the office screens them and harmful if it forwards everything unchecked to the house.

I recommend that the family office is the default address for anything that does not have to go to the home, that it screens before forwarding, and that forwarded items travel with staff rather than by courier where practical. The office should also know which family members have changed their public profile recently, because a new board role, a court case or a media appearance can generate a new wave of mail.

Personal security for high networth individuals at the company address

Personal security for high networth individuals does not stop at the family office. A principal who runs or chairs a company receives mail there too, often more of it, and often from people who are angry about a business decision. Corporate mail rooms in larger companies usually have their own screening. Smaller companies, boutique funds and start-ups often do not, and the principal’s assistant opens everything at a desk next to the principal’s office.

I suggest that the family office and the company agree on a simple rule: items addressed personally to the principal at the company are screened by the company in the same way as the family office would screen them, and anything threatening is shared with the family’s security lead the same day. A threat sent to the office address is still a threat to the person, and the family needs to know about it before the principal drives home.

Technology: what helps and what does not

Families sometimes ask whether they should buy screening equipment. For some, particularly those with a sustained threat or a high public profile, it can make sense, and a qualified provider can advise on what fits the space and the volume. For many households, the gains come from procedure rather than equipment: the receiving point, the expected-delivery list, the closed room and the trained person who knows when to stop.

Cameras at the delivery point, good lighting and a logged intercom help in every case. So does a delivery management system at the family office that records what arrived, from whom and where it went. What does not help is equipment that nobody is trained to use, or a procedure that relies on one person who is away half the year. I would rather see a simple routine followed every day than an expensive one followed occasionally.

Children and the parcels addressed to them

Children receive a surprising amount of mail and parcels: gifts from relatives, items from online games and shops, fan mail for children who have a public profile of their own. They are also the family members least likely to stop and question an unexpected box with their name on it.

I suggest that parcels for children are always opened with an adult present, that unexpected gifts for children are confirmed with the sender like any other gift, and that older children are told, without frightening them, why the household has the routine. Teenagers who understand that a parcel from a stranger means a stranger knows their address are much more likely to mention it. Our article on building a security culture in the household covers how to make routines like this feel normal rather than fearful.

High net worth security services and in-house research and development

Good high net worth security services treat mail screening as a living procedure, not a binder. At MSB Protection we run in-house research and development to counter threats to UHNW clients, and part of that work is tracking how threats arrive at households and offices, including the methods described in public reporting such as this month’s mailings. We use that research to update the routines and the staff training we give families, so that the procedure reflects how hostile senders behave now rather than how they behaved years ago.

That does not mean every household needs scanners or a dedicated mail room. Many do not. What they need is a routine matched to their exposure, owned by a named person and practiced by the people who touch the items.

What recommended HNW security teams do with mail

What recommended HNW security teams do with mail is unglamorous. They map the flow, they move receiving away from the family, they write a short procedure, they train everyone who handles deliveries and they test it. They also connect what arrives in the mail with the rest of the threat picture, so that a strange gift, an online message and a car seen at the gate are understood as one pattern rather than three unrelated events.

What families and family offices can do now

Name one person who owns the mail and parcel routine, with a deputy.
Map every way items reach the family, including second homes and the family office.
Move as much delivery as possible away from the main residence.
Create a receiving point at the perimeter and a closed room for checking items.
Keep a simple list of expected deliveries and ask family members to add to it.
Brief every person who might take in a delivery on stop, isolate and report.
Log unusual items and share the log with the security team.
Pause or redirect deliveries when the family is away.
Review the routine after any threatening contact, by any channel.

Frequently asked questions

Does security for UHNW family offices need to include mail screening?

Yes. Mail and parcels reach the family directly and arrive every day. A short, written routine owned by one person, with screening away from living areas, closes a route that many programs leave open.

What should staff do with a suspicious letter or parcel?

Stop handling it, leave it where it is, close the room, wash their hands, move people away and call the security lead. The security lead then decides with the family office whether to call emergency services and law enforcement.

Is a white powder letter always dangerous?

Not always. Some turn out to be harmless, as Wisconsin found this month. The household should still treat it as dangerous until professionals say otherwise, and it is always a threat communication that belongs in the threat assessment.

Should a family stop deliveries to the home?

Many families benefit from sending the bulk of deliveries to the family office or another receiving address, which reduces both risk and the number of strangers who learn the home routine. Where deliveries continue, they should stop at the perimeter.

How often should the mail routine be reviewed?

At least once a year, whenever key staff change, and immediately after any threatening contact or a change in the family’s public profile.

Bringing the mail into the security plan

The letters sent to election offices this month were stopped, opened safely or handled by trained people in many of the places described in the reporting. That is a credit to the postal inspectors and office staff involved. It is also a reminder that the outcome of a threatening mailing depends on routine, training and distance long before anyone calls for help.

Security for UHNW family offices should give the mail and parcel flow the same attention as the gate, with an owner, a receiving point, a short procedure and people who know when to stop. For the wider program that sits around this, including home security, close protection, travel and the family office trust chain, read our complete 2026 overview of high net worth security. If you would like a review of how deliveries reach your family, our security assessment covers it, and our residential security teams can run the routine day to day. You can contact us for a confidential conversation.

Sources

About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.

Security for UHNW Family Offices: Mail and Parcel Screening