One of the mistakes people make in executive protection is waiting for an unwanted communication to contain the perfect threat before taking it seriously.

Real cases are rarely that clean.

Sometimes the concern is persistence.

Frequency.

Late-night calls.

Changing phone numbers.

Attempts to continue contact after the recipient does not engage.

Contact spreading from the principal to relatives.

Information that suggests the person knows more about the family than expected.

None of those things, standing alone, automatically means somebody is preparing physical violence.

But they can change the protective picture.

That is what makes the federal cyberstalking case involving podcaster and former political adviser Katie Miller worth examining from an executive-protection standpoint.

On October 1, 2026, federal prosecutors in Massachusetts announced the indictment of John Anthony Proia III, 41, of Waltham, Massachusetts, on one count of cyberstalking.

Prosecutors allege that between August 3 and September 23 he contacted the alleged victim at least 40 times through telephone calls, text messages and voicemails. The Justice Department says some communications occurred multiple times in one day and sometimes late at night. The government further alleges that the communications came from an ever-changing series of unfamiliar telephone numbers generated through Voice over Internet Protocol applications capable of supplying new numbers and obscuring the user’s identity.

The allegations did not remain limited to the alleged victim.

Prosecutors say disturbing messages were also sent to telephone numbers associated with her parents.

The Justice Department did not identify the alleged victim by name in its announcement, but Reuters and the Associated Press identified her as Katie Miller, a conservative podcaster and former Trump administration official who is married to senior White House official Stephen Miller. Reuters reported that Proia pleaded not guilty at his initial federal court appearance.

The charges are allegations.

The defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

And the publicly available information reviewed for this article does not establish that he physically approached Miller, attempted to enter a residence or was preparing an act of physical violence.

Those limitations matter.

Professional protective intelligence should not turn harassment into an assassination plot simply because the behavior is disturbing.

It should also not dismiss persistent unwanted behavior simply because no physical approach has occurred.

The job is to understand the pattern, identify what has changed, protect the wider family and decide whether the protective posture needs to change.

Key takeaways for executive protection and UHNW family security

• Persistence matters. Repeated unwanted contact over time can carry more protective significance than one isolated offensive message.
• Behavior matters more than labels. I want to know what the person is actually doing, how frequently and whether the behavior is changing.
• Protection extends beyond the principal. Contact with parents, spouses, children, assistants or other relatives can expand the security problem.
• A direct threat is not required before documenting concerning behavior. Protective intelligence works best when information is captured before the situation becomes urgent.
• Digital anonymity complicates recognition. New VoIP numbers, accounts and platforms can make repeated contact appear to come from different people.
• Preserve original communications. Messages, voicemails, screenshots, call records and dates may become important later.
• One reporting channel matters. The assistant, spouse, parents, residential team and driver should not each hold separate pieces of the same pattern.
• Digital and physical security overlap. Contact information, addresses, schedules and relatives’ identities can support continued unwanted attention.
• Residential security should be reassessed when the behavior changes. Digital harassment does not automatically require guards, but greater knowledge of the family or movement toward physical proximity can change the response.
• Do not independently confront or investigate the person. Protect the family, preserve evidence and coordinate with legal counsel and law enforcement where appropriate.
• Protection should remain proportionate. The objective is informed prevention, not turning every unpleasant communication into an emergency.
• The program should be scalable. If behavior escalates tomorrow, the family should already know how additional protection will be activated.

What happened in the Katie Miller cyberstalking case

According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts, Proia was indicted by a federal grand jury on October 1 and arrested that afternoon.

The Justice Department alleges that the conduct took place during August and September 2026 and involved repeated contact with a former political adviser and prominent Republican figure living near Washington, D.C., who is married to a high-level federal government employee.

The government says the alleged communications included calls, text messages and voicemails from changing unfamiliar numbers.

Prosecutors allege that some calls were answered and that others resulted in voicemails. The government characterized the caller’s tone as menacing and said the communications frequently contained expletives and disturbing statements about the alleged victim and her husband.

The indictment alleges at least 40 contacts between August 3 and September 23.

That time period matters from a protective-intelligence standpoint.

This was not described by prosecutors as one impulsive message.

The alleged conduct continued over roughly seven weeks.

The repeated use of new numbers matters operationally

According to prosecutors, the telephone numbers used in the alleged communications were obtained through applications that provide free numbers for internet-based calls and messages.

The government says those applications can allow a user to obscure identity and generate additional numbers easily.

That creates a simple problem for the recipient.

Blocking one number may not end the contact.

The next message may arrive from another.

Then another.

Then a new account.

Eventually, the communications can look fragmented unless somebody is recording them centrally.

This is why I do not want a stalking-related security program organized around a list of blocked telephone numbers.

I want it organized around the behavior.

Caller ID does not necessarily establish identity

This is useful context beyond the criminal case itself.

The Federal Trade Commission notes that internet-based calling and caller-ID technology can allow callers to use changing or spoofed numbers and warns that the number displayed on a phone cannot always be trusted as proof of who is calling. The FTC also notes that blocking technology can reduce some unwanted calls but will not necessarily stop every unwanted communication.

For protective intelligence, the lesson is straightforward.

Do not organize the incident history solely around the telephone number.

Look at the language.

Timing.

Frequency.

Subject matter.

Knowledge demonstrated.

Targets contacted.

And any recurring behavioral characteristics.

The contact with parents is particularly relevant

The allegations say messages were sent to telephone numbers associated with the alleged victim’s parents.

That represents an important change in the protection environment.

The contact is no longer occurring only through the original person’s phone.

Now relatives have become part of the communication pattern.

From a professional protection standpoint, I want to understand what that means without immediately assuming why it occurred.

Was the purpose simply to harass?

Was the sender trying to increase emotional pressure?

Was he attempting to reach the principal through people around her?

How were the parents’ telephone numbers obtained?

What other family information is publicly available?

Have any other relatives received contact?

Those questions become relevant even when the motive remains unclear.

The federal cyberstalking law itself recognizes family impact

Federal stalking law, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, addresses courses of conduct using interstate or electronic communications that can place a person in fear of death or serious bodily injury or cause substantial emotional distress. The statutory language also expressly recognizes potential fear or harm involving immediate family members, spouses and intimate partners.

That is a legal fact rather than a protective methodology.

But it reinforces something protection professionals already need to account for operationally:

A stalking-related concern can expand outward from the principal.

The family becomes part of the protective environment

When unwanted attention begins reaching relatives, I stop looking only at the principal’s phone.

I look at the family network.

Parents.

Spouse.

Children.

Siblings where relevant.

Assistants.

Drivers.

Household employees.

Close friends who may receive contact.

The point is not to put every relative under protection.

The point is to understand whether the behavior is widening.

Different family members may have completely different exposure

The principal may already have professional security.

A parent may not.

The principal may have a private telephone number.

A relative’s number may be readily available through public databases.

The principal may live behind controlled access.

A family member may live at a residence with no professional security at all.

The principal may have staff screening communications.

A parent may answer every unfamiliar number personally.

When contact spreads to relatives, I want to understand those differences.

Protective intelligence starts by organizing the information

The first operational problem is frequently not lack of information.

It is that the information is scattered everywhere.

The principal has messages on one phone.

The parents have texts on two others.

The executive assistant has an email.

A social-media account receives a direct message.

The residential team heard about a strange call but never documented it.

Everyone has a piece.

Nobody has the timeline.

That is a weak position.

I want one reporting process

The exact system can vary.

Security director.

Executive protection lead.

Family-office security manager.

A secure internal reporting platform.

The important thing is that someone has responsibility for assembling the complete picture.

Every relevant event should not have to be remembered independently by five family members.

Build a chronology

A useful incident chronology can reveal things that individual messages do not.

Date.

Time.

Communication method.

Number or account used.

Recipient.

Exact or summarized content.

Whether the person responded.

Whether another family member received contact around the same time.

Whether anything happened physically that day.

That makes change visible.

Frequency is one part of the pattern

One communication.

Then another three weeks later.

That is one pattern.

Several communications a day is another.

Late-night calls add different context.

Continued contact after numbers are blocked adds another.

None independently proves violent intent.

But the protection team should know the pattern is changing.

Channel switching matters

Someone begins with email.

Then calls.

Then texts.

Then creates new social-media accounts.

Then contacts the executive assistant.

Then a parent.

The individual communications may look different.

The behavior may be one continuous effort to maintain access.

This is why protective intelligence should follow the person or behavior where possible rather than treating each communication channel as a separate incident.

Contact expansion matters

The original person stops responding.

The unwanted contact shifts to the spouse.

Then parents.

Then staff.

Then professional associates.

Again, I am not assigning motive automatically.

I am identifying a change.

The person’s efforts to reach the protected individual are expanding.

That deserves assessment.

Specific knowledge matters

Ten angry messages containing publicly available commentary may have one level of significance.

One communication containing accurate nonpublic information may create a different concern.

The principal’s private address.

A child’s school.

A travel itinerary.

A hotel.

A private telephone number.

A meeting that was not public.

I want to know not only what the person said.

I want to know what the person appears to know.

Movement toward the physical environment matters

This is a major escalation question.

Communication remains entirely remote.

That is one situation.

The person begins contacting household staff.

Different.

The person sends material to the residence.

Different again.

The person appears at a workplace or public event.

Now physical proximity enters the picture.

The person appears near the residence.

That changes the assessment further.

Protective intelligence should track direction, not just volume.

The public record in the Miller case does not establish physical proximity

That is important.

The current DOJ announcement describes calls, messages, voicemails and communications involving the alleged victim’s parents. Reuters and AP reported the federal charge and not-guilty plea, but the public reporting reviewed for this article does not establish that Proia physically approached Miller or her family.

That means I would not write this case as though a physical attack had been underway.

The operational lesson is about persistent communication and family expansion.

Persistent communication does not equal inevitable violence

This deserves its own section because protection teams can become overly reactive.

Someone can send dozens of disturbing communications and never physically approach.

Another person may send very few communications and eventually appear in person.

Message volume alone does not give us a reliable prediction.

I care about the complete behavioral picture.

Do not reduce the assessment to whether there is an explicit death threat

This is the opposite mistake.

People ask:

“Did he actually threaten to kill her?”

That is a relevant question.

It is not the only question.

What is the persistence?

Is the person circumventing blocks?

Are relatives being contacted?

Has the person demonstrated private knowledge?

Has physical proximity changed?

Is there evidence of surveillance?

Are attempts being made to access the principal through staff?

Threat assessment is larger than searching messages for one sentence.

Preserve the original evidence

I do not want family members deleting disturbing messages simply because they do not want to see them anymore.

I understand the instinct.

But if the situation is becoming a security concern, the original communication may be important.

Voicemail.

Text message.

Email.

Direct message.

Call log.

Account name.

Telephone number.

Timestamp.

Photograph.

Envelope.

Package.

The FBI’s current threat-intimidation information similarly advises recipients of electronic threats not to delete them and to preserve message information and other electronic evidence for law enforcement.

Preserve before blocking when circumstances allow

Blocking may be entirely appropriate.

But if a new communication appears and the family is already managing an active case, I want the relevant evidence captured first when doing so is safe and practical.

A screenshot alone may not preserve every useful detail.

The original message may contain time information, account information or other data important to investigators.

The protection team should coordinate evidence handling with law enforcement and legal counsel when a case is active.

Do not reply impulsively

Repeated unwanted contact puts emotional pressure on people.

Family members may want to:

argue;

explain;

threaten legal action;

tell the person to stop;

mock them;

or find out what they want.

I do not want five different family members improvising five different communication strategies.

Once a situation reaches the point of professional security involvement, communication should be deliberate.

One communication strategy is better than five

Legal counsel may want a specific boundary communicated.

Law enforcement may prefer no response.

A platform may require particular reporting steps.

The circumstances determine the approach.

The larger point is that the principal, spouse, parents and assistants should not each decide independently how to engage.

Family members should not investigate the sender

Do not turn relatives into amateur detectives.

Do not have the executive assistant begin calling unfamiliar numbers back.

Do not have a parent create a fake social-media account to engage the person.

Do not send the driver to find someone’s address.

Do not initiate a physical confrontation.

Protective personnel should protect.

Law enforcement investigates criminal conduct.

Cyberstalking can quickly become a privacy problem

If somebody knows how to reach the principal and both parents, I want to understand what other information about the family is readily available.

Addresses.

Telephone numbers.

Email addresses.

Relatives.

Children.

Employers.

Properties.

Vehicles.

Social-media profiles.

The objective is not to assume the person possesses all of it.

The objective is to understand what could be obtained easily.

Data-broker exposure matters for California UHNW families

For California residents, the state’s Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform, known as DROP, now provides a practical privacy tool. The California Privacy Protection Agency says registered data brokers have been required since August 1, 2026 to access DROP at least once every 45 days and process qualifying deletion requests. A California consumer can submit one verifiable request directing registered data brokers to delete qualifying personal information, subject to legal exceptions.

That will not erase a family from the internet.

It will not remove every government record.

It will not delete news articles or every social-media reference.

But it can reduce unnecessary commercial circulation of personal information.

For an UHNW family dealing with persistent unwanted attention, that is worth considering as one component of a broader privacy program.

Review relatives’ exposure too

The principal may already use professional privacy services.

The parents may not.

A spouse may have an older public telephone number.

An adult child may use a professional profile containing location information.

One relative’s exposed data can provide another path into the family.

That does not mean everybody must disappear from public life.

It means the review should extend beyond one person when behavior already has.

Social media can reveal family relationships

A person’s relatives are often easy to identify through photographs, tags, comments and public profiles.

Once the connection is known, other information may become easier to find.

That is why I want UHNW family privacy assessed as a network rather than only as the principal’s Google results.

Residential security should be reviewed when digital behavior changes

One disturbing message does not automatically justify 24/7 guards.

That would not be a proportionate response.

But if communication becomes more persistent, expands to relatives or demonstrates increasing knowledge of the family, I want to review residential security.

Can the residence be identified publicly?

Can somebody approach without being noticed?

Is visitor access controlled?

Are deliveries managed?

Are cameras useful at night?

Does somebody respond to alarms?

Do household employees know not to disclose occupancy?

What happens if an unfamiliar person appears at the gate?

The residential team needs the relevant intelligence

If the family is experiencing persistent unwanted contact, the residential protector should not be completely unaware.

The protector does not necessarily need every offensive message.

They need enough information to perform the job.

Is there a known person’s name?

Photograph?

Vehicle?

Known location?

History of attempting physical contact?

Has the behavior remained entirely remote?

What should happen if someone arrives asking for the principal?

That is operational information.

Household staff need simple instructions

Do not tell an unknown caller whether the principal is home.

Do not provide travel details.

Do not provide family telephone numbers.

Do not confirm children’s schedules.

Do not explain security arrangements.

Report unusual questions.

That is enough for most employees.

They do not need to receive the entire threat file.

Executive assistants are often the first people to see escalation

An assistant may receive:

increasing meeting requests;

emails after the principal stops responding;

gifts;

requests for private telephone numbers;

calls claiming an emergency;

messages directed through colleagues;

or attempts to obtain itinerary information.

Assistants should have a low-friction reporting channel.

Drivers need to know what to report too

A stalking-related concern does not always remain online.

The driver may notice:

the same vehicle repeatedly;

someone near the office;

a person photographing the principal;

someone waiting near a recurring pickup location;

or somebody asking whether the principal is inside the vehicle.

The driver should report what occurred.

Not decide whether the person is a stalker.

The executive protection detail needs the complete pattern

A mobile protector may never see the messages.

The executive assistant may never see the gate.

The parents may never see the vehicle.

That is why all relevant pieces need somewhere to meet.

The protection team should be able to answer:

What started first?

How often is contact occurring?

Has frequency increased?

Have new channels appeared?

Are more family members involved?

Has nonpublic information appeared?

Has there been physical proximity?

What did law enforcement say?

That is the protective picture.

Do not over-share the threat internally

Family offices can overcorrect.

A threat appears and suddenly the emails, screenshots and subject’s name are sent across a large staff list.

That can create:

gossip;

confusion;

unnecessary fear;

and additional exposure.

I want need-to-know distribution.

The principal should not become the incident manager

This is important.

Persistent harassment is already disruptive.

The principal should not also have to:

catalog every message;

brief every protector;

call every relative;

coordinate lawyers;

explain the situation to household staff;

manage police contact;

and decide staffing.

A well-designed protection program takes that work away from the principal.

Parents and relatives need a simple plan

If the unwanted contact reaches relatives, I want them to know:

Who do I notify?

Should I answer?

What should I preserve?

What should I not post?

What do I do if someone appears physically?

Who do I call in an emergency?

Simple instructions.

Not a 30-page security briefing.

Children require even more care

If children are connected to a stalking concern, the adults carry the burden.

I do not want a child turned into a junior security officer.

Protective adjustments may occur around:

school pickup;

drivers;

sports;

social media;

and authorized adults.

But the communication with the child should remain age-appropriate.

School information deserves particular control

Schools are naturally predictable environments.

Same times.

Same entrances.

Same activities.

If the threat picture meaningfully changes, school-related exposure should be reviewed carefully and discreetly.

That does not automatically mean placing obvious security around a child.

Often the strongest improvements involve communication and pickup procedures.

Travel can change a stalking-related threat picture

Travel may reduce exposure to one location while creating another.

Airports.

Hotels.

Public events.

Transportation providers.

A travel security program should understand relevant stalking information before the movement begins.

Again, relevant.

Not every disturbing text needs to be sent to a hotel security manager.

Public events may require a different posture

A podcaster, executive, entertainer or public figure may appear at scheduled events that are advertised well in advance.

If unwanted contact is becoming more persistent, those events deserve review.

Is the location public?

Is registration controlled?

Can someone wait outside?

How does the principal arrive?

How do they leave?

What happens if an unwanted person appears?

The objective is not automatically to cancel.

The objective is to understand exposure.

Law enforcement liaison should be organized

Once authorities are involved, I want one designated security contact maintaining continuity.

Who is the investigator?

What case number applies?

What evidence has already been provided?

What new events should be reported immediately?

What information can law enforcement share?

What instructions have been provided?

That prevents five relatives from separately calling different agencies with partial information.

The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force made the arrest in this case

The Justice Department said Proia was arrested by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force and that the matter is being prosecuted by an Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the National Security Unit in Massachusetts.

That is a fact about this particular prosecution.

It does not mean ordinary cyberstalking cases are terrorism cases.

Nor should a private protection program attach that label to conduct simply because the allegations are disturbing.

Protective personnel should not try to replace investigators

The private team has plenty to do.

Protect the principal.

Preserve evidence.

Reduce exposure.

Organize information.

Control residential access.

Plan movements.

Coordinate family members.

Support law enforcement.

That is enough.

Trying to personally identify, track or confront the subject can make the situation worse.

Escalation criteria should be defined in advance

When does the program add protection?

I want the answer before the next event.

Possible triggers for reassessment can include:

• material increases in communication frequency;
• new communication platforms;
• contact spreading to additional relatives;
• communications containing accurate private information;
• attempts to reach household or professional staff;
• physical deliveries to private locations;
• appearance at a principal-related location;
• repeated appearances across several locations;
• evidence of surveillance;
• attempts to bypass access controls;
• or new information from law enforcement.

Those are not automatic proof of violent intent.

They are reasons to reassess.

The protection response can scale gradually

Level one may simply be:

documentation;

privacy review;

law-enforcement reporting;

and staff awareness.

Then the behavior changes.

Maybe residential procedures tighten.

Additional advance work occurs.

A driver becomes part of movements.

Then something else changes.

Temporary executive protection is added.

Or residential coverage increases.

Or an event receives additional personnel.

The response should follow the developing facts.

Do not leave protection permanently elevated without review

The opposite matters too.

Once extra security is added, decide when it will be reassessed.

Has contact stopped?

Why?

Has law enforcement acted?

Has a court imposed restrictions?

Has the subject moved away?

Has behavior shifted?

Does the underlying vulnerability remain?

Protection can decrease when the risk supports decreasing it.

Time passing by itself is not enough

“Nothing happened for three months.”

Useful information.

Not always the complete answer.

I want to know whether the person stopped voluntarily, lost access, became subject to legal action or shifted tactics.

Context matters.

A security assessment should look at the entire family system

When persistent harassment reaches the point of a professional security assessment, I am looking at more than the phone.

Principal.

Spouse.

Children.

Parents if relevant.

Residences.

Public information.

Executive assistants.

Drivers.

Travel.

Social media.

Access control.

Protective intelligence.

Existing security personnel.

The problem may have started digitally.

The solution can involve several protective layers.

What families and family offices can review now

Create one reporting channel

Everyone who may receive relevant contact should know where to send it.

Preserve original communications

Do not rely only on memory or manually rewritten notes.

Build one chronology

Put messages, calls and related events into one timeline.

Track recipients

Principal.

Spouse.

Parents.

Assistants.

Other staff.

Expansion matters.

Track communication channels

Calls.

Texts.

Email.

Social media.

Mail.

Packages.

Review public family information

Search names, addresses, phone numbers and family relationships from an outsider’s perspective.

Consider California DROP

For California families, the state platform can reduce qualifying data-broker exposure through a single deletion request covering registered brokers, subject to legal exceptions.

Review residential security

If behavior becomes more specific or expands, make sure the home environment can recognize and manage an unwanted approach.

Brief household staff narrowly

Give them procedures, not unnecessary threat details.

Review children’s information

School, activities, social media and pickup authorization.

Review parents and other close relatives

If contact has already reached them, they belong in the privacy and communication review.

Review public events

Know which upcoming movements are advertised and what protective coverage exists.

Establish one law-enforcement liaison

Keep reporting consistent.

Define escalation criteria

Know what changes would justify more security.

Define reassessment dates

Do not allow heightened measures to continue indefinitely without review.

How MSB Protection approaches stalking-related protective intelligence

At MSB Protection, I approach persistent unwanted contact through an intelligence-led, risk-based process.

I do not begin by calling every unwanted message a threat.

I begin with the behavior.

What happened?

When?

How often?

Through what channel?

Did the person change numbers or accounts?

Did the behavior continue after access was blocked?

Did the contact expand to relatives?

Did the person demonstrate private knowledge?

Did anything move from digital communication into the physical environment?

Has law enforcement developed additional information?

What vulnerabilities exist around the family?

Then I look at the protective measures.

That may involve:

• protective intelligence;
• executive protection;
• residential security;
• security assessments;
• travel security;
• privacy review;
• family-office procedures;
• law-enforcement coordination;
• or temporary additional staffing.

The measures follow the information.

I want the system to catch escalation without manufacturing it

This is the balance.

If security assumes every disturbing message will become violence, the program becomes fear-driven.

If security dismisses everything until somebody appears at the gate, the program becomes reactive.

I want disciplined middle ground.

Observe.

Preserve.

Document.

Compare.

Assess.

Respond proportionately.

Frequently asked questions about cyberstalking and executive protection

What happened in the Katie Miller cyberstalking case?

Federal prosecutors allege that John Anthony Proia III of Waltham, Massachusetts, contacted a former political adviser at least 40 times between August 3 and September 23, 2026 through calls, texts and voicemails sent from changing telephone numbers. The Justice Department also alleges that disturbing messages were sent to phone numbers associated with the alleged victim’s parents. Reuters and AP identified the alleged victim as Katie Miller.

Has John Anthony Proia III been convicted?

No. He has been charged with one count of cyberstalking, pleaded not guilty and is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

Did prosecutors say he physically approached Katie Miller?

The publicly available DOJ announcement and reporting reviewed for this article describe electronic and telephone communications. They do not establish that Proia physically approached Miller or her family.

Why is this case relevant to UHNW executive protection?

Because the allegations illustrate how persistent unwanted contact can spread beyond the principal to family members and involve changing communication methods. Those are issues family offices and protective teams need processes to recognize and document.

Does repeated unwanted contact mean somebody will become violent?

No. Frequency alone does not establish violent intent. The protection team should evaluate persistence, behavior changes, specificity, knowledge, physical proximity and other corroborating information.

Does a communication need to contain a direct death threat before security should document it?

No. Protective intelligence should preserve potentially relevant behavior early enough that a pattern can be recognized later.

What makes persistent communication more concerning?

Factors that may justify closer review include increasing frequency, circumventing blocks, using multiple channels, contacting family or staff, demonstrating private knowledge and moving toward physical locations associated with the principal.

Are VoIP numbers difficult to block?

Individual numbers can often be blocked, but services can permit users to generate additional numbers. The DOJ alleges that changing VoIP numbers were used in this case.

Can caller ID be trusted?

Not completely. The FTC warns that callers can spoof the number or name displayed by caller ID.

Should a victim block unwanted calls?

Blocking can reduce unwanted contact, and the FTC describes call-blocking and call-labeling tools as useful options. In an active stalking or threat case, however, evidence preservation and communication strategy should also be considered with security, legal counsel and law enforcement.

Should threatening messages be deleted?

No when they may be relevant to an active security or law-enforcement matter. The FBI recommends preserving electronic threats and associated message information for investigators.

What information should be recorded?

Date, time, communication method, number or account used, recipient, relevant content and any associated event. Preserve the original message whenever possible.

Why should family members report communications?

Because contact directed at different family members may form one larger pattern. Security cannot connect incidents it never receives.

Should parents or relatives respond to the sender?

They should follow the agreed communication strategy established with the protection team, legal counsel and law enforcement rather than improvising individual responses.

Should executive assistants be included in protective intelligence?

Yes. Assistants often receive meeting requests, gifts, calls and emails that may show changes in unwanted attention before the physical-security team sees anything.

Should household staff know the subject’s entire history?

Usually not. Most staff need practical instructions such as not disclosing occupancy or schedules and reporting unusual inquiries. Sensitive intelligence should remain need-to-know.

Does cyberstalking justify residential security?

Sometimes, but not automatically. Residential measures should follow the assessed circumstances. Increased private knowledge, physical proximity, surveillance or attempts to approach the residence can materially change the decision.

What should residential security do if an unwanted person appears?

Follow established access-control and response procedures, protect the family, document what occurred and coordinate with law enforcement where appropriate. Personnel should not create unnecessary confrontations simply to investigate the individual.

Does executive protection include digital threats?

Professional executive protection should understand digital behavior when it affects physical safety, movements, family exposure or the principal’s ability to operate normally.

Is protective intelligence the same as cybersecurity?

No. Cybersecurity protects systems, accounts and data. Protective intelligence evaluates information and behavior relevant to the safety of the principal and family. The disciplines overlap when compromised digital information affects physical security.

What is California DROP?

DROP is California’s Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform. California residents can submit a single qualifying deletion request covering registered data brokers, subject to statutory exceptions. Registered brokers began processing requests through the system in August 2026.

Will DROP remove all personal information from the internet?

No. It applies to qualifying data held by registered data brokers and does not erase every public record, news story, social-media page or other lawful source.

Should children be included in a stalking-related security review?

If the changing threat picture could affect them, yes. The review may include privacy, school pickup, drivers and public information while keeping the child’s involvement age-appropriate.

What should trigger increased executive protection?

Potential triggers can include increasing persistence, contact spreading to family or staff, private information appearing in communications, physical deliveries, unwanted appearances, suspected surveillance, access attempts or new information from law enforcement.

Does increased protection need to be permanent?

No. Protection should be reassessed as the behavior and intelligence picture change.

Why is one reporting system so important?

Because family members and staff can each receive one piece of a developing pattern. Centralized reporting allows security to compare those pieces instead of evaluating them in isolation.

Can a family office manage cyberstalking without involving the principal in every detail?

Often, yes. A well-managed protective program can preserve evidence, coordinate authorities and adjust procedures while reducing the amount of operational burden placed directly on the principal.

When should law enforcement be contacted?

Threats, stalking behavior, criminal harassment, unwanted physical approaches and other serious conduct may warrant law-enforcement involvement depending on the circumstances. An established security liaison can help organize evidence and communication.

What federal law covers cyberstalking?

Federal stalking law is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Depending on the facts, it addresses certain courses of conduct involving interstate or electronic communications intended to kill, injure, harass, intimidate or place a person under surveillance and that produce specified fear, injury or substantial emotional distress.

Was the FBI involved in the Katie Miller case?

Yes. The Justice Department said the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested Proia. The charge remains an allegation.

Final thoughts: persistent harassment becomes a family-security problem when the behavior expands

The most useful lesson from the Katie Miller case is not that repeated unwanted communication automatically predicts physical violence.

It does not.

The useful lesson is that persistent behavior creates information.

Forty alleged contacts are different from one.

Repeated calls late at night provide context.

Generating additional numbers to continue communication provides context.

Contacting a person’s parents provides context.

None of those facts alone tells us exactly what will happen next.

Together, they give the protection team something to assess.

That is what protective intelligence is supposed to do.

Recognize the pattern before the principal has to manage it personally.

Preserve evidence before it disappears.

Connect communications received by different members of the family.

Understand whether the person appears to know private information.

Watch for movement from digital contact toward the physical environment.

Review the residence when the facts justify it.

Control sensitive information.

Coordinate with authorities.

Increase protection when the behavior changes.

And avoid turning unsupported assumptions into facts.

For high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth families, stalking and persistent harassment cannot be treated as purely a communications problem.

The phone connects to the principal.

The principal connects to the family.

The family connects to residences.

Residences connect to household staff.

The family office connects to schedules and travel.

The driver connects to movement.

The executive protection detail sees the public environment.

All of those pieces can become relevant.

The objective is not to surround everyone with security because an unpleasant message arrived.

The objective is to have a system capable of recognizing when unpleasant communication is becoming something more.

That requires disciplined reporting.

Good documentation.

Protective intelligence.

Privacy.

Residential security.

Professional executive protection when justified.

And the ability to scale the program as the facts change.

That is how persistent harassment should be handled inside a professional protection program.

Sources

• U.S. Department of Justice
• Associated Press
• Reuters

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About Michael Braun

Michael Braun is a former Special Unit Operator, former Manager at Gavin de Becker & Associates, and Founder & CEO of MSB Protection, an executive protection and residential security firm serving high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth clients.

Braun has built his career at the intersection of specialized protective operations, executive protection, residential security, protective intelligence, and security risk management. His experience spans special-unit operations, leadership within Gavin de Becker & Associates, and the development and oversight of private protection programs within demanding UHNW environments.

He has been recognized by The Top 100 Magazine as a leading CEO in the private security field and is the subject of an upcoming Marquis Who’s Who feature highlighting his leadership and contributions to the profession.

Today, Braun is recognized for his work in executive protection, UHNW estate security, residential protection, protective intelligence, adversarial security assessments, and security auditing throughout Beverly Hills and Southern California.

His work focuses on moving private security beyond simply “providing a body” and toward intelligence-led, risk-based protection programs designed to identify vulnerabilities before an adversary can exploit them.

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Looking for Executive Protection or Residential Security Services?

If you are a high-net-worth or ultra-high-net-worth individual, family office, estate manager, chief of staff, or executive in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, Malibu or Southern California, MSB Protection provides executive protection, residential security, 24/7 protection, protective intelligence, medical-readiness planning, and security risk management.

We evaluate the complete security environment, from threat exposure and residential vulnerabilities to personnel, technology, procedures, protective intelligence, and emergency response, and build a program around the risks that actually exist.

Contact us for a confidential consultation or message us at +1 (805) 285-2807.